

Also by Charles J. Esdaile
THE SPANISH ARMY IN THE PENINSULAR WAR

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The Duke of Wellington and the Command of the Spanish Army, 1812-14

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Preface

In 1983 the papers of the first Duke of Wellington were deposited at the University of Southampton. In order to promote the use of this collection it was decided to establish the Post-Doctoral Fellowship of which the author has been the incumbent, and this book the result.

So why another book on the Duke of Wellington? After all, there are few figures of nineteenth-century British history who have attracted such attention: as the Duke himself complained, 'I have been much exposed to authors.' His career has been the subject of at least three major biographies in this century alone, his military campaigns have been refought *ad infinitum*, and various aspects of his life treated to detailed thematic analysis. Most recently Neville Thompson has published a fine study of Wellington's statesmanship which also sheds much light on his enigmatic character, whilst Paddy Griffith has edited an interesting collection of essays on his generalship. Yet, for all that, certain aspects of the Duke's career remain relatively unknown, one of these being his tenure of the command of the Spanish army between 1812 and 1814. A glance at previous Wellingtonia will reveal that this has received no more than a passing mention, and yet control of the Spaniards came to be regarded by the Duke as a *sine qua non* for the ejection of the French from the Peninsula. An important object of British strategy long before 1812, the command also became a serious bone of contention, and continued to poison relations between the allies even when it was finally conceded by the Spaniards. So severe were the tensions provoked by Wellington's appointment, in fact, that at one point the Anglo-Spanish alliance seemed to be on the brink of collapse.

Important though it is, none of this has received much attention. Cynics might argue that the answer is that the story is less than creditable: Wellington himself can be seen to have adopted tactics that were as clumsy as they were counter-productive, whilst the behaviour of his troops was such as to cause deep resentment

amongst the Spaniards. To paraphrase Sir Arthur Bryant, the Peninsular army's readiness to lark may indeed have been an index of its readiness to fight, but when its practical jokes – not to mention drunken savagery – were directed at the inhabitants, and, above all, the Catholic religion, the effect on inter-allied relations was distinctly deleterious. The problem, of course, was not one-sided, for the Spaniards were all too often xenophobic and overproud, but the fact remains that the British troops did little to lessen their commander's difficulties. Unpalatable though the facts may be, there are also practical reasons why the story of Wellington's command of the Spanish army should have gone untold. In the first place, its understanding required a knowledge of Spanish politics that was often unavailable to historians writing from a British point of view. At the same time, much damage was also done by the fact that the published editions of Wellington's correspondence – the source used for much of the previous work on the Duke – omitted the numerous Spanish and Portuguese documents contained in his papers, without which it would have been impossible to write this study.

If previous work on the Duke of Wellington has left a gap which justifies this book, the present study also provides an interesting case-study of the problems faced by a coalition general. Although the Duke may not have handled his Spanish allies with all the finesse that was required, he may also be seen to have been in an unenviable position. Determined to make something of the Spanish army, his chances of success were constantly undermined by the desire of Cabinet Ministers and commercial interests alike to obtain a measure of free trade with the Spanish empire, their efforts serving only to inflame hispanic opinion against the Duke. With domestic requirements in conflict with the dictates of the situation in the field, the need for some form of strategic co-ordination was already becoming clear a century before the First World War finally made it a necessity.

In writing a work of analysis, the author has for obvious reasons been unable to dwell on the details of military operations. For further details the reader is referred to Oman, failing which the works of Glover, Gates and Weller will also be found to be helpful primers. Of these, the most useful is undoubtedly that of David Gates, in that it is the only English-language, single-volume history of the war to pay due attention to the Spanish struggle.

So far as usage is concerned, all punctuation and spelling has

been modernised, except in the case of the titles of books, pamphlets and newspapers. Place names are as they appear on modern maps, and have where necessary been hispanised, except where to do so would sound over-pretentious (thus, La Coruña and Zaragoza, but Seville and Navarre). Noblemen and peers are always referred to by their title (thus, the Conde del Abisbal, and not Henry or Enrique O'Donnell). Wellington himself is always referred to as such, even though he did not receive his title until 1809. All Spanish money has been converted to *reales de vellón*, of which there were about eighty-nine to the pound sterling in 1813. Four *reales* made one *peseta*, and twenty *reales* made one dollar or *peso*.

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Acknowledgements

My debts are manifold. As ever, I owe my warmest thanks to my *ci-devant* supervisor, Martin Blinkhorn, who from the University of Lancaster has continued to provide me with all the help and support at his disposal. At Southampton, Professor Colin Platt, Professor Paul Smith and Professor Henry Ettinghausen have all treated me with the greatest generosity and patience, whilst I should also like to thank the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Gordon Higginson, and the Librarian, Mr Bernard Naylor, for the great encouragement which they have given me during my tenure of the Wellington Fellowship. Nor would this book have appeared at all without the efforts of the archivist, Dr Christopher Woolgar, and his dedicated staff to preserve and catalogue the Wellington Papers. At the same time, the kindness that has always been shown me by Dr Woolgar and his assistants, especially Karen Robson, Sue Donnelly and Mary Cockerill, has greatly lightened the burden of research. Finally, the Committee for Advanced Studies provided me with much needed financial assistance.

Amongst my friends and colleagues, Martin Alexander, Tony Kushner, Rory Muir and Karen Noyce have all given generously of their time and inspiration, and have helped me lift my sights beyond the heat and dust of the Iberian Peninsula.

Much of the research for this book was carried out in Madrid, and in the French Revolution and Napoleon Collection at Florida State University in Tallahassee. In America I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Professor Donald Horward and his gracious wife, Annabel. As a distinguished scholar, Professor Horward has provided immense guidance, encouragement and stimulation; as good friends, he and Annabel have given me the most generous of hospitality. The warmest of welcomes was also received from Kyle Eidahl, Lori Forster, Jan Gadel, Phil Bacon, and Henry and Pat Srbrnik. In Spain, Teniente Coronel D. Fernando Redondo of the Servicio Histórico Militar has always been unsparing of his time and advice, whilst my dear friends, Concha Bocos Rodríguez

and Marta Requena Martínez, have continued to overlook my failings as a correspondent in the months between my visits. Much kindness has also been shown me by José Enrique Uhagón Foa and his wife, Angélica.

Apart from the University of Southampton, I have also worked at the British Library, the Public Record Office, the Servicio Histórico Militar, the Biblioteca del Senado, the Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid, the Archivo Histórico Nacional, and the Strozier Library at Florida State University. In every case the staff could not have been more accommodating, whilst often providing me with invaluable assistance.

If the archivists and librarians of all these institutions provided me with the raw material for this project, the project itself would not have come to fruition without the encouragement of the publisher, among whose staff I should particularly like to thank Pauline Snelson, Steven Gerrard and Tim Farmiloe.

Last but not least, I owe my deepest love and gratitude to my wife, Alison. As well as tolerating my frequent absences, not to mention a punishing schedule of work, she has never failed to do everything that she can to support my studies. In a very real sense, this book is as much her achievement as it is mine.

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1

An Unhappy Alliance




Figure 1 The Iberian Peninsula

In the long years of the French wars of 1792–1815, there can have been few more gloomy moments for the British than the spring of 1808. In Europe Napoleon reigned supreme. Following his defeat of the much-vaunted Prussians in 1806, and then the Russians in 1807, the Emperor had met Tsar Alexander I at Tilsit, and signed a treaty of alliance with his former enemy. With Austria still *hors de combat* after her defeat in 1805, Prussia occupied and humiliated, the Confederation of the Rhine, Denmark, Holland, Italy, Naples, Spain, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw all in alliance with France, Britain's only friends on the continent were Portugal, Sicily, and Sweden. Of these, Portugal was occupied by the French and Spaniards in October 1807, Sicily was too poor and weak to be able to do more than provide Britain with a Mediterranean base, and Sweden was under attack from the Danes, French and Russians. Nor were Britain's efforts to meet the crisis uniformly successful: if the Danish fleet had been effectively neutralised by an attack on Copenhagen in September 1807, the joy of victory had been undermined by the news that a British expeditionary force that had been sent to invade South America under General Whitelocke had been forced to surrender at Buenos Aires in July. Other failures had occurred in Egypt and the Dardanelles, whilst an attempt to succour the Swedes ended in disillusionment and confusion. Meanwhile the effects of the Continental System were already beginning to bite, with British exports falling dramatically and the textile industry experiencing a serious depression, trade also being badly hit by the restrictive measures imposed by the Americans in response to the British Orders in Council. As if all this was not enough, in March 1808 news arrived that the large French army that had been moving into Spain ever since the occupation of Portugal had suddenly launched a coup against the Bourbon monarchy. With Spain directly under French control, it seemed that Napoleon would gain access to the wealth of Latin America, and

close its markets – the largest remaining outlet open to British goods, if only in the form of contraband – to British commerce.

Britain's sensitivity to events in Latin America becomes more comprehensible if it is remembered that Nelson's great victory had not given her total control of the sea. On the contrary, modern research has suggested that shortage of timber, the wear-and-tear resulting from the blockade of the continent, and large-scale French shipbuilding were threatening her supremacy.¹ When news arrived that first Spain and then Portugal had revolted against the Napoleonic yoke, there was therefore considerable rejoicing. Not only was it a considerable boost to British morale, but the Emperor seemed to have been denied access to the New World. The Spaniards, in particular, were toasted as heroes, their actions having appealed to all shades of opinion in Britain. For the Tories, the Spanish uprising was a war in defence of religion and legitimacy, whilst for the Whigs and radicals it was the spontaneous act of a whole people determined on its liberty. When a French army was forced to surrender at Bailén, the grandiloquent proclamations of the Spanish leaders were lent added veracity, and a mood of optimism and over-confidence was generated that was only equalled by that which gripped Spain herself. Something of the spirit that prevailed is apparent from a letter that was written to Wellington which proclaimed, 'Nothing can offer a more glorious prospect than the apparent state of the public mind in Spain.'² Sensing, meanwhile, that it had at last found a theatre in which it could intervene effectively upon the continent of Europe, the government of Lord Portland lavished aid upon the Iberian insurgents, and diverted as many troops as it could to the Peninsula, where the first major contingents landed in Mondego bay on 1 August 1808.

Small, weak, deprived of her political élite, which had mostly fled into exile with the royal family in October 1807, and conditioned by a long tradition of friendship with Great Britain, Portugal quickly allowed herself to be transformed into a British protectorate. Her army was placed under the command of Sir William Beresford, the British ambassador was admitted as a member of the Council of Regency, and the Portuguese people loyally co-operated in the measures that were considered necessary for the defence of their homeland, even when these amounted to the imposition of scorched-earth tactics. Although friction was never entirely absent, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance proved a resound-

ing success, but the same could not be said of its Anglo-Spanish counterpart, which was constantly disrupted not only by the course of the war, but also by major diplomatic and cultural differences. As a result, Britain's intervention in the Peninsula was to be marked by a level of inter-allied conflict that was almost unprecedented.

Before embarking upon a description of the events that soured the course of Anglo-Spanish relations, it is worth noting that British expectations of her new ally were hopelessly unrealistic. There can be no doubt that there was much ignorance with regard to Spain in general, and to the political situation that had reigned there since the uprising in particular. The Spanish revolt had been neither spontaneous nor united, but the work of a variety of discontented interest groups who wished not only to fight the French but also to pursue their own designs. Nor had there been a single nation-wide movement, but rather a series of regional conspiracies whose characteristics were in some instances very different from one another. Political power had fragmented, and fallen into the hands of a variety of provincial juntas and petty military dictators who were vying with one another for power and influence, and who proved less than amenable to the reimposition of any form of central authority. When a new government did emerge from the confusion in September 1808 in the form of the Junta Suprema Central, there was little agreement as to its status or function, still less to the extent of its powers. Weakened by internal opposition and military defeat, the Junta had no chance of consolidating its authority, or of giving adequate direction to the war effort, which had already been undermined by the disruption that had been suffered by the armed forces.

As very little of this was apparent to British observers, the Portland government's laudable attempts to remedy its own ignorance by dispatching a number of liaison officers to the Peninsula did little good. As Sir John Moore complained, 'They have been buoyed up in England by the false information transmitted by the officers sent to the different Spanish armies, who had neither sense nor honesty to tell the truth so that Lord Castlereagh has very little idea of the situation in which we are here.'³ To be fair, much of the information that was returned to London was sensible and accurate, but some of the officers concerned were undoubtedly less than responsible in their actions. To quote a letter that was forwarded to Wellington in 1812, 'Officers who have been

sent out here . . . to give information to our government have deceived it, for they have begun by deceiving themselves. They have taken rank and sometimes pay in the Spanish army, and instead of being *judges* . . . they have become *parties*, and seeing everything through the medium of their own interests and passions, they have reported to their government what they *wished*, and not what they knew.⁴ Perhaps the worst offender was Lieutenant Colonel Charles Doyle, who was originally sent to Galicia. Though popular with the Spaniards, he is described by Wellington as being afflicted by the habit of 'attending to anything and everything excepting his own business'.⁵ In a misguided attempt to provide the Spanish cause with a strong leader, Doyle attached himself to the singularly vapid Duque del Infantado, and thus incurred the risk that the British government would be implicated in the faction-fighting that was raging in the patriot ranks. In the meantime, he also raised false hopes that a British force would be sent to Bilbao, and thus precipitated a futile uprising in the Basque country – which had hitherto remained quiet – which was crushed by the French with great bloodshed.⁶

Nor was Doyle any more reliable in his description of the military situation in Spain. On the one hand, he persistently underestimated the number of French troops in the country, and therefore had no hesitation in pressing the most foolhardy plans of campaign upon the Spanish generals.⁷ On the other hand, in common with some of his fellows, he was as optimistic as possible in his comments on the new levies that were everywhere forming against the French.⁸ Not all observers were so sanguine, but it cannot be denied that the initial impression was highly favourable. So buoyant was the current that it even impressed the normally sceptical Wellington, who wrote to Lord Castlereagh on his first arrival in the Peninsula, 'It is impossible to convey to you an idea of the sentiment which prevails here in favour of the Spanish cause. The difference between two men is whether the one is a better or worse Spaniard, and the better Spaniard is the one who detests the French most heartily.'⁹ Particularly in the light of the somewhat disappointing result of the victory of Vimeiro (which had been followed by the repatriation of Junot's defeated army to France in British ships), it was only natural that the British forces in Portugal should have been eager to enter 'that country whose patriotism has aroused the admiration of England, and led our armies with the ardour of a crusade to the Spanish shores'.¹⁰

To travel hopefully was better than to arrive. Marching into Spain under the command of Sir John Moore, the British found not the romantic land of sun and orange groves which they had pictured, but the cold and rain of winter on the *meseta*.¹¹ Nor was the welcome from the populace much warmer. From the very beginning of the war the patriots had shown a marked reluctance to allow British forces to land.¹² The Junta of Galicia now made every effort to frustrate the disembarkation of the reinforcements that had been sent under Sir David Baird and failed to provide them with transport for their march to join the main army, whilst the troops who marched from Portugal were given the most unfriendly of receptions at the frontier fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo.¹³ There was also little sign of martial ardour. Although the Spaniards often displayed the greatest ferocity in the defence of their own homes, a long tradition of hostility to military service made them reluctant to enlist in the regular army, whilst the outpourings of the press had undermined any sense of urgency. As a result the entire population seemed sunk in apathy, the British attributing this to pusillanimity and incompetence.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the military situation was distinctly alarming. Most of the Spanish forces in the front line had been crushed by the counter-attack that had been launched by Napoleon in response to Bailén, and there seemed nothing to prevent him from moving straight across the plains of Old Castile to attack Moore's headquarters at Salamanca. To make matters worse the British army was not properly concentrated: not only was Baird's column still on the march from Galicia, but Moore himself had sent his cavalry and artillery on a circuitous march up the Tagus valley in the mistaken belief that they could not manage the direct road from Lisbon. As these troops had not yet arrived, disaster seemed imminent, and feelings at Salamanca ran very high. To quote the German commissary, Augustus Schaumann:

The Spaniards rely entirely upon us, and after leading us into a most dreadful mess through their deceitful and mendacious promises, they run away and say, 'Now try to get out of it as best you can!' This is the general feeling, and it is shared even by cultivated and enlightened Spaniards. The people here have the effrontery to look upon the English troops as exotic animals, who have come to engage in a private fight with the French, and now that they are here all that the fine Spanish gentlemen

have to do is to look on with their hands in their pockets. They do not regard us in the least as allies . . . they simply regard us as heretics . . . Poor General Moore is . . . in a parlous plight and the more one sees of the Spaniards the more discouraged one gets. Everything that has been blatantly trumpeted in the papers about their enthusiasm, their great armies and the stampede to join them, and their spirit of self-sacrifice is simply lies. It often looks as if Spain were not even willing to defend herself . . . Is this the daring patriotic race about which the press has raved so bombastically? It seems to me as if the people . . . loathe us as much as they do the French, and would gladly be free of us both.¹⁵

Matters now went from bad to worse. Saved from immediate destruction by Napoleon's belief that he had fallen back to Portugal, Moore was able to concentrate, and eventually decided to launch a daring blow at the French communications in Old Castile. Hearing that the Emperor was marching against him in overwhelming force, the British general halted his men in their tracks, and embarked upon his famous retreat to the sea. Unaware of the overall strategic situation, his disappointed army jumped to the conclusion that they had been forced to withdraw because of Spanish treachery.¹⁶ Their detestation of their allies was confirmed when they reached the town of Astorga on 30 December, for at that point their path was crossed by the remnants of the *Marqués de la Romana's* Army of the Left, which was also in full retreat, having been reduced to a starving and typhus-ridden remnant whose survivors were intent only on seizing whatever food and warmth that they could find. Shocked at the appearance of their allies, with whose forces they had had little previous contact, the British reacted with some pity and much contempt.¹⁷

Much disorder had occurred at Astorga, and the subsequent retreat to the sea was marked by widespread straggling and drunkenness that was undoubtedly exacerbated by the extreme privation with which it was accompanied. Participants also laid much emphasis on the refusal of the civilian population to provide them with any assistance.¹⁸ Yet it is clear that a large proportion of the privation was due to the confusion that reigned in the army's commissariat, as well as the indiscipline of the men themselves, both of which hampered the distribution of food and the allocation of billets.¹⁹ Furthermore, drunkenness was a vice that

beset the British army throughout the war: indeed, it had been prevalent from the very moment of disembarkation.²⁰ On several occasions British writers also drew unfavourable comparisons between the profligacy of their own men and the common sense exhibited by the French.²¹ Above all, however, the attempt to exculpate the British army is undermined by the savage treatment that was meted out to the districts through which it passed. From the very beginning of the retreat its passage was marked by a trail of burnt villages and homeless inhabitants. Brutalised stragglers took what they wanted by force, whilst there were also outbreaks of mindless vandalism.²² Justify these excesses by reference to the hostility of the Spaniards though they might, the British should not have been surprised if the inhabitants chose to flee their homes rather than wait upon the mercy of their allies. Nor, of course, could Moore offer the Galicians any protection: retreating at the speed that he did without any attempt to offer battle, the British general was in a poor position to solicit assistance from the very people that he was abandoning to the mercy of the enemy. Only at La Coruña, where the city's powerful defences offered some protection from the fear of French reprisals, did the populace show a less hostile attitude and take some interest in their own defence.²³

Following its arrival at the coast, Moore's army turned at bay and fought a successful rearguard action outside La Coruña on 16 January 1809 which cost the British commander his life but bought sufficient time for the troops to embark unmolested. With the benefit of hindsight it can be seen that Moore had saved the allied cause by diverting the French from an immediate advance on Lisbon and Seville. At the time, however, the return of his battered army provoked an immense furore. Madrid had been taken, the Spanish armies defeated, and the British expeditionary force so roughly handled that it seemed lucky to have escaped destruction. Meanwhile, the Spaniards seemed to have done very little to merit the assistance which they had been given, and were also suspected of betraying the alliance – not only had the governor of Madrid, Tomás de Morla, defected to the French, but the important fortresses of La Coruña and El Ferrol were surrendered without resistance. Profiting from these events, the opposition used the issue of intervention in Spain to launch a major attack upon the Portland government. Though still committed to the Peninsula, the Cabinet not unnaturally felt impelled to seek some guarantee

against further embarrassments in the form of a secure base for any future British expeditionary force.

Such a guarantee had already been under discussion even before the full news of Moore's retreat had reached London. The Junta Central having now fled to Seville, Andalucía seemed the most likely theatre for intervention, and it was determined that a British garrison should be stationed at Cádiz. The choice of this city casts an interesting light upon British strategy at this stage of the war. Militarily speaking, the demand was not essential: though certainly less convenient than Cádiz as a base for operations in the hinterland, Gibraltar provided all the security that any expeditionary force could need. By occupying Cádiz, the Cabinet was looking more to the naval war, for the city was not only a vital port, but also contained numerous men-of-war that might have been rendered seaworthy by the French. Particular weight was given to this aspect of affairs by the fact that the enemy had just captured a sizeable Spanish squadron at El Ferrol. As the most important centre of the colonial trade Cádiz also possessed considerable commercial importance. Finally, the presence of a British force at Cádiz would represent a major political advantage, for it would be clear that the Cabinet had done everything in its power to provide for the security of its forces in the Peninsula. On 14 January 1809 the British ambassador at Seville, John Hookham Frere, was therefore instructed to open the question of Cádiz and informed that 4000 troops were on their way to provide the necessary garrison.²⁴ Needless to say, the arrival of the story of Moore's retreat strengthened the Cabinet's determination, Frere being informed that acceptance of Britain's demands was 'more than ever indispensable and more than ever reasonable as a preliminary to any British operation in the south'.²⁵

Understandable though it was, particularly in the light of the fact that there seemed nothing to prevent the city from falling to the enemy, the decision to secure Cádiz entailed substantial dangers. In view of Britain's occupation of Gibraltar, it was inevitable that all such proposals would give rise to much suspicion, and all the more so when the city in question was Spain's greatest port and naval base. At this particular moment, moreover, the idea was likely to be received with even less grace than would normally be the case. Blind to the strategic importance of Moore's intervention, the Spaniards felt that he had deserted them, and not the other way about. The long delay before the British general had

moved from Salamanca had occasioned much restiveness amongst its inhabitants, whilst his retreating troops had been accused to their faces of betraying the cause.²⁶ In addition to Moore's refusal to stand and fight, much damage was also done by the abominable behaviour of the British soldiery.²⁷ Spanish disappointment was exacerbated by profound ignorance. Determined to keep resistance alive, the press had fed the country with a diet of bombast, rumour and propaganda which sapped the struggle for independence by generating expectations that were wildly over-optimistic. In the case of Great Britain, too much was expected of her. Not only did the Spaniards have no conception of the economic constraints under which she was operating, but they had no knowledge of the difficulties which the government faced in parliament and country alike. At the same time, such aid as the British did succeed in sending to the Peninsula was often exaggerated: in December 1808 Moore was reported to have 40 000 troops instead of 30 000, whilst in July 1809 Wellington was given 28 000 men instead of 20 000.²⁸ The problem persisted throughout the war, but in the winter of 1808-9 in particular the British were reported to be winning great victories whose only basis in fact were the minor skirmishes at Sahagún de Campos and Benavente that preceded the retreat to La Coruña.²⁹

None of these reports prepared the population for the fact that the British were actually in full flight, the consequent disappointment being so great as to have made it impossible for the Junta Central to admit British troops to Cádiz even had it wanted to – to have surrendered on so sensitive an issue would have provided its enemies with far too potent a weapon. Its refusal of Frere's demand was not the end of the affair, however, for matters were now greatly complicated by Sir George Smith, who was one of the numerous liaison officers who had been sent to the Peninsula. Convinced that Cádiz was French for the taking, without any communication with either Frere or the British government, nor still less the Junta Central, Smith took it upon himself to implore the British commander in Portugal, Sir John Cradock, to send troops to occupy the city. As Cradock complied, by early February a British force was actually present off Cádiz. As Frere had only just raised the question of the garrison, the Junta Central was left with the wholly mistaken impression that the British had been intent on securing a landing with or without their permission. Permission for the landing was refused and the troops sent back

to Portugal, but the whole incident had ended all hope of placing a garrison in Cádiz, which, as Frere was forced to recognise, 'would be not only superfluous at the present moment, but productive of the worst possible political consequences'.³⁰ Realistic though this assessment was, the incident still strengthened British prejudice towards the Spaniards. To quote one irate officer, 'Who could have thought that the high-minded, generous, patriotic Spaniards, our allies . . . would refuse admittance to our army into Cádiz? Such, however, has been their return for our generous conduct, and it has fallen to our lot to suffer the mortification of the refusal.'³¹ Meanwhile, of course, the Spaniards were becoming more and more impatient at the inactivity of Cradock's forces which were reported to number 70 000 men when the actual figure was a mere 16 000.³²

Already enmeshed in a web of suspicion and misunderstanding, Anglo-Spanish relations were now soured still further by the campaign of Talavera. The refusal to admit troops to Cádiz should have ended the question of direct British intervention in Spain. When Wellington was appointed to command the British forces in Portugal, his instructions made it very clear that he was not to embark upon general operations in Spain, but rather to concentrate upon the defence of Portugal. A campaign in Spain was not ruled out so long as its aim was limited to providing for Lusitanian security, but it seems fairly certain that the Cabinet did not want Wellington to advance far beyond the Portuguese frontier.³³ Eager to escape from the stigma of the embarrassing convention of Cintra to which he had been one of the signatories, the British general made full use of the latitude which he had been given: indeed, from the moment that he landed at Lisbon, he made it plain that once he had expelled the French forces that had occupied northern Portugal under Marshal Soult, he intended to attack the corps of Marshal Victor which lay in Extremadura.³⁴

Having secured the agreement of the Cabinet to this plan and driven Soult into a headlong retreat across the Galician border, Wellington duly turned south, and entered into correspondence with the commander of the Spanish Army of Extremadura, General Gregorio García de la Cuesta, an officer who has somewhat unfairly gone down in the annals of the Peninsular War as the very epitome of military incompetence – Costello, for example, describes him as a 'deformed-looking lump of pride, ignorance and treachery'.³⁵ The subsequent campaign was to leave its impact

on the alliance for the rest of the war. In essence, the military situation was that only two French corps had been left to hold down central and western Spain: whilst Marshal Victor's First Corps held the Tagus valley, Horace Sebastiani's Fourth Corps occupied La Mancha. In addition, Madrid was protected by a small central reserve under King Joseph. Facing these troops was Wellington's army, which was concentrating at Abrantes in Portugal, Cuesta's Army of Extremadura which lay in the southern half of that province, and Francisco Xavier Venegas' Army of La Mancha which protected the line of the Sierra Morena. In all, the allies could field some 80 000 men to the French 50 000. After much deliberation, it was resolved that Wellington and Cuesta should march eastwards up the Tagus valley towards Madrid, whilst Venegas struck towards the capital from the south. Caught between the two offensives, the French would be trapped on the horns of a dilemma: either they could concentrate against one of their opponents and risk the other seizing Madrid, or they could attempt to contain both assailants and run the risk of being defeated in detail.

Inherently problematical due to its use of external lines, the plan had one fatal flaw in that it took no account of the French forces in northern Spain. As most of these troops were engaged in prolonged operations against the Galicians and Asturians, or consisted of the battered fugitives whom Wellington had so recently herded over the frontier, there seemed no reason to fear their intervention. For a variety of reasons whose nature need not detain us here, however, in the second half of June the French evacuated Galicia and concentrated their whole force in Old Castile, from where they were in perfect position to fall on any allied force that should advance up the Tagus valley. As the allies were unaware of this fact, they were advancing into a trap. Even without the presence of these troops, the chances of success were very slim. Wellington and Cuesta were on poor terms: as early as 13 June Wellington complained, 'I can only say that the obstinacy of this old gentleman is throwing out of our hands the finest game that any armies ever had.'³⁶ Cuesta's impracticability was related to the political situation in patriot Spain. The Spanish general was notoriously hostile to the Junta Central, and seems only to have been left in command of the Army of Extremadura because the government feared the reaction of his troops should he be removed. Meanwhile, Frere had somewhat foolishly seized upon

one of Cuesta's subordinates, the Duque de Alburquerque, as a possible British puppet among the Spanish generals, and had repeatedly pressed his appointment to an independent command composed of troops drawn from Cuesta's army.³⁷ Getting wind of these intrigues, the Spanish commander was inclined to believe that Wellington was a party to them, especially when the latter proposed that Alburquerque should be sent with 10 000 men to outflank Victor from the north.³⁸ Faced with such evidence, Cuesta concluded that every suggestion on the part of his ally was a dastardly attempt to secure his defeat – and thus a pretext for the Junta Central to remove him from the command. It was almost certainly thinking of this sort that occasioned his famous refusal to attack Victor's corps when it was caught in an isolated position on the river Alberche on 22 July. In view of the outrage with which certain British writers have reacted to this incident (which some diarists attributed to the fact that it was a Sunday!), it is worth quoting Wellington himself upon the subject. Though the Duke complained of 'the whimsical perversity' of Cuesta's disposition, he admitted that his refusal to attack 'I consider fortunate as we have dislodged the French without a battle in which the chances were not much in our favour' (seeing that he was not to be attacked, Victor had slipped away in the night).³⁹

Though it was only half-way to Madrid, Wellington refused to proceed any further than the Alberche unless he was supplied with adequate food and transport.⁴⁰ The question of logistics was to do more to disrupt relations between the British and their allies than any single issue. There can be no doubt that as Wellington advanced into Spain, his men began to suffer shortages, as well as being tormented by the heat and dust of a Castilian summer. In contemplating his campaign, the British general had relied on receiving food and transport from the Spaniards, but the fact was that the district into which he marched had always been deficient in corn, and had just been thoroughly stripped of its resources by several months of French occupation.⁴¹ There is therefore no reason to disbelieve the assurances that Wellington received from the local authorities that they were doing their best to meet his wants.⁴² In a letter to the Junta of Plasencia, he even acknowledged that he had received the food – though not the transport – which it had promised.⁴³ Such was not the impression that is gleaned from his correspondence with Frere – 'I can only say that I have never seen an army so ill-treated in any country, or, considering

that all depends on its operations, one which deserved good treatment so much. It is ridiculous to pretend that the country cannot supply our wants . . . The Spanish army has plenty of everything, and we . . . are really starving.'⁴⁴ Yet the Spaniards were also going hungry, and their situation was not improved by the fact that their supplies were being preyed upon by the British (although the reverse was also true).⁴⁵

Wellesley's halt on the Alberche is certainly mysterious, especially as the countryside ahead of him was far less exhausted. The most likely explanation seems to be that he was privately becoming alarmed at his own temerity in advancing so far into Spain, though two letters which he wrote to Frere on 24 July suggest that he was hoping that Cuesta would advance on his own and suffer such a defeat as would secure his removal from the command.⁴⁶ Cuesta did march a few more miles towards Madrid, but he escaped such a fate, rejoining Wellesley at Talavera. The campaign was still in ruins, however, for Venegas had failed either to neutralise the French forces in his path or to advance on the capital. Concentrating every man that they had available, Joseph, Victor and Sebastiani attacked the combined Anglo-Spanish army on 28 July. In a hard-fought battle, of which the British bore the brunt, the French were repulsed with heavy casualties. Posted to hold the least exposed section of the front, the Spaniards had little to do, but that which they had to do they did well. Confronted by the enemy, Cuesta also proved a model of co-operation. Yet the battle still did lasting damage to the alliance. Even before it was fought Wellington's troops had been shocked at the undisciplined appearance of their allies, and on 27 July their suspicions were confirmed when three Spanish regiments suddenly fired a massive volley at some distant French cavalry and then took to their heels at the sound of their own muskets. Ignoring – or simply ignorant of – such creditable incidents as the charge of the Rey cavalry regiment which helped put to flight a French attack, the British only had eyes for the crowds of Spanish stragglers and camp followers who fled from imagined French successes and pillaged the camps, quarters and baggage of both armies. Nor could they forget the manner in which the local inhabitants murdered those Frenchmen whom they found lying on the field, and refused to give any assistance to the British wounded.⁴⁷

Exhausted and badly depleted, the British army was in no state

to proceed with the campaign, but the movements of the enemy had in any case made further operations impossible. Led by Marshal Soult, the three French corps in Old Castile marched southwards into the Tagus valley, and left Wellington and Cuesta with little option but to retreat across the Tagus into the mountains of Extremadura. Food was very short, the British were incensed because Cuesta had left behind a contingent of their wounded who had been entrusted to his care, and further quarrels broke out with regard to the distribution of supplies. After bitter recriminations Wellington led his troops back to the river Guadiana, and finally retired into Portugal. To the Spaniards, of course, the retreat was yet another betrayal, an impression that could only be strengthened in the following months when Wellington first refused to lend any support to the Spanish offensives that culminated in the disastrous defeats of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes (19 and 28 November 1809), and then did nothing to arrest the onslaught which was launched against Andalucía in January 1810 and led to the loss of Seville and the replacement of the Junta Central by a council of regency. Well aware that the French were massing troops for an invasion of Portugal, Wellington remained ensconced behind the frontier, and would not even be tempted out when the enemy's invasion army besieged Ciudad Rodrigo within sight of his own outposts.⁴⁸ As even the British general was forced to admit, his decision was not one likely to win him any friends in Spain: 'However unreasonable it may appear to His Majesty's government and to his subjects in general . . . it cannot be denied that the people of Spain are by no means satisfied that His Majesty's troops have taken so active a share and have performed such efficient services in the war as might have been expected from them, and the necessity which existed of refraining from the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo will render this opinion more prevalent.'⁴⁹ Confirmation of this dissatisfaction is provided by the recollections of an officer in the Forty-Eighth Foot. Encountering a group of Spanish soldiers near Villa Velha, he remarked, 'They knew little of . . . the regular practice of war, they knew only that we had not fired a shot by their side since the battle of Talavera, that our companions in arms under Sir John Moore had fled through the strong country of Galicia without fighting two years before, and their angry and contemptuous looks told us plainly that they expected we should retire through Portugal . . . with similar precipitation.'⁵⁰

If the Spaniards felt that they had good reason to be dissatisfied with their allies' performance following the battle of Talavera, Wellington and his troops were no more pleased with what they heard of events in Spain. The British general had urged the Junta Central to adopt a defensive strategy, but it had felt constrained by internal political pressures to launch a renewed attack. Showing his usual lack of sympathy for the problems faced by others, Wellington poured scorn on this decision, which he ascribed to 'political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political objectives', and became even more angry when it led to defeats which he regarded as being as futile as they were calamitous – 'I declare that if they had preserved their armies, or even one of them, the cause was safe . . . But no! Nothing will answer excepting to fight great battles in plains in which their defeat is as certain as the commencement of the battle.'⁵¹ Nor was this the only occasion when the British found good reason to question the strategic and tactical competence of their allies. In the first months of 1811, Marshal Soult, who had acted as the effective viceroy of Andalucía ever since its conquest by the French a year before, sent a column of troops to invade the patriot enclave that still held out around the great fortress of Badajoz, and thence to press on into what Wellington always regarded as the 'soft underbelly' of Portugal. Badajoz was held by a large Spanish army under the command of General Gabriel Mendizábal, but within a few weeks that officer had succeeded in allowing the French to defeat him in a surprise attack at the river Gebora on 19 February 1811, leaving Badajoz to surrender – in the most shameful of circumstances – a few weeks later. Needless to say, Wellington was furious: remarking that the defeat had been one of the most grievous to afflict the allied cause, he commented that 'it would certainly have been avoided had the Spaniards been anything but Spaniards.'⁵² To add insult to injury, Mendizábal attempted to blame his misfortunes on Wellington's refusal to send him an auxiliary force of British cavalry.⁵³

For most of 1810, however, it had been the Duke who was feeling abandoned. As he had foreseen, in 1810 the French had launched a third invasion of Portugal under Marshal Massena. Advancing to within a few miles of Lisbon, the *enfant chérie de la victoire* was only brought to a halt by the lines of Torres Vedras, the impregnable fortifications which Wellington had erected to provide for just such an eventuality across the neck of the peninsula on which the capital of Portugal was built. Despite the fact

that Wellington had attempted to deny his army adequate supplies by the imposition of scorched-earth tactics, Massena held out for far longer than any one had expected, and it was not until April 1811 that the Marshal's starving army was finally driven across the Spanish frontier. Though it was known that the guerrilla insurrection against the French was growing apace, for the most part the news from Spain during the campaign in Portugal was uniformly dismal. Badajoz had only been one of a series of fortresses to fall to the enemy in the course of 1810 and 1811, whilst from those areas still held by the Spaniards, such as Galicia and the environs of Cádiz, reports flowed in of disorganisation, misgovernment, impotence, intrigue, confusion and want of resources. So bad was the situation that in some areas the Spanish cause seemed utterly *hors de combat*.⁵⁴

All this served only to confirm the disgust which had already been caused by the collapse of Andalucía in January 1810.⁵⁵ Yet from Wellington downwards the British made no allowances for the practical difficulties that had dogged the Spanish war effort ever since 1808. In complaining of what they saw around them, they saw only the symptoms of the trouble and not the cause. Wellington, in particular, was outraged at what he saw as the Spaniards' failure to take advantage of the absence of so many French troops before the lines of Torres Vedras.⁵⁶ In reflecting upon the reasons for the disorder, the British general could only conclude that it was related to the defects which he affected to see in the Spanish national character: 'The Spanish nation will not sit down soberly and work to produce an effect at a future period; their courage and even their activity is of a passive nature, and must be forced upon them by the necessity of their circumstances, and is never a matter of choice or foresight'.⁵⁷

The year 1811 once again saw the Spanish and Anglo-Portuguese forces acting together on the battlefield, but in general the results were no happier than they had been in 1809. Following the French conquest of Andalucía, an Anglo-Portuguese division had been sent to help secure Cádiz, and had this time been admitted to the Isla de León – the island on which the city was built – without demur. At the beginning of March 1811 these troops were dispatched with a force of Spaniards to disembark on the coast of the mainland and attack the French siege lines from the rear. To demonstrate his confidence in the alliance, their commander, Sir Thomas Graham, agreed that the expedition should be com-

manded by the Spaniard, Manuel La Peña. The latter seems to have lost his nerve, however, and sought to do no more than make his way back to the safety of Cádiz by way of the road that ran along the coast towards the city from the east. After obligingly moving out of his way, on 5 March 1811 the besieging army attacked the rear of La Peña's column as it approached the Isla de León. As it happened, Graham's troops bore the brunt of the attack. Hastily turning about, they fell upon their attackers with such ferocity that the French were soon in full retreat. La Peña, meanwhile, had done nothing to support his allies (though probably because he did not dare attempt to disengage his troops from the French division facing them rather than out of treachery⁵⁸). Graham saw things differently, however, and brought his men back to Cádiz, refusing to play any further part in the campaign, his anger being shared by many British observers.⁵⁹ Yet the Spaniards were no less unhappy: not only did the Regency protest at Graham's refusal to follow up the victory, but La Peña later published a self-congratulatory manifesto in which he claimed it for himself, and lamented the manner in which its fruits had been thrown away.⁶⁰

The Spanish propensity to seize all the credit for such successes as were gained by the allies also marred the victory that was gained by the southern wing of Wellington's army under Marshal Beresford at La Albuera on 16 May 1811. Sent by Wellington to besiege Badajoz, Beresford was himself attacked by a relief force under Marshal Soult. In a skilful outflanking manoeuvre, Soult succeeded in placing the bulk of his troops in a position from which they could have rolled up the entire allied array, and the day would undoubtedly have been lost had not some of the substantial number of Spanish troops attached to Beresford's army stood firm against the French onslaught until they could be relieved by the redcoats. As even Wellington was forced to admit, the Spaniards had done very well on this occasion, holding their positions against heavy odds even when the British mistakenly opened fire upon them from the rear. Yet he still succeeded in finding fault, alleging that the Spaniards' very immovability had been a disadvantage, forcing Beresford 'to apply the British everywhere'.⁶¹ The British casualties were the heaviest of the war, but the dispatch which was read out in the Cortes made it impossible to believe that they had played anything other than a minor role in the fighting.⁶² Not all the Spanish accounts of the battle were quite so

exaggerated – for example, the *Gazeta de la Junta Superior de la Mancha* carried a reasonably accurate version of the fighting⁶³ – but Graham was still highly offended:

The news of the victory in Extremadura has filled the minds of the people . . . with the most determined belief of the superiority of the Spanish army, which now in the public opinion neither admits of nor requires improvement, being already perfect. Without being a witness to this unfortunate national egoism . . . it is not to be believed . . . Instead of a generous feeling of sympathy for the loss of the British troops at Albuera, the people here universally believe that it is purposely exaggerated . . . and that at all events the safety of the British and Portuguese was entirely owing to the intrepidity of the Spanish soldiers, and the activity and judgement of their leaders.⁶⁴

Though space precludes a discussion of all the incidents concerned, events at the front continued to make for tension between the British and the Spaniards until well into 1812. The hard-won fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was stormed by Wellington's army on 19 January of that year, seemed at one moment to be in danger of falling back into the hands of the French because the Spanish forces that had been sent to garrison it could not be supplied by the patriot authorities. Some months later one of the Spanish armies which Wellington was relying upon simply to remain in being, so as to prevent the French from concentrating all their troops against his forces when he finally advanced across the frontier into Spain, suffered a particularly humiliating defeat at the first battle of Castalla (21 July 1812). Such defeats remained inevitable in view of the nature of the Spanish armies. To quote General Long, 'All the Spanish troops I see are of a most despicable description, neither clothed, paid, disciplined or even organised, and but precariously fed. They resemble more a motley banditti than battalions of infantry, and their great generals have scarcely more than Lieutenant Colonels' commands. The Spanish government appears to be doing nothing, satisfied, I suppose, that the seat of their residence . . . is sufficiently secured from insult by a British force.'⁶⁵ So serious was the problem that it drove Wellington to the point of despair:

I . . . am apprehensive that till the Spanish government will

reform their military system, till the officers will be instructed and their troops disciplined, till regular resources be found and faithfully applied to the support of their armies . . . and till the armies will be equipped as they ought for the service required of them, the history of every attempt on our part to alter the nature of the war on any general combined plan will be the same as the last.

The enemy will collect . . . a larger body of troops than the allied British and Portuguese army can bring into the field, and will oblige us to take the defensive, and they will experience no danger or even inconvenience from their weakness in all other parts of the Peninsula in consequence of their collecting their whole force to oppose us because the Spanish armies are neither disciplined nor provided nor equipped in such a manner as that they can perform any operation even of the most trifling nature if there should be any opposition on the part of the enemy.⁶⁶

In searching for an answer to the Spanish conundrum, the British turned to the idea that they themselves could impose order upon the patriot cause. At the highest level these ideas found expression in the attempts to secure the command of the Spanish army whose results are examined in the next chapter, or the proposal that was put forward by Henry Wellesley, who had been the British ambassador at Cádiz since February 1810, that Wellington should be given control of the Spanish provinces bordering upon Portugal as well as of the troops contained therein.⁶⁷ Numerous suggestions were also made that the Spanish forces should be placed under the command of British officers.⁶⁸ Such plans were stimulated by the general agreement that the Spanish common soldier was as courageous and hardy as his officer was cowardly and ignorant, a belief that reflected the unfavourable comparisons that were constantly being drawn between the ordinary inhabitants and the nobility.⁶⁹ At the same time, they also appealed to the British conviction that the superiority of their own bearing and physique was such that they could not but make a powerful impression upon the Spaniards.⁷⁰

Such messianism was certain to upset the Spaniards, who, as one observer noted, 'are . . . much indebted to us, but . . . would give their ears not to owe us a straw'.⁷¹ Much to Henry Wellesley's fury, his proposal that Wellington be given the command of the frontier provinces was rejected out of hand.⁷² As for the sugges-

tions that the Spaniards be commanded by British officers, a Scottish commissary named John Downie was permitted to form a new 'legion' in Extremadura, Samuel Whittingham a division in Mallorca, and Charles Doyle a depot for the training of new recruits on the Isla de León. Yet these officers were all hispanophiles who had made themselves popular with the Spaniards. For the most part, as Wellington himself recognised, such plans had little chance of success: even assuming that they would restore order to the Spanish army, which he believed that they would not unless it was also properly provided for, the Spaniards were unlikely to be willing to serve under British officers.⁷³ To judge from the angry protests aroused by the very mention of such plans the Duke was undoubtedly right, whilst as early as 1810 Whittingham's growing prominence had 'created a thousand enemies for him among the Spaniards'.⁷⁴

Spanish sensitivity with regard to the military command was exacerbated by the burgeoning controversy that surrounded the linked issues of British subsidies, free trade and the Latin American revolutions. When Spain went to war with Napoleon, the patriot authorities had bombarded the Portland government with a barrage of petitions for help that took no account of Great Britain's ability actually to meet their expectations. In April 1809, for example, the Foreign Secretary, George Canning, complained that the Spanish representatives in London had not only asked for the attachment of British auxiliary forces to the various Spanish armies and a loan of between ten and twenty million pounds, but were refusing to take any notice of the limits that must be placed on British aid, particularly at a time when Britain was simultaneously attempting to furnish assistance to the Austrians (who were once more at war with France).⁷⁵ The demands for men, supplies and money were renewed in a draft treaty presented to the British government in August, of which the main terms were that Britain should provide Spain with an auxiliary force of 30 000 men for use in either Europe or America, sufficient muskets for 500 000 men, and a loan of two million dollars per month.⁷⁶ Canning was outraged, remarking that the proposal was 'so utterly extravagant that it was useless to begin negotiating upon'.⁷⁷

As a matter of principle, the British were averse to signing any treaty of subsidy to the Spaniards, preferring instead to use what money they could send to Spain as a weapon of diplomacy.⁷⁸ Yet from the very beginning of the war Canning had maintained that,

because of the shortage of specie that afflicted Great Britain, her ability to aid the Spaniards in financial terms would be contingent upon her gaining access to American silver.⁷⁹ His response to the Spanish demands was therefore to request the Junta Central for permission to export specie directly from the Spanish colonies, or at least for Britain to be given a share of the vast quantities of bullion that were arriving at Cádiz.⁸⁰ Meanwhile, the empire was also being seen as a means of breaking the hold of the Continental System. British merchants had long since been casting greedy eyes upon its markets, and had exploited the Royal Navy's blockade of the Peninsula before 1808 to make substantial inroads upon it, commercial interest in the region being stimulated still further by the British occupation of Montevideo and Buenos Aires.⁸¹ In consequence, domestic pressure and economic necessity combined to persuade Canning to instruct his representatives in Spain to open the question of acquiring greater access to the colonial trade for Great Britain.⁸²

To this demand, the Spaniards had only one answer, however. Recognising that to relinquish their commercial monopoly on the empire would be to sever one of the most important links that bound it together, they refused point-blank to make any commercial concessions except in exchange for a guaranteed subsidy. Nor was their anxiety wholly selfish, for the shipments of bullion that were arriving at Cádiz were becoming ever more important as the tide of French conquest spread across Spain. Yet the British took great offence at this attitude, and would not relinquish their desires – indeed, as unrest grew in the colonies so they came to believe that a relaxation of the Spanish monopoly, whose effect was currently to starve the Americans of all supplies of manufactured goods, would stave off the crisis in the colonies that seemed to be imminent.⁸³ In April 1810 revolt broke out in Venezuela, an example that was soon followed in Buenos Aires, Chile and Mexico. With the outbreak of revolution, the British government was placed in a most unpleasant quandary. On the one hand, it could not openly support a revolt against its most important European ally, but, on the other, to fail to do so would be to risk driving the rebels into the arms of the French (although apparently never stated openly, the inference was that the Royal Navy was so overstretched that it could not prevent the *criollos* from making contact with Napoleon.) Faced by this dilemma, the British attempted a most unhappy compromise. Whilst their representa-

tives in the Caribbean and elsewhere were forbidden to give direct assistance to the rebels, revolutionary emissaries were received in London. Furthermore, rather than agreeing to Spanish demands that it should help put down the rebels by force, the British government offered to mediate between the belligerents in the hope of securing terms that would restore the Americans to their allegiance. Needless to say, among the terms it proposed was a liberalisation of trade.⁸⁴

Satisfactory though this policy may have been from the British point of view, to the Spaniards it was totally unacceptable, particularly as the Americans were bitterly unpopular at Cádiz.⁸⁵ According to the Regency, the risings had been the work of 'a handful of factious people' rather than the fruit of genuine grievances. In consequence, it would only agree to the proposed mediation if the British promised to assist in the suppression of the insurrections should the negotiations fail.⁸⁶ Such obduracy was only to be expected in view of the Regency's situation at Cádiz, which had depended on the colonial trade and contained a powerful mercantile interest, but it still aroused much anger among the British, and all the more so when the Spaniards announced the first of a series of punitive expeditions against the rebels.⁸⁷ The British concerns about Latin America were perfectly genuine, the government having always been afraid that the colonies might fall under French influence.⁸⁸ Yet to Spanish eyes, the assistance that had been given to *criollo* dissidents such as General Miranda before 1808, the attack on Buenos Aires, the friendly reception given to the rebel emissaries, the fact that the British clearly expected them to make concessions to the rebels, and, above all, the continued demands for free trade, could not but suggest the presence of more sinister motives. The result was much hostility. Writing from La Coruña, for example, Sir Howard Douglas noted a worrying tendency 'to attribute all our measures to selfish policy', which he connected with the suspicion that 'the revolutionary party in South America is favoured by us'.⁸⁹ So strong was this feeling in Cádiz that it even began to infect those who were generally regarded as being amongst Britain's friends.⁹⁰

The emergence of an anti-British tendency was not solely due to the question of Latin America – the president of the new Regency which had been established after the convocation of the Cortes, General Joaquín Blake, was notoriously hostile to their influence, and is alleged by Henry Wellesley to have encouraged

resistance to his plans.⁹¹ However, the issue continued to poison Anglo-Spanish relations until at least 1813, and was admitted by the ambassador to have been 'the principal cause of all the trouble and vexation I have met with in my different communications with the . . . government'.⁹² For ordinary Spaniards, however, the aspect of British policy with which they were most likely to come into direct contact was the presence of British forces in the Peninsula. Painful though it may be found by the admirers of Wellington's army, there can be little doubt that Britain's soldiers caused considerable harm to her standing amongst the Iberians. The inhabitants of Spain had never relished the presence of regular soldiers in their midst on account of their habitual brutality, licence and drunkenness – hence, in part, the anti-militarism which had been so strong an ingredient of the national uprising – and many of Wellington's troops conformed to the very stereotype which had aroused such distaste. Forgetting their commander's somewhat unfair and much misquoted remarks about them being composed of the 'scum of the earth', it is clear that hard drinking was the norm and drunkenness extremely common. As for the troops' behaviour, the prolonged campaign against the French began to have alarming effects that were noted even by their own officers. As Browne wrote, whilst the officers often became more sensitive to the horrors of war, the soldiers 'appeared to me to become daily more ferocious and less fit for return to the duties of citizens, and I sometimes apprehended that when they should be disbanded in England after the restoration of peace the country would be overrun with pilferers and marauders of every description'.⁹³ Added to the brutalising influence of the campaign, the men's isolation from society produced a feeling of superiority over their fellow men, and this in turn 'a blamable disposition to waste and destroy'.⁹⁴ Although the author of this remark stressed that most soldiers were kind-hearted and friendly men who shunned the company of known bad characters, they often seemed to have regarded the civilian population as fit only for bullying.⁹⁵ Nor could Wellington's provost marshals ever do more than keep the army's pillaging within acceptable limits – even officers being in the habit of purloining 'souvenirs' from the places through which the army passed.⁹⁶

Despite repeated orders to respect the custom of the inhabitants, the army's behaviour with regard to Catholicism also left much to be desired. Although a few enlightened observers praised the

contribution of the Church to the struggle against Napoleon and accepted the validity of its faith, the army as a whole was infected with a virulent anti-papism, diarist after diarist complaining of popish ignorance and superstition, and bewailing the large numbers of monks and friars who thronged the streets when they might have been serving in the army, such denunciations being supported by allegations that their morals were lax at best, and at worst totally deficient.⁹⁷ So extreme was the dislike evinced by one Protestant writer for the Catholic religion that he even welcomed the French invasion of Spain as a means of abolishing 'the present system of idolatry', not to mention the hated Inquisition.⁹⁸ Such feelings found expression in a series of more-or-less unpleasant practical jokes that ranged from holding mock religious processions to assaulting members of the clergy.⁹⁹ Particular revulsion, mixed with a considerable amount of romantic fascination, was caused by the institution of the convent, whose 'fair inmates' and 'lovely foresworn' were widely supposed to have been incarcerated against their will, or at least to have submitted to a 'cruel perversion' of human nature.¹⁰⁰ So strong was this belief that on one occasion a group of drunken British officers even tried to storm a convent at Trujillo so as to rescue 'the fair señoritas'.¹⁰¹

Nor was religion the only subject which the British found to dislike in the Peninsula. Much distaste was caused by the manner in which the Spaniards, particularly the civilian inhabitants and the more undisciplined guerillas, paid no heed to the conventions that made war more bearable for its usual participants, perpetrating terrible atrocities against the French invaders and desecrating their very graves.¹⁰² Such behaviour was in stark contrast to the general perception of the Spanish soldiery: 'We always know when the French are near – they, the Spaniards, run away in every direction.'¹⁰³ Even the guerrillas were sometimes mocked in this respect, and their exploits given little credence.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, British observers noted that, rather than taking an active part in the struggle against the French, a large number of the inhabitants seemed actually to be partial to them, or at least sought only to live at peace with both sides, there being several stories of British troops marching into Spanish villages to be greeted by frightened shouts of 'Long live France!'.¹⁰⁵ Such incidents were greeted with laughter or with pity as often as they were with anger, but there still can be no doubt that the British army came to harbour a deep dislike and contempt for the popu-

lace, and this provides some explanation for the savage treatment that was meted out in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz and San Sebastián when they were taken by assault. Lest it be thought that these incidents were solely the product of the madness induced by the horrors through which their assailants had to pass, it is worth quoting Grattan's description of the feeling that prevailed at Badajoz before the attack began: 'The soldiers were full of ardour . . . their joy was indescribable. Badajoz had ever been looked upon by them as unfriendly to our troops, and they contemplated with delight the prospect of having it in their power. . . .'¹⁰⁶

How far such resentment was justified is a moot point. There are many accounts of hostility and even cruelty being shown towards the British troops, who were, with the exception of the Irish, never able to escape from the stigma of heresy.¹⁰⁷ On occasion, too, they were cheated or robbed by the inhabitants.¹⁰⁸ Yet other testimonies allege that the Spaniards were by nature affable and generous.¹⁰⁹ Unlike the Portuguese, however, who were said to have behaved with 'a grovelling deference', they 'never regarded others as in any way superior to themselves', and furthermore refused to demonstrate 'the monstrous combination of servility towards those in alliance with them, and independence of spirit towards their declared oppressors' which many of their allies apparently expected them to portray.¹¹⁰ Meanwhile, the British sense of superiority was fuelled not only by the failings of the Spanish army, but also by the poverty and backwardness which they saw around them.¹¹¹ As Grattan ruefully remarked, they therefore failed to moderate their behaviour, still less to placate the feelings of the inhabitants.¹¹² So insufferable was their arrogance, indeed, that they sometimes refused even to acknowledge that there was any reason for them to be unpopular.¹¹³ The results of British insouciance and brutality were admirably caught by the pen of Joseph Sherer:

It is with pain I am compelled to confess that the manners of my . . . countrymen soon wrought a change in the kind dispositions of this people. When they saw many assume as a right all which they had accorded from politeness, and receive their respectful attentions and cordial services as expressions of homage due to the courage, wealth and power of the British nation; when the simplicity of their manners, their frugality, the spareness of their diet, the peculiarities of their dress and their

religious prejudices were made the subject of derision and ridicule; when they witnessed scenes of brutal intoxication, and were occasionally exposed to vulgar insult from uneducated and over-bearing Englishmen . . . they began to examine our individual titles to their esteem, they were often very soon disenchanted, and the spirit which we had awakened in them manifested itself in various acts of neglect, rudeness and even resentment.¹¹⁴

Although many British soldiers were by no means so deficient in their bearing towards the inhabitants, the problem was sufficiently serious to compound the damage that had already been done to the Anglo-Spanish alliance by the disappointments and disagreements of the first four years of the Peninsular War. On both sides expectations had been too high. Refusing to acknowledge the difficulties which the other had to overcome, both Britain and Spain came to feel that they were shouldering an unfair burden. In such an atmosphere, the growth of disillusionment was all too rapid, with mutual congratulation soon giving way to mutual recrimination, if not to accusations of betrayal. Meanwhile, matters were exacerbated by the manner in which the Portuguese had succumbed to British tutelage: for the British, such behaviour was a model for all their Iberian allies, but for the Spaniards it was an object lesson of the dangers to which their national independence was exposed. Rather than be patronised and organised, they adopted a pose of intransigence that infuriated their allies. If the alliance held firm, it was out of necessity alone, and not through the trust and friendship which would be necessary if Britain was to achieve the greater control of the Spanish war effort to which she increasingly aspired.

2

The Making of a Generalissimo

From the earliest days of the Peninsular War, British observers found a solution to the disorder that characterised the Spanish war in the appointment of a commander-in-chief. As early as 20 August 1808, Lord Castlereagh wrote to Sir Hew Dalrymple, 'It appears to me that if there were means of making the whole Spanish force now in arms unite under a common head . . . so large a body might be assembled against the French . . . position as to render it untenable. It is my wish therefore that upon the subject you would take the earliest means of consulting General Castaños and other leading military men.'¹ The fragmentation of the Spanish army into a number of independent provincial forces had been a reflection of the heterogeneous leadership of the patriot cause. Once a new government had been formed, the British supposed that it would proceed to the appointment of a commander-in-chief.² Such hopes paid no attention to the circumstances that had produced the Spanish uprising. Though directed against the French, it had also been a political revolution of which the army had been a major casualty. Many senior officers had been murdered or imprisoned, whilst the important role which it had enjoyed in the governance of Bourbon Spain had been brought to an end. From May 1808 onwards, political authority lay in the hands of a civilian oligarchy whose attitude towards the military had always been one of jealousy and resentment.

Having once succeeded in subordinating the generals to their control, Spain's new rulers were most unwilling to restore them to any measure of their former influence. Justification for such a course was found in claims that in the last resort the authority of a general must be founded upon the bayonets of his troops rather than upon the consent of the people. It therefore followed that the war effort must inevitably suffer should the generals be in charge, for the Spaniards would be fighting for tyranny rather than

liberty, and thus have no reason to sacrifice their all.³ Suspicion of the military was inflamed still further by the activities of General Cuesta, who not only erected a personal dictatorship in Old Castile, but also attempted to defy the Junta Central.⁴ Though Cuesta's actions had been repudiated by his fellow generals, they had nevertheless caused great alarm. Cuesta was eventually forced to surrender, but he had still dealt a serious blow to the chances of the appointment of a commander-in-chief.⁵ Even supposing that the political climate had been more favourable, a further obstacle existed in personal jealousies that divided the Spanish *generalato*. In addition to men who had already held high rank before 1808 such as Castaños and Cuesta, it now contained commanders such as Blake and Palafox who had risen to prominence as a direct result of the uprising. The tension that was certain to be engendered by such a situation was inflamed by events that had taken place during the first campaigns of the war. Blake and Cuesta, for example, were bitterly divided by the mutual recriminations that followed their defeat at Medina de Río Seco (14 July 1808). As is suggested by the failure of a council of war that was convened in Madrid for this very purpose on 5 September 1808, it was futile to expect the military to settle upon a common candidate for the supreme command.⁶ Nor did matters improve thereafter. As Henry Wellesley complained in March 1811:

There is not a general officer in the service of Spain whose character has not in some way or other suffered in the opinion of his countrymen by the events of the revolution. One is objected to because he took the constitutional oath at Bayonne, another because he accompanied Joseph Bonaparte to Madrid, a third for having been present when that city capitulated, a fourth because he was a member of the Central Junta or of the [first] Regency. All these generals have their partisans and followers in the different armies so that if one of them happens to be appointed to a command he is certain of finding two thirds of his army prepared to counteract his views, to undermine his reputation, and, by every species of intrigue and misrepresentation, either to compel him to resign his command, or to conduct himself in such a manner as to render his removal . . . a matter of necessity.⁷

The generals' inability to offer a coherent alternative left the

Junta Central free to take the control of strategy into its own hands. Rather than appointing a single general to command the motley collection of provincial forces that were assembling on the Ebro to oppose the impending French counter-attack, it decreed the formation of 'a general military junta which shall . . . propose the plans most appropriate for ridding the country of our perfidious enemies'.⁸ The British were furious. As Lord William Bentinck, who had been sent to liaise with the Junta Central, complained:

The Spanish government have come to the strange resolution of making the command separate and independent of each other. You will observe by a comparison of the strength of these divisions with that of the French army that each is very inferior in effective force to that of the French army concentrated before them . . . In consequence, the power of uniting and combining these different bodies . . . to be lodged in some one person became indispensable for the salvation of the whole . . . The non-appointment of General Castaños as commander-in-chief is the more extraordinary as he happens to be without a competitor . . . It is also much to be desired in as much as his various great and good qualities ensure the utmost harmony.⁹

In accordance with these views Bentinck submitted a formal protest to the president of the Junta Central, the Conde de Floridablanca:

Where is the man of common sense who hesitates about the necessity of a supreme junta which shall direct all the various and dispersed resources and energies of the state into one centre of union and movement? All the juntas are willingly sacrificing their own personal consequence for this important national object. If this is indispensable in the civil government, are not the reasons for a supreme authority in the army even more striking? If . . . all these different corps were each of them superior to the French army . . . not much danger would arise . . . But . . . the most able distribution and the most hearty co-operation of the whole force will not be more than sufficient for the expulsion of the French. Let the Spanish troops consider themselves invincible. But let not the Spanish government be deluded by the same opinion . . .

The public opinion expects such an appointment. The same good sense that has universally required a head to the government will also require a head to the army. It may be right for the supreme council to nominate the commanders of the different corps. But one person upon the spot can be entrusted with the disposition of the different parts of the army according to existing circumstances. The French will not refer their operations to a Spanish council of war where all the different commanders may quietly agree upon what is best to be done. In war much is uncertain and the movements of the French will be quick. They can only be met by the same quickness, combination and union . . . The commander-in-chief alone can make the decisions . . . ¹⁰

Although it is hard to see how anything could have saved the Spaniards from Napoleon's retribution, there is no doubt that the absence of a commander-in-chief made a material contribution to the subsequent *débâcle*. Yet the Junta Central still did not appoint a *generalísimo* for fear that such a move would lead to the downfall of the revolution. Cut off from the provinces of Old Castile, Galicia and Asturias by the advance of the French armies, the Junta had delegated its authority in those provinces to the *Marqués de la Romana*, who had replaced Blake as commander of the Army of the Left. However, the Marquess was bitterly opposed to the Spanish revolution, which he regarded as an outbreak of jacobinism.¹¹ Practically his first action had been to refuse to recognise the new government.¹² In May 1809 he overthrew the Junta of Asturias, and would have gone on to dispose of that of Galicia as well had not the Junta Central forestalled him by calling him to Seville to fill a vacancy in its ranks.¹³ If the government's intention in doing so had been to stifle La Romana by implicating him in its actions, then it was to be sorely disappointed. In October 1809 the Marquess published a manifesto in which he denounced the Junta Central and demanded the formation of a regency, of which he undoubtedly envisaged himself as the president.¹⁴ Nor was La Romana the only general who was plotting against the government. Throughout 1809 the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox (the younger brother of the defender of Zaragoza) were implicated in a series of conspiracies whose aim was the overthrow of the Junta Central. In January 1810 their efforts finally bore fruit in a rebellion in Seville that broke out in the wake of its evacuation

by the government.¹⁵ Although the success of the conspirators was overtaken by the fall of Seville and the Junta Central's surrender of power into the hands of a regency in Cádiz, the new régime showed no disposition to accept the principle of a commander-in-chief. Indeed, in June 1810 a permanent general staff was established with the specific purpose of providing the government with the means to implement the control of strategy to which it aspired.¹⁶

Faced with this refusal to appoint a Spanish general as commander-in-chief, it was not long before the British were considering whether they themselves might not be able to co-ordinate the operations of their allies. Even before the Junta Central had refused to take such a step, Doyle had suggested to Lord Castlereagh that the British might use the power of the purse to free the Spanish armies from their political masters.¹⁷ Following the rejection of his protests to the Junta Central, Bentinck had proposed that some unity of action might be achieved if the various British liaison officers in Spain could persuade the Spanish generals to act in accordance with the demands of a plan of operations drawn up by himself.¹⁸ Yet it was by no means certain that the Spaniards would listen to the advice that was proffered to them: if Doyle became a favourite of José Palafox and Whittingham of Castaños, at Bilbao the *Marqués de Portago* deliberately excluded Sir James Leith from his counsels.¹⁹ In short, it was apparent that to achieve their aims the British would have to work for the appointment of one of their own generals as commander-in-chief.

How this was to be achieved in the face not only of the Spaniards' anti-militarism, but also of their notorious national pride, was unclear. Yet it was a Spaniard who first raised the issue. As the victorious French armies closed in on Madrid in December 1808, an unnamed Spanish nobleman is supposed to have sent a message to Sir John Moore suggesting that he should press for the command of the Spanish armies and a reform of the government as the only means of saving Spain.²⁰ Supposing the claim to be true, its most likely explanation was that the opposition to the Junta Central was seeking to win British support for a change of régime in exchange for the hint of military concessions. The command, in short, had already become a 'political football' which Spanish leaders exploited as the need arose. Hearing of the offer, the Junta Central's Secretary of State, Martín de Garay, seems to have decided to make use of it for his own ends. With the Junta under

constant threat from its numerous domestic enemies, military success – and, by extension, British support – became ever more important to its political survival. In an attempt to shame the British into returning to Spain, on 12 March 1809 Garay sent Caning a long remonstrance in which he laid much emphasis on the heroism of the Spanish people, and protested at the manner in which Great Britain had failed to lend adequate support to the patriots. Particular attention was given to the disasters of November–December 1808, which were laid directly to the account of the British. Instead of remaining for so long at Salamanca, Moore, it was argued, should have marched to support the Spanish armies on the Ebro. Yet ‘General Moore did no such thing . . . requests, solicitations and a formal offer made to Mr Frere that Sir John should be invested with the command of our troops . . . all proved fruitless’.²¹ At the same time, Garay employed the command-in-chief as a bait to persuade John Hookham Frere to support the removal of the ever-hostile Cuesta from the command of the Army of Extremadura. The ambassador was completely deceived. Impossible though it is to see how he could have believed that any Spanish régime, let alone one so weak as the Junta Central, could have made good such an offer, on 9 June Frere wrote to Wellington to inform him that many of its members had come to the conclusion that Cuesta must be relieved of his duties, and further that, ‘If Soult’s army had been surrounded and taken prisoner . . . there would have been a brilliancy in the event which would have enabled your friends here to make you the same offers which it had before been proposed to hold out to Sir John Moore, that of the chief command. Any decided success on the part of the British troops against the army of Marshal Victor would probably have the same effect.’²²

In falling for Garay’s blandishments, Frere was influenced by his conception of Britain’s long-term interests. In an undated memorandum the ambassador argued that Britain and France represented the two different forms by which countries came to dominate their fellows. On the one hand, Britain’s maritime supremacy allowed her to achieve a position of pre-eminence through her superior commerce and industry, whilst, on the other, France was able to overawe her neighbours through the superiority of her armies. As the former was probably the more unpopular on account of the real differences that it could make to living standards, it followed that had Napoleon been less aggressive he might

have welded all of Europe into a great anti-British coalition, instead of which he was driving all of Europe into Britain’s arms. Once France was defeated, however, there was no guarantee that Britain’s popularity would prove at all durable, for her commercial hegemony would again become apparent. It therefore behoved the British for the time being to adopt the guise of ‘a military power, a character in which we can never inspire apprehension or jealousy . . . and which, without derogating from our naval superiority, would prevent it from being considered as our only attribute’. As far as the war in Spain was concerned, if the Spaniards were to drive the French beyond the Pyrenees by their own force, extirpate all French influences from their culture and society, and erect a system of constitutional government, ‘they will have brought about precisely that state of things in which France will become their natural ally and Britain their only enemy’: without any danger on the continent, the Spaniards would once again fall out with Britain over their American colonies. To prevent a resurrection of a Franco-Spanish maritime bloc, Spain must be reduced to a client state, and ‘should not be able to attribute her military deliverance to her own means alone independent of British military assistance’.²³

For all Frere’s cynicism, the military rationale for the appointment of a *generalísimo* remained as pressing as ever. Despite the useful precedent created by the appointment of Sir William Carr Beresford to the command of the Portuguese army in February 1809, there was little hope of the ambassador achieving his ambitions, for Wellington had not yet obtained the overwhelming level of success that would alone be enough to overcome Spanish sensibilities. On the contrary, there was much Spanish dissatisfaction with his conduct of the Oporto campaign. On 3 May 1809 Cuesta complained to the Minister of War that the object of British strategy appeared to be ‘never to expose their troops, from whence it happens that decisive battles by land never take place, and that they are sacrificed in retreats’.²⁴ The Marqués de la Romana was almost equally unenthusiastic: not only did he lament the failure to destroy Soult’s army, but he felt that the Portuguese should have been allowed to enter Galicia to assist in the expulsion of the French.²⁵ Even had Wellington’s prestige been greater, the military situation was simply not desperate enough to persuade the Junta Central to adopt so humiliating and politically dangerous a mea-

sure. Sensing the reality of the situation, the British general wrote to Frere:

I am much flattered by the notion entertained by some of the persons in authority at Seville of appointing me to the command of the Spanish armies. I have received no instructions from Government upon that subject, but I believe that it was considered an object of great importance in England that the commander-in-chief of the British troops should have that situation, but one more likely to be obtained by refraining from pressing it, and by leaving it to the Spanish government themselves to discover the expediency of the arrangement than by any suggestion on our parts.²⁶

Although the near-disaster of the Talavera campaign was not enough to shake this policy of *laissez faire*, it certainly persuaded Wellington that further operations in the hinterland of Spain were out of the question unless he was given the command of the Spanish armies. In a dispatch to Marquess Wellesley – who had just replaced Frere as British ambassador – dated 24 August, he first of all justified his decision to withdraw within the Portuguese frontier on the grounds of his inability to subsist his army and of the persistent Spanish misbehaviour on the battlefield. He then turned to the question of future military co-operation. In so far as defensive operations were concerned, Wellington believed that so long as the Spaniards held the line of the Tagus in Extremadura, there was no reason why he should go to their assistance. Not only were the Spaniards perfectly safe from frontal assaults, but the French could not turn their flanks. Nor did an attack appear to be a likely possibility, given that many of the troops who had been employed in the Talavera campaign had already been withdrawn into Old Castile. The only result of a return to the Tagus would therefore be to renew the logistical problems which had so bedevilled inter-allied relations in the previous months. Wellington was no more accommodating on the subject of a renewal of the offensive. As he pointed out, the French forces in Spain probably outnumbered the allies, and were certainly superior to them in quality, particularly in so far as the Spaniards were concerned. An advance across the Tagus towards Madrid would therefore fall into precisely the same difficulties as before. If the French were not once again to threaten to cut the British army off from Portugal,

then it would be necessary to hold the passes which led into the Tagus valley from Old Castile. The Spaniards could not be entrusted with this crucial task, however. Furthermore, even if the passes were properly protected, there would still be nothing to prevent Soult, Ney and Mortier from reinforcing the garrison of Madrid to such an extent as to put an end to all hopes of further progress. As the quality of the Spanish forces had been shown to be appalling, it followed that all the work would have to be done by the British army, which was clearly much too small for the demands that would be placed upon it. Wellington therefore felt that he had no option but to withdraw into Portuguese Extremadura, where he would at least be able to feed his troops whilst still providing some indirect protection to Andalucía.²⁷

The following day Wellington developed these ideas further in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, which he began by demonstrating not only that the allies were outnumbered and outclassed, but also that the Spanish armies in northern Spain could not take the field on account of their want of cavalry. In addition to increasing the numerical advantage enjoyed by the French, this effectively ruled out the possibility of an offensive in the south, for the campaign of Talavera had shown beyond all doubt that success was unattainable unless steps were taken to neutralise the enemy forces in Old Castile. Yet even had this not been the case, the quality of the Spanish troops was so poor that it was impossible to place any reliance upon them in formal operations. As the British army could not be reinforced to the point at which it could take the field alone, its only hope was to maintain a bridgehead in Portugal, which Wellington maintained that he could certainly do. If Spain was to be defended instead – for this was incompatible with the defence of Portugal – it was essential that the British army should be very heavily reinforced and allowed to garrison Cádiz, and that Wellington should be appointed as Spanish commander-in-chief, failing which Britain should not 'have anything to do with Spanish warfare on any ground whatever'.²⁸

Very similar conclusions had in the meantime been drawn by the British government. In the wake of the exaggerated hopes of 1808, the collapse of the Spanish armies and the ignominious return of Sir John Moore's expeditionary force had raised a political furore. Whereas the opposition had been prepared to support the Spanish war in 1808, it now turned upon the government, questioning not only the manner in which Moore's campaign had

been conducted, but also the very principle of aid to Spain. Although the government weathered the tempest without too much difficulty, it was apparent that its position in the Commons was increasingly precarious. Nor were matters aided by the successive scandals that beset first the Duke of York and then Lord Castlereagh over the abuse of patronage. Though committed to the war in the Peninsula, Canning, in particular, was convinced that the government could not afford to incur any further loss of credibility. With this in mind, not to mention an eye to his own advancement, he embarked upon the campaign to strengthen the government that was eventually to lead to its complete collapse and the notorious duel between the Foreign Secretary and Lord Castlereagh. In the meantime, Canning was determined to do whatever he could to lessen the chance of further Peninsular disasters. When Garay raised the subject of the command-in-chief, he therefore chose to take his words at face value. In replying to the Secretary of State's letter of 12 March 1809, he remarked how glad he was that the offer that had been made to Moore was now to be repeated to 'a commander whose talents are even greater than his reputation, and whose genius, I am persuaded, will be found to be more powerful in proportion as the sphere of its exertion is enlarged'.²⁹ When Wellesley was sent out to replace Frere, his instructions included an injunction to investigate the possibility of having Wellington invested with the supreme command. Although it was clear that the command could not be demanded of the Spaniards, and that it was unlikely to be offered so long as Cuesta remained in command of the Army of Extremadura, Canning still felt that 'if obtained it would probably afford the best chance of remedying all inconveniences, and would be above all things likely to ensure that promptitude and unity of action by which alone any very extended and important operation could be carried into execution'.³⁰

Canning's desire to see the Spanish armies placed under British command was undoubtedly strengthened by the Talavera campaign. In the autumn of 1808 there had been some possibility that the British army might be placed under the command of a Spanish commander-in-chief.³¹ On 12 August 1809 Canning wrote to Marquess Wellesley, 'It is to be understood distinctly . . . that in no case is the British commander to place himself under the orders of the Spanish generalissimo, much less of any Spanish general commanding a separate army.' Nor was this all: if the Spaniards

wanted the British to continue the struggle in Spain, they would have to provide them with adequate transport and supplies, and, if Wellington thought it necessary, to accept a British garrison in Cádiz, and surrender control of their army.³² In a further dispatch of 25 August the Foreign Secretary made it clear that his conditions now extended to the removal of General Cuesta.³³ In making these demands, Canning was still as much concerned with the political situation in England as he was with the safety of the British army. As he wrote to Wellesley two days later, 'I think it is important that you should know what is the impression made here by . . . Cuesta's retreat from Talavera. The abandonment of our wounded will never be forgiven, and such will be the feeling excited here . . . that I am persuaded we shall not be able to keep parliament and the country up to the support of the Spanish cause unless we receive some signal reparation.' Though an offer of the supreme command would undoubtedly have constituted such a gesture, in Canning's eyes there could be no limit to the demands that Great Britain should place upon the Spaniards: although he protested that continued support for Spain was his 'dearest wish', he remarked, 'That wish cannot be rationally executed except by our obtaining a full control over all their affairs political and military, which, if we are to go on together at all, the present seems the moment for obtaining'.³⁴

In view of the controversy that had been caused by the attempt to place a garrison in Cádiz, it is difficult to see how the Foreign Secretary could have entertained such views unless it was with the clandestine intention of providing Great Britain with a pretext to concentrate all her attentions upon Portugal. That such was Canning's intention is suggested by a private letter to Wellesley of 12 August:

I confess I shall not be surprised if . . . there is nothing to be done but to keep our army together and bring forward the Portuguese so as to have a strong force to fall upon the flank or the rear of the enemy if he advances after receiving his reinforcements, leaving the Spaniards in the meantime to harass him in detail. Whatever the Spaniards have attempted more than this since the battle of Bailén (which was won I know not how) has succeeded so ill that I confess I am alarmed when I hear of their determination to take the field. Under any leader whom they now have a system of extended operation by them-

selves seems hopeless and mischievous, and I shall not be surprised if Sir Arthur should think the advantage of unity of command in his person too dearly purchased by the responsibility that would attach to it . . .

If the result should be that there is no mode in which the British army can act in Spain creditably and advantageously, the next object is to get creditably out of the difficulty, and I hope that the instructions which I send you today [see above] will at least put that within your power. The refusal of . . . the conditions, if it is thought right to press them (*at the risk of their being accepted*), would afford a plain and strong ground . . . for withdrawing from the contest in Spain . . . Whatever be the result of the discussion, I am persuaded that it is very necessary to let the Spaniards see that if they are not at once more active and more tractable we shall soon leave them to themselves. At present they think they are sure of us and that they have a right to us, and that instead of every assistance we afford them being matter of fresh acknowledgement, every point upon which we hesitate is an injury and a breach of engagement.³⁵

Fortunately for the allies, Wellesley was acute enough to realise that the British needed the Spaniards rather more than Canning was prepared to admit. As Whittingham wrote, 'However the conduct of the Spanish army may increase the difficulties of co-operation, alienate the spirit of the English from their cause, and even apparently justify a total separation of the interest of the two nations, yet it must never be forgotten that in fighting the cause of Spain, we are struggling for the last hope of continental Europe.' The way to restore harmony to the alliance, Whittingham continued, was not to bully the Spaniards, but rather to pour reinforcements into the Peninsula in order to restore its confidence in Great Britain.³⁶ Financial difficulties apart, Spanish mistrust was already so great that it is difficult to see any other means by which it could be broken down. In the immediate aftermath of the Talavera campaign, moreover, the Spaniards were still showing no signs of contrition. Far from making concessions, they were rather pressing for a counter-attack.³⁷ In reply to Canning's demands, Wellesley simply stated that, in view of the disorganised state of the Spanish armies, not to mention the Junta Central's complete inability to supply the British forces, the latter should not operate in Spain for the foreseeable future. To have presented

the Foreign Secretary's demands would in consequence have been counter-productive. In the first place, they would 'occasion great jealousy in the minds of those best affected to the British cause, . . . strengthen the misrepresentations of the French and of their partisans in Spain, . . . impair the general confidence of the Spanish nation in our sincerity and good faith, and . . . induce the people to believe that our army had retreated for the purpose of enabling me to obtain those objects'. At the same time, as there was no means whereby the ills of the Spanish army could be reformed, 'the British commander-in-chief could not now accept the command of the Spanish troops, and the immediate appointment of a Spanish commander-in-chief might preclude all future possibility of introducing a British officer to that command'. As for Cádiz, 'the demand for a British garrison . . . would certainly be refused, and such a refusal might oppose great obstacles to the success of any proposition of that nature upon a future occasion'.³⁸

Wellesley's refusal to press home these demands did not imply that he disagreed with them: on the contrary, in the same dispatch he made it abundantly clear that he believed them to be essential for the conduct of future operations in Spain. Unlike Canning, however, he was not prepared to leave the Spaniards to their own devices. Returning to Britain to take up the post of Foreign Secretary in the Perceval administration, he bent his attentions – or, at least, such of them as he deigned to bring to bear on the business of government – to reinforcing the British commitment to Spain. Though the command of the Spanish army undoubtedly remained a corollary of that commitment, for the time being it was allowed to lapse as an issue in Anglo-Spanish relations: with Wellington immured in Portugal, there was no reason for it to be required nor opportunity for it to be exercised. The question does not seem to have been revived until the beginning of 1811. On 25 January 1811, Henry Wellesley informed Wellington that one of the deputies had told him that there was 'a strong disposition in the Cortes to appoint you generalissimo of the Spanish armies, and to employ English officers in the army'.³⁹ Asked what he thought of this, Wellington replied that 'if the Spanish government had made the arrangement for the command of their armies eighteen months ago which they now propose to make, the cause would have been safe, and I think much might be done to save it if this arrangement were made provided it is connected with others for disciplining, paying, feeding, and clothing the troops'. Never-

theless, he continued, should such an offer now be made he would answer that he could not accept it without the assent of the British government, and even then only if it was coupled with measures of the sort he had described. In the meantime he would continue to advise the various Spanish generals with whom he was in contact on the course which he thought they ought to undertake, adding drily 'to which plans I hope they will be induced to pay more attention than they have hitherto when they find that the government intended that I should command the army'.⁴⁰ Writing in much the same vein to Lord Liverpool, the Duke remarked, 'It is impossible for me to say what will be the effect of such an arrangement now. It will certainly not answer any purpose whatever, excepting to throw upon me additional trouble and the blame and odium of certain ultimate failure if measures are not taken to feed and pay the Spanish troops. If these measures are taken, some advantage would undoubtedly be derived to the cause from combining in one system . . . all the troops on this side of the Peninsula.'⁴¹ In thus imposing conditions on the circumstances in which he would accept the command, Wellington was adding a new element to the discussion which the more sober elements of the government could not but regard with alarm. Though Wellesley continued to press for ever greater involvement in the Peninsula, he seems to have paid little heed to the financial realities of Britain's position. As Lord Liverpool made haste to point out to the Duke, Britain would have difficulty in maintaining its present level of commitment to the Peninsula, let alone in taking on further responsibilities. 'After bringing these circumstances under your view', Liverpool concluded, 'it appears scarcely necessary to add that under the present circumstances we see no adequate advantage that would result from the command of the Spanish armies being conferred on you.' All that he would agree to was that, so long as it did not involve Great Britain in greater expense, Wellington was welcome to come to some arrangement for the Spanish armies operating on the frontiers of Portugal to be placed under his command.⁴²

Liverpool's negative response to the suggestion that Wellington might be offered the command throws the extent to which the Wellesley family had become committed to the Peninsula into sharp relief. With the exclusion of Canning from the government after his duel with Lord Castlereagh, support for Wellington as *generalísimo* came largely from the Wellesleys. If the Duke looked

askance at the prospect, it was solely because the command appeared a 'poisoned chalice' that would do more damage to his reputation than bring benefit to his operations. As for his brothers, on 12 January 1811 Henry Wellesley wrote that 'I hope that the Cortes will feel the necessity of taking some more decisive steps with regard to the augmenting of the army and to the state of its discipline. If they would make Arthur generalissimo and employ British officers, and if England would assist in a loan of eight or ten millions . . . (which would save sixty in the end), I am persuaded that in a year there would not be a Frenchman in the Peninsula.'⁴³ The unknown deputy who suggested that an offer might be imminent therefore found a willing listener as well as a gullible one: that the prospect had been ephemeral is sufficiently demonstrated by the angry reaction to the ambassador's suggestion that Wellington should be given command of the frontier provinces. Not that the tumult was sufficient to deter Marquess Wellesley. With a blithe disregard for political reality, that 'brilliant incapacity' chose the immediate aftermath of this episode as the moment officially to instruct Henry Wellesley to repeat the very demands that had just been rejected, with the additional provocation of requiring the troops involved to be placed under the command of British officers.⁴⁴ Once again it was only the Duke of Wellington who showed any caution: apprised of this demand by Henry Wellesley, he advised that it should not be made, remarking, 'I have no doubt whatever that the Spanish government will not comply with this requisition, and from all that I see and hear I am convinced that the demand will tend to interrupt much of the harmony and good will which exist among us at present.'⁴⁵

With both Henry and Richard Wellesley convinced it was only their brother who could secure the reform of the Spanish army, the command remained central to their thinking. In October 1811, for example, the ambassador proposed that the British government should offer to maintain 100 000 Spanish troops on a permanent basis on condition that they were placed at Wellington's disposal.⁴⁶ For success to be achieved, however, they were well aware that something would have to be done to influence the climate of opinion in their favour. From March 1811 onwards, the Wellesleys therefore worked through anglophiles in the Cortes, such as the Galician deputy, Andrés Angel de la Vega, to secure the removal of the antagonistic General Blake from the Regency.⁴⁷ Unsuccessful

attempts were also made to establish a British mouthpiece in the press, whose importance was becoming ever more apparent.⁴⁸

The political situation that reigned in the Spanish capital was to prove a major element in Wellington's eventual appointment as *generalísimo*. After the fall of the Junta Central in January 1810 Spain was officially ruled by a series of regencies, but the focus of political power was constituted by the famous Cortes of Cádiz, a unicameral national assembly, whose members represented not just metropolitan Spain, but also her colonies. Virtually the first action of its deputies had been to proclaim the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Having thus thrown off all limits to its authority, the Cortes had gone on to humble the Regency by forcing its members to swear an oath of allegiance. When they demurred they were immediately replaced by a more pliable body headed by General Blake, an officer who had never shown any signs of wanting to challenge the supremacy of the civil power. No sooner had it been installed than the Cortes embarked upon a dramatic programme of political, social and judicial reform that was to reach its apogee in the Constitution of 1812. Spain was transformed into a limited constitutional monarchy, and the legislative power placed in the hands of a national parliament elected by a system of indirect suffrage. The heterogeneous collection of kingdoms, principalities, estates and corporations that had made up Bourbon Spain was swept away in favour of a unified judicial and administrative system, which in turn implied the abolition of the privileges of the nobility and the clergy. To ensure that the army could not be used to crush the constitutional system, it was given a system of universal conscription (on the grounds that citizen soldiers would never overthrow their own liberties), the Cortes assumed control of the military budget, and a national guard was established that was to be under the command of the civil authorities.

The political reforms that were introduced by the Cortes were accompanied by major social change. Before 1808 the most dynamic class in Spanish society had been constituted by an admixture of the petty nobility, the rural bourgeoisie, and the commercial and professional classes. Although these groups had increased in prosperity during the last years of the eighteenth century thanks to the rapid expansion of Spain's trade with the Americas, their ability to better themselves had been restricted by the manner in which the Church and the upper nobility held large

quantities of land that was never allowed to appear upon the open market. In addition, although they provided the bulk of the lower and middle echelons of the bureaucracy and the judiciary, they were held back by the influence which the aristocracy continued to enjoy at the Bourbon court. Finally, they were forced to endure the overweening arrogance of an officer corps in which they found it difficult to build a satisfactory career. It is therefore no surprise to find the Cortes abolishing all restrictions on the sale and ownership of land, seizing the property of the religious orders, putting an end to the privileges of the nobility, and throwing the officer corps open to all sections of the propertied classes. In an additional blow to the pretensions of the old army, the Captains General and other military authorities were officially subordinated to the *jefes políticos*, or civil governors, who were appointed to each province. Determined to attack the ignorance and superstition that were conceived to be at the root of Spain's decay, the Cortes also decreed the freedom of the press, and abolished the Inquisition. In making such sweeping changes, the Cortes was clearly responding to the aspirations of the classes which provided the backbone of its constituency. Yet the reformers were never so crude as to proclaim their sectionalism. Instead, they camouflaged their attack on authority and privilege with claims that they were restoring the liberty of the Spanish people, and thus maintaining the popular enthusiasm which they always held to be the motor of the war effort.⁴⁹

After the restoration of Spanish absolutism in 1814, it was alleged that the Cortes' radicalism was due solely to the fact that it met in Cádiz in circumstances in which it could not possibly reflect the conservative sentiments that prevailed in the rest of the country.⁵⁰ There is a grain of truth in this argument to the extent that Cádiz, with its powerful merchant community and long tradition of intercourse with the outside world, was the most radical city in Spain. For as long as the Cortes remained there, the reformers had the services of a burgeoning press as well as of a crowd that could frequently be mobilised in support of liberal orators. At the same time, the occupation of so much of Spain by the French and the immense distance that separated the capital from the American colonies led to the election of a number of substitutes from inhabitants of those territories who happened to be resident at Cádiz. In this manner it is probable that fewer outright reactionaries were elected than would otherwise have

been the case, but the *suplentes* never constituted more than one-third of the Cortes, and were gradually replaced by deputies who had been properly chosen by their own constituents.⁵¹ If the liberals triumphed it was because they gave expression to the current of reformism that had been unleashed by the national uprising of May 1808. Evidence for this tendency may be found in the *Informes sobre Cortes*, a national 'opinion poll' carried out by the Junta Central in 1809 to ascertain the views of the nation on the manner in which the Cortes should be called, and the measures which it should adopt. Though few of the answers went so far as to demand a written constitution, the majority nevertheless called for a wide range of reforms of every type.⁵² The pressure for reform was stimulated by events both before and after 1808. On the one hand, the Bourbons were held to have presided over Spain's complete humiliation. On the other, it could be argued that unless the abuses of the *ancien régime* were overcome, Spain would never be able to expel the invaders. By providing the most coherent expression of a programme of reform, the liberals were initially able to win the support of many deputies who would normally have been inclined to a more conservative posture.

The general accord was not to survive for long. As time went on so the broadly reformist coalition that had dominated the Cortes at the time of its convocation became increasingly fragmented. The liberals' belief that the regeneration of Spain could not be achieved without a root-and-branch transformation of Spanish society was not shared by many of their fellows. Whilst many deputies were genuinely concerned at the failings of the *ancien régime*, they sought salvation in a restoration of the very rights and privileges which the liberals were seeking to overturn. As the liberals proceeded with their reforms, many moderate deputies were driven to ally themselves with those men who had opposed the cause of reform from the very beginning. There thus emerged the traditionalist group known as the *serviles*, or 'slavish ones'. Finally, with the arrival of the deputies who had been elected to represent the empire, a third group appeared in the ranks of the Cortes. Though generally inclined towards the cause of reform, these *americanos* were not tied to either side of the ideological divide, but instead tended to vote in accordance with the dictates of their own particular interests.

The extent to which British diplomacy appreciated the complexity of the political situation in Cádiz must be open to doubt.

For example, the importance which the liberals placed on the connection between the Constitution of 1812 and the struggle against the French was lost on Henry Wellesley, who persistently bemoaned the manner in which the Cortes refused to devote its entire attention to the conduct of the war.⁵³ In the same way, Britain's naiveté with regard to matters hispanic laid her open to manipulation by the Spaniards. When concessions were forthcoming, their intention was as much to strengthen one or other of the factions in Cádiz as it was to propitiate the British. The fall of the Blake Regency in January 1812 is a case in point. Henry Wellesley had wanted to rid himself of General Blake ever since the disputes of March 1811, and had been working to achieve this end in collusion with Andrés Angel de la Vega. As 1811 drew to a close, these intrigues at last seemed to be bearing fruit, allowing Henry Wellesley to write, 'All parties seem agreed upon the necessity of a change . . . , and I am assured that the new government will be formed upon the principle of a cordial union with Great Britain.'⁵⁴ On 21 January 1812 a new Regency was duly appointed, composed of the Duque del Infantado (whom the ambassador had always wanted to see placed at the head of affairs), Admiral Villavicencio, the Conde del Abisbal, and two obscure bureaucrats named Mosquera and Rivas.⁵⁵

Encouraging though this development may have been, it cannot simply be attributed to a newfound readiness to fall in with the requirements of British policy. The outbreak of the Latin American revolutions had seriously reduced one of the last sources of revenue remaining to the Cádiz government. Whereas 225 500 000 *reales*, or approximately fifty-five per cent of Spain's revenue, had been received from America in 1810, in 1811 the figure plummeted to only 70 900 000. Nor were the denuded resources available to the Regency in the Peninsula even remotely capable of making good the shortfall.⁵⁶ The signing of a treaty of subsidy, whereby the British would provide the Spaniards with a guaranteed sum of money each year, consequently became a matter of the first importance. So desperate was the Cortes to obtain such a treaty that it offered the British a limited amount of direct trade with the American colonies, whilst even Henry Wellesley realised that 'those who are most anxious to bring about a change which shall be satisfactory to the government of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent are perhaps principally influenced by the idea that Spain will thereby obtain larger succours from Great Britain'.⁵⁷ However,

these factors were not alone in producing the change of government. Cold, arrogant and lacking in charisma, Blake had never been especially popular, whilst his star had been further dimmed by an almost unbroken string of military defeats.⁵⁸ Since July 1811 he had been absent in the Levante, where he had put up a singularly lacklustre defence against Suchet's invasion of Valencia. Beaten outside that city on 26 December, he was now besieged within its walls with no hope of relief. His disgrace had occasioned fresh intrigues in Cádiz, where an attempt was afoot to place Princess Maria Carlota at the head of the Regency. La Carlota, as she was nicknamed, was the elder sister of Fernando VII and the wife of the Prince Regent of Portugal. As ambitious as she was unscrupulous, the princess had been attempting to build up a party in Cádiz that would ultimately engineer her election to the Regency.⁵⁹ Thanks to the radicalism exhibited by the liberals, her cause became a natural rallying point for the conservative camp, which seized upon the dissatisfaction with the Blake Regency as a means of pursuing its own ends. A good example of this tactic may be found in an anonymous pamphlet entitled *Indagación de las causas de los malos sucesos de nuestros ejércitos y medios de removerlos*, whose basic argument was that, as all Spain's ills could be attributed to a collapse of political authority, she now needed a strong government headed by a member of the royal family.⁶⁰ In accordance with this thinking, a motion was introduced in the Cortes calling for the formation of a new regency headed by the Princess of Brazil. Realising that her election would have represented their downfall, the liberals were left with no option but to pre-empt their opponents by forcing through a change in the government on their own terms.⁶¹

The new Regency proved to be little improvement on its predecessor: few of its members were men of real talent, whilst clientage, waste, extravagance and incompetence were all too widespread.⁶² Yet Henry Wellesley initially professed himself to be delighted, writing to Wellington, 'Everything is going on very well here, and I am persuaded that my expectations with regard to the new Regency will be fully realised.'⁶³ What he does not seem to have understood is that the change in the Regency had only been brought about because it happened to suit the interests of the liberals. It nevertheless appeared that the policy which Wellington had outlined to Frere in June 1809 was being vindicated. The recapture of the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in Janu-

ary and April 1812 acted as a powerful antidote to the negative impression that had been created by the retreats of previous years, as well as boosting the reputation of the Duke of Wellington. Not even the appalling behaviour of the victors was enough to shake Wellington's growing popularity: when the Duke returned to Ciudad Rodrigo on 26 April to the *vivas* of the population, his path was strewn with flowers, and he was forced to stand on the balcony of the town hall for an hour and a half whilst he received the applause of the crowd.⁶⁴ Fulsome displays of pro-British feeling also began to appear in the press.⁶⁵ Whether or not it was as a result of such articles, for the first time British observers began to come across what seemed to be a genuine desire for the Spanish army to be placed in British hands.⁶⁶

Wellington's victory at Salamanca on 22 July 1812 swelled his popularity to fresh heights. Not only were the inhabitants of that city overjoyed at their liberation, but they did all that they could do help the allied army.⁶⁷ All seemed well even at Cádiz, from where Henry Wellesley wrote exultantly to his brother:

I heartily wish you joy of your glorious victory, and I wish you could have witnessed the effect it produced here. It is the only time I have witnessed in this town anything like the feelings of patriotism and enthusiasm which I believe to exist in other parts of Spain. A deputation of the Cortes came to congratulate me upon the victory, and the people assembled under my windows, hailing you as the saviour of Spain. The Cortes at the recommendation of the Regency has conferred upon you the order of the Golden Fleece . . . In short, ample justice is done to your exertions . . . and I am sure that there is not a man in Cádiz (with the exception of those who are Frenchmen in their hearts) who does not feel that it is to your exertions that there is still a probability of his being delivered from the French.⁶⁸

Important though Wellington's victories undoubtedly were, their impact was outshone by his occupation of Madrid. Following his defeat of Marmont, the Duke decided that his opponents in Old Castile had been so badly beaten that they could pose no real threat to the allies for some considerable time. After detaching a force to watch the Army of Portugal, he turned southwards towards Madrid, whose occupation promised major political and military advantages. The subsequent march from Valladolid to

Segovia and across the Sierra de Guadarrama was a triumphal progress. The British had been received warmly enough at Segovia, but when the Duke finally rode into Madrid on 12 August the joy of the civilian population knew no bounds. The Duke himself has left little record of the celebrations, but his soldiers describe the delight with which the crowds filled the streets, cheering their liberators, embracing the officers and men, and plying them with food and drink. The attentions of the women were especially welcome: Private Wheeler describes them as 'the most bewitching and interesting little devils I had ever seen', whilst Cocks remarked that 'I was never kissed by so many pretty girls in a day in all my life, or ever expect to be again.' As for the Duke, 'Ladies threw down their most valuable veils and shawls for his horse to pass over; they got hold of his legs as he sat on horseback and kissed them.' The only sour note came when the British soldiers found that the men wanted to kiss them as well. As Wheeler writes, 'Amidst all this pleasure and happiness we were obliged to submit to a custom so unenglish that I cannot but feel disgust now I am writing. It was to be kissed by the men. What made it still worse, their breath was so highly seasoned with garlic, then their huge moustaches well stiffened with sweat, dust and snuff, it was like having a hair broom pushed into one's face that had been daubed in a dirty gutter.'⁶⁹ The inhabitants continued to show the greatest warmth and courtesy towards the troops in the days that followed. However, many of the British were less than impressed when they were invited to a gala bullfight on 31 August. Though some of them found the spectacle to be exciting, others were disgusted by what they regarded as just one more proof of Spanish savagery.⁷⁰

The last factor that was influential in the growth of Wellington's prestige was the attitude that he adopted towards the Spanish revolution. Although the Duke had serious doubts with regard to the Constitution of 1812, wherever he went on his progress across Spain, his first step was to have it publicly proclaimed, whilst he enjoined the Spanish generals who were acting in conjunction with him to do the same.⁷¹ The effect was to increase his stock still further. As Henry Wellesley remarked, 'Depend upon it, my dear Arthur, you never did a wiser thing in your life than in proclaiming the constitution at Madrid. You can have no conception of the effect that it has produced here. Whether the constitution be good or bad, it seems to be generally approved in Spain and this is all we have to look to.'⁷² Nor was the Duke unaware

of the need to conciliate Spanish pride: when he rode into Madrid, for example, he was accompanied by Carlos de España on his left-hand side, and the guerrilla, Julián Sánchez, on his right.⁷³

The growth in Wellington's prestige among the Spaniards had begun to bear fruit in the military sphere well before the liberation of Madrid. As well as the support that was given to the projects of Doyle and Whittingham, permission was given for the British army to recruit 5000 Spaniards into its service.⁷⁴ In contrast to the ambivalent behaviour of the Junta Central in 1809, the Regency had instructed its generals to lend their fullest support to the Anglo-Portuguese army in the campaign of 1812. On 31 May 1812, the Minister of War had written to General Castaños informing him that Wellington intended to take the field against the forces of Marshal Marmont in Old Castile. The Spanish general was in consequence immediately to concentrate all the disposable forces of the three armies under his command and launch a powerful diversionary operation in support of the allied army.⁷⁵ The continued deficiencies of the Spanish armies in terms of their training and equipment frequently lessened the efficacy of such co-operation, but it cannot be denied that most of the Spanish commanders did their best to fall in with Wellington's requirements. From the earliest days of his election to the Regency, the Conde del Abisbal had been assuring Henry Wellesley of his eagerness to co-operate with the Duke of Wellington.⁷⁶ On occasion, other generals had even solicited his advice when they received orders from the government which they felt might interfere with his plans.⁷⁷ The triumphs of July and August 1812 also produced a flood of letters from military commanders, congratulating the Duke on his successes and assuring him of their continued co-operation.⁷⁸ On 28 September the British diplomat, Thomas Sydenham, therefore felt justified in writing that 'from the respect and confidence which all the Spanish officers place in his military talents and what I may term his unassuming character, he now exercises almost as much authority as he could do under a regular commission from the government'.⁷⁹

Such optimism was hopelessly misplaced. In reality Spanish prejudice was as strong as ever, whilst many of the people seemed weary and apathetic, there being little response to the call for Spaniards to enlist in the British army.⁸⁰ Carried away by the superficial mood of co-operation, Henry Wellesley once more turned to the idea that Wellington should be elevated to the

supreme command, telling the Duke that he believed a prolonged campaign involving co-operation with the Spanish forces to be impossible unless 'the command of the whole is put into your hands'.⁸¹ For his brother the problem was not so pressing, however. If he was still entirely dependent upon the Spanish armies to neutralise the French numerical superiority, his own troops now numbered 66 000 men rather than the 20 000 he had commanded in 1809. Though success would be as unattainable as ever without the Spaniards, Wellington could at least be certain that his army was strong enough for its survival to be assured. For the time being he could continue to operate without the supreme command, but even had that not been the case he was still convinced that it was unwise to trespass too far upon Spanish pride. As he wrote to Castlereagh, the Spaniards were 'an obstinate race, in nature not unlike their mules, and I am certain that the only rule in dealing with them is to make them request as a favour everything it is wished in which we should interfere'.⁸²

In September 1812 it finally appeared that Wellington's patience was to be vindicated. The key figure in breaking the deadlock was to be the British surrogate in the Cortes, Andrés Angel de la Vega, who had now been elected to its presidency. Long since convinced of the need for Wellington to be given the command of the Spanish armies, Vega's determination to achieve this goal was strengthened by the parallel that could be drawn with the events of 1808, when the Spaniards had recaptured Madrid only to be overwhelmed by Napoleon's subsequent counter-attack on account of the weakness of the Junta Central. Interestingly, however, Toreno notes that he was also motivated by a belief that British protection had to be assured for the success of political change. After airing his views in private Vega won the support of a number of liberal deputies, including Francisco Ciscar (brother of the Gabriel Ciscar who served in both the Blake and Borbón regencies), Agustín Argüelles, José María Calatrava, the Conde de Toreno, Fernando Navarro, José Mejía, Francisco Golfín (who was also an army officer), Juan María Herrera and Francisco Martínez de Tejada. Eventually this group decided that the question should be laid before the Cortes in secret session so that it could be discussed without fear either of offending the British or of provoking the ire of public opinion. If there really had been any fear that the proposal would be defeated, it was soon shown to have been without foundation, for on 19 September 1812 the Cortes voted to offer

Wellington the command. The only opposition came from a number of Catalan deputies who argued that Wellington's appointment presaged an ever growing tide of British influence that would endanger the nascent Catalan cotton industry. After referring the question to the Regency, which agreed that Wellington could be offered the command on condition that certain limits were placed on his authority, on 22 September the Cortes finally passed a decree appointing him to the command of all the Spanish armies in the Peninsula.⁸³

Henry Wellesley was understandably delighted with this development, of which he denied all responsibility, attributing it to 'the unanimous voice of the nation'.⁸⁴ Writing to Lord Castlereagh on 1 October, he enthused, 'After the experience of four years there is no-one in Spain who believes that this country will be saved by the measures of this or any other government composed of Spaniards, and it is to the prevalence of this sentiment in the Cortes, as much as the increasing confidence of the nation in the British army and in its commander, that we are indebted for the sacrifice of those prejudices which existed to placing a foreigner at the head of the Spanish armies.'⁸⁵ If the ambassador did not see any significance in the fact that it was the liberals who had taken the lead, however, an inspection of the terms of the decree of 22 September 1812, which ran as follows, should surely have given pause to his enthusiasm:

It being indispensable for the quicker and more certain destruction of the enemy that there should be unity in the plans and operations of the allied armies in the Peninsula, and impossible to attain that important object unless a single general should have the command-in-chief of them all, the General and Extraordinary Cortes, attending to the urgent necessity of profiting from the glorious triumphs of the allied armies and the favourable circumstances which are bringing closer the so-much-desired moment when the ills that have afflicted the nation will be brought to an end, and greatly appreciating the distinguished talents and relevant services of the Duque del Ciudad Rodrigo, Captain General of the national armies, have decreed that during the co-operation of the allied forces in the defence of the Peninsula, the command-in-chief of them all should be conferred upon him to be exercised in accordance with the Ordenanzas Generales, with the sole difference that . . . what is laid down

by the sixth article of the first section of the seventh volume [whereby the civil authorities in a war zone were exempted from the authority of the commander of the armies in the field] should be extended to the whole of the Peninsula, the illustrious commander having the duty to communicate with the Spanish government via the Secretary of State for war.⁸⁶

A careful examination of this monstrously tortuous document (which has deliberately been translated without any attempt to alleviate its complexity) provides clear evidence that the Spanish offer was anything but ingenuous. In the first place, the Duke was not appointed to be the army's titular commander-in-chief, a role still enjoyed by Fernando VII and exercised in his absence by the Council of Regency. Instead, he was merely to command the army in the field, the significance being that he was not allowed to make any alteration in its internal arrangements. Confirmation that this was indeed the Spanish intention may be found in a pamphlet that was published towards the end of 1812. Writing in defence of the decree of 22 September, the author pointed out that it had specifically used the phrase 'commander-in-chief' rather than *generalísimo* to describe Wellington's appointment. The two roles were very different, 'the first indicating the direction of the . . . armies, and [the second] extending to the government and arrangement of their constituent units'. Proof that Wellington was no *generalísimo* could be found in the provision for his command to be exercised in conjunction with the Ordenanzas, for these contained no reference to any such position, whose only precedent was the unlimited powers that had been conferred upon such figures as the royal favourite, Manuel de Godoy.⁸⁷ Nor was Wellington even to be free in the exercise of his command. Although the verb used to describe his relationship with the government – *entenderse* – may be translated to mean that he should simply keep the Regency informed of his operations, it can also imply that the Duke was to submit his plans for its approval. Finally, being limited to the metropolis, Wellington's command would give him no means of interfering with Spain's attempts to restore order to her rebellious colonies.

Viewed in this light, the offer may be seen as one more attempt on the part of the Spaniards to manipulate their allies for their own purposes. In the past the British had on several occasions severely compromised successive Spanish governments through

their refusal to co-operate in the military sphere. For example, Wellington's withdrawal into Portugal after the Talavera campaign had deprived the Junta Central of the support that it needed to restore its political credibility. As the Anglo-Portuguese forces were regarded as auxiliaries, the Spaniards could in any case see no reason why they should not be placed at their disposal. Evidence for these pretensions may be found in events earlier in 1812 when a junta of generals was set up in Cádiz under the patronage of the Conde del Abisbal, and the British commander at Cádiz invited to participate in its discussions. According to Henry Wellesley, the purpose of this body was to ensure that the Spanish forces in Andalucía and Extremadura were properly supplied and to co-ordinate their operations with those of the Anglo-Portuguese army.⁸⁸ However, Wellington maintained that the junta was superfluous: not only had he already discussed every possible course of action with General Castaños, who was in command of all the troops in western and northwestern Spain, but he professed himself to be completely averse to adopting 'plans to forward the operations of such a corps as that of Ballesteros or even that of Galicia'; instead, it was rather for the Spaniards to forward the operations of the Duke.⁸⁹ As Wellington wrote to Lord Liverpool:

I am very anxious to be as much as possible free to carry on any operation or not as I may think proper . . . The Spaniards . . . have long pressed for a military convention for the execution of a particular plan of operations. It has always appeared to me that I was the only person in the Peninsula who really commanded an army, and that as I command it under restrictions and instructions imposed by Your Lordship, I ought not to consent to lend myself to such a convention unless I should see such an army formed in Spain capable by its numbers, its equipment and its efficiency to effect some important object in our common operations. Now there is no such army, and the consequence of entering into such a convention would be that I should bind myself . . . to perform a certain operation even after my own judgement should have convinced me that . . . I ought to discontinue it.⁹⁰

In addition to securing control of the Anglo-Portuguese army, the liberals in particular saw important political advantages in Wellington's appointment. In nominating the Duke for the

supreme command in the Cortes, Francisco Ciscar had made use of military arguments, and had specifically warned of the danger of 'losing the fruits of the battle on the Tormes [i.e. of Salamanca] as we in some measure lost those of Bailén'.⁹¹ At about the same time that the matter was being discussed in secret in the Cortes, similar arguments appeared in the liberal press.⁹² Yet only a few months earlier the liberals had shown their refusal to subordinate the dictates of political dogma to those of military necessity in the debate which had been held on the Spanish guerrillas. For reasons which are discussed elsewhere, the guerrillas actually caused almost as many problems to the Spaniards as they did to the French. By 1812 it had become apparent that steps had to be taken to check the proliferation of the *partidas*, to curb the independence of their commanders and co-ordinate their operations with those of the regular armies, and, above all, to prevent them from giving shelter to deserters who preferred 'rioting and plunder and living in free quarters with the guerillas to being drilled and starved in the regular army'.⁹³ Despite the overwhelming evidence that the guerrillas could not liberate Spain by their own efforts, and actually sapped the strength of the regular armies by which the French would ultimately have to be driven across the Pyrenees, the liberals denounced the regulations that were introduced to regulate their operations for fear that they would stifle popular enthusiasm.⁹⁴ Nor did their opinions show any signs of change: in March 1813, for example, the liberal journalist, Alvaro Flórez Estrada, published a panegyric on the guerrillas in which he claimed that they alone had been the salvation of Spain.⁹⁵

If dogma should have continued to play so important a role in liberal policy with regard to the guerrillas, there is no reason why their attitude towards the supreme command should have been any different. Whilst some liberals were undoubtedly genuine in advocating the military advantages that were to be expected from Wellington's appointment, many others were influenced solely by calculation. Spanish military historians have accused the Cortes of seeking solely to block the election of a Spanish general, but it is difficult to see any officer who could have taken Wellington's place.⁹⁶ A more plausible explanation for their activities is provided by a consideration of the political situation that pertained in Cádiz in 1812. The Regency that had been elected to replace that of General Blake in January 1812 was a far more conservative body than its predecessor. Of its members, by far the most important

was the Duque del Infantado who before 1808 had been implicated in the aristocratic intrigue that had culminated in Fernando VII's enthronement as a puppet king in March 1808. Infantado's presence had been counter-balanced by that of the more liberal Conde del Abisbal, but in August 1812 the situation was suddenly transformed when the Count resigned on account of the storm of criticism engendered by the defeat of his brother, José O'Donnell, at Castalla (21 July 1812).⁹⁷

The prospect that Abisbal might be replaced by a conservative was by no means the only danger facing the liberals, for the Princess of Brazil had once again started to press her claims to the regency. In an earlier attempt to garner support by capitalising on the growing anglophobia at Cádiz, she had written the Cortes a letter in which she denounced Britain's policy with regard to Latin America.⁹⁸ Yet with breathtaking impudence she now wrote to Wellington, denying that she was anti-British and promising always to work in favour of the alliance.⁹⁹ In addition, the Portuguese ambassador, who was one of her supporters, approached Henry Wellesley to obtain his support.¹⁰⁰ As it happened, the British had no intention of favouring La Carlota, but the liberals were not aware of this; indeed, the ambassador was showing signs of flirting with the cause of reaction, having agreed to act as an intermediary for Abisbal, who, for all his supposed liberalism, was venting his spleen in demands for the executive to be strengthened at the expense of the Cortes.¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, a second Regent, Admiral Villavicencio, was also threatening to resign on account of a quarrel with one of his fellows. Fearing that their enemies would be able to secure a traditionalist government by default, the liberals decided that they would once again have to form a new Regency, to which end Vega paid a call on Henry Wellesley, whose approbation both liberals and *serviles* had come to regard as necessary for the success of any political manoeuvre. Informed that Vega and his friends were anxious to have his opinion, the ambassador replied that he would not give any government his approval unless he first received assurances that it would immediately appoint a commander-in-chief with the 'powers necessary to render the army efficient'. As if this was not enough, 'proper persons' were to be appointed to collect and distribute the huge amount of war material that had been abandoned by the French, measures adopted to ensure that the troops were properly fed,

paid and clothed, and efficient Ministers appointed to the government.¹⁰²

In presenting this *diktat*, Wellesley was moved by a genuine fear that the fruits of Salamanca would be thrown away, Abisbal's resignation having in his eyes deprived the Regency of the only one of its members who had taken the slightest interest in military affairs.¹⁰³ Yet for him to claim that he had had nothing to do with Wellington's appointment was extremely disingenuous. The very day after he had seen the ambassador, Vega returned and told him that 'a motion would very shortly be made in the Cortes for appointing Lord Wellington Generalissimo of the Spanish armies'. So anxious was Vega that the offer should not be rejected that following the decree of 22 September he visited Wellesley yet again to assure him that the Cortes was ready to invest the Duke with any powers that he felt to be necessary.¹⁰⁴ Although Vega had no authority to make such a promise, it was as well that he should have done so, for the intended recipient of the command had every intention of making his acceptance conditional on his ability to transform the Spanish army into an adequate fighting force that would not bring disgrace upon its general. Indeed, Wellington's initial reaction differed markedly from the enthusiasm displayed by his brother, to whom he wrote, 'We shall see in what form the proposal will be made to me to command the Spanish army, which I will accept of, if it should be conferred in such a manner as to enable me to be of any service to the cause.'¹⁰⁵

In so far as the command itself was concerned, Wellington's perception of the role which he had been proffered was bound up with his experience of the Spanish army. Ever since his first encounters with his Spanish allies, Wellington had maintained that their abiding sin was a lack of discipline. Although he agreed that their officers were of poor quality, he attributed the major share of the responsibility to the perennial lack of pay, clothing, food and transport. In addition to reducing the value of the Spanish forces in battle, it also prevented them on occasion from taking the field at all; hence the failure of the Spaniards to take any of the pressure off his own army during the French invasion of Portugal in 1810–11. In view of these circumstances Wellington had always maintained that no good could result either from his being given the supreme command or from the employment of British officers in the Spanish army unless the Spaniards were properly provided for. As he wrote to Henry Wellesley:

I consider troops that are neither paid, fed nor disciplined (and they cannot be disciplined, and there can be no subordination amongst them unless they are paid and fed) to be dangerous only to themselves when assembled in large bodies . . . I never will voluntarily command troops who cannot and will not obey, and therefore I am not desirous of having anything to say to the command of the Spanish troops till I shall see the means provided for their food and pay, and till I shall be certain that the regular issue of these has been the effect of introducing among them a regular system of subordination and discipline.¹⁰⁶

These considerations had led Wellington to believe that he should be given the powers that he considered necessary, not simply to lead the army into battle, but also to transform it into an effective fighting force. As he had suggested to Lord Liverpool in May 1812, one of the ways in which this might be done was for him to take control of the subsidies paid to the Regency by the British government so as to ensure that they were only spent on that part of the army that could be made fit for service.¹⁰⁷ As yet these powers remained unstated, but of one thing Wellington was absolutely clear: he was utterly determined 'to guard against the pretensions which the Spanish government might form to direct the operations of the war in consequence of this appointment of me to command the Spanish armies'.¹⁰⁸

Herein, then, lay a recipe for disaster. The Duke of Wellington had finally been appointed to command the Spanish armies for reasons that were at least as much political as they were military. What was worse, the Spaniards clearly believed that he had only been given the power actually to lead their forces in the field, and had specifically prohibited him from exercising the wide-ranging political authority that Wellington regarded as a *sine qua non* of his appointment. Whether the Duke had permission to make any changes in the organisation and composition of the army is not so clear, but it is certainly the case that, thanks to the excesses of the patriotic press, Spanish public opinion was not prepared for such a programme of reform. Finally, both the Spanish government and many of its generals were possessed of a strong desire to exercise a greater measure of control over the operations of Wellington's army. Yet, as he was soon to lay out in greater detail, the Duke was determined that he should be given the power to reorganise the Spanish forces as well as to ensure that they were

properly supplied and equipped. In addition, he was highly suspicious that the offer of the supreme command cloaked an attempt by the Spaniards to gain control of his forces, a pretension to which he had no intention of submitting. So disparate were the British and Spanish positions that a conflict was inevitable. If the clash was postponed because Wellington insisted on referring the Spanish offer to the British government before he would accept it, the problem could not be evaded forever. Once brought to the surface, it could not but threaten serious disruption.

3

Protest and Retreat, September–November 1812

Thanks to his insistence on referring the decree of 22 September to the British government, the Duke of Wellington did not formally accept the command of the Spanish army until 22 November.¹ The delay was unfortunate, for by the time that he did so the political and military situation had altered dramatically. Had Wellington been able to accept it immediately, his own prestige and the liberals' fear of a conservative coup would probably have been sufficient to secure as many concessions as he pleased from the Spaniards. Two months later, however, the Duke had suffered the most humiliating setback of his military career, whilst the secrecy which had hitherto concealed his appointment had been breached in dramatic fashion amidst a storm of controversy. With the best will in the world, it would now be harder for the Regency to make the sort of concessions which Wellington required, and yet the events of the campaign had confirmed the British general in his belief in their necessity. Conflict, in short, was becoming ever more certain.

The first blow to the alliance after Wellington's appointment was the result of the continued disruption attendant upon events in Latin America. For reasons which had already been explained, ever since the outbreak of the creole revolutions, Britain's policy had been to achieve a reconciliation between the contending parties, to which end she had eventually proposed that an Anglo-Spanish commission should be dispatched to the colonies to mediate between the two sides. As the Spaniards had proved less than willing to implement these proposals, negotiations had dragged on interminably, but by September 1812 the British government felt that it could afford to wait no longer. Only four days after Wellington's appointment, Henry Wellesley wrote to

the Spanish Secretary of State, Ignacio de la Pezuela, pointing out that 'the progressive failure in the supply of money experienced throughout the Peninsula . . . at this moment not only cripples but at no distant period may arrest the operations of the allied armies'. In addition, because Great Britain, as a loyal ally of Spain, had steadfastly declined every overture from the American rebels, a danger had emerged that they would turn for help 'to other powers and through them to the common enemy', with the result that the resources of the Spanish empire would not only be denied to the allies, but 'directed hostilely against the interests of the alliance'. It was therefore essential that the negotiations with regard to the mediation should be revived. These having failed on two main grounds – the refusal of the Spanish government to grant the colonies full commercial freedom, and to extend the mediation throughout the empire – the British government was now prepared to compromise upon its original proposals. The mediation could be limited to the areas that were actually in revolt if the Spaniards would agree that the commissioners were sent to America with the fullest powers, and that any settlements should be extended to all the colonies. Furthermore, a separate Spanish commission, accompanied by an agent of the British government, was immediately to be dispatched to Mexico, where the Morelos rebellion was then at its height, to offer an amnesty to the rebels and implement the Constitution of 1812.²

On 20 October the ambassador had still not received any response to his appeal, and therefore penned a second letter to the Regency in which he expanded upon the reasons why the matter had suddenly become of such great importance. The root of the problem was that the British government was finding it increasingly difficult to procure specie upon the London market, where the price of gold and silver had suddenly soared due to the huge profits that speculators could make by exporting bullion to St Petersburg thanks to the campaign of 1812. Further problems had resulted from the North American Non-Importation Act, a measure designed to exclude British trade from the United States, and the outbreak of the war of 1812. The British army in the Peninsula had been dependent on supplies of American grain that were shipped to Lisbon, and paid for in bills on the Treasury, which were then used by American merchants to buy British manufactures for export to the United States. As they could no longer indulge in this trade, the Americans had to be paid in coin.

The result was that the amount of bullion available to Wellington's army had fallen by seventy-five per cent. As there was no means by which the drain of specie could be halted, and no aid to be had from Cádiz, the only alternative was to find some means to restore the flow of bullion from the Spanish empire, Wellesley stating flatly that unless this was achieved, Britain would be unable either to continue her aid to Spain and Portugal or to maintain her army in the Peninsula. A peace settlement was therefore essential, to which end Wellesley demanded a prompt and positive answer to his letter of 26 September.³

The Regency's response to these demands was to reiterate its determination that the colonial revolts should be crushed by force, whilst raising a series of quibbling objections to the proposals that had been outlined in Henry Wellesley's letter of 26 September. Of these, perhaps the most transparent was the claim that because all the citizens of the Spanish empire had been placed on an equal basis by the Constitution of 1812, the Regency could not make special concessions to the Americans without at the same time damaging the interests of the *peninsulares*.⁴ To say that the ambassador was furious at this answer was an understatement. In a further letter he pointed out that, whatever the causes of the American insurrections, it was clear that Spain was not going to be able to reconquer America by force. In consequence, a negotiated settlement was the only means by which order might be restored and its resources harnessed to the common cause.⁵ Yet the Regency remained as stubborn as ever, and refused to return a firm answer until the whole matter had been considered by the Cortes.⁶

This exchange brought a temporary end to the controversy, but it had still wrought much harm. If on the one hand the British were angered and frustrated by what they regarded as the complete lack of realism displayed by their allies, on the other the Spaniards had been left with a strong impression of British duplicity. However genuine the British government may have been in its protestations of disinterest, the fact remained that its policy created a strong impression that it was actively in favour of the destruction of the Spanish empire. Free trade might well have been a *sine qua non* for a settlement with the colonies, but it was also a measure that could not but undermine Spanish rule, whilst at the same time advancing the commercial interests of Great Britain. When Wellesley suggested that without a settlement with the colonies Britain

could not continue the war, his activities inevitably assumed the appearance of blackmail. In the same way, Britain's consistent refusal to support the use of force against the rebels in the event of the mediation breaking down added weight to the belief that in reality she favoured their designs. All these suspicions were now resuscitated at a moment that could not have been more unfortunate, as the exchange coincided with the news of Wellington's appointment.

For some weeks after 22 September the decision of the Cortes in this respect had remained a secret. The only exception was the generals commanding the various Spanish armies, who were informed of their new commander in a letter from the Minister of War of 11 October, with the request that they should place themselves at the Duke's disposal.⁷ For all the congratulations that many Spanish generals had heaped upon the Duke of Wellington in the course of 1812, it would have been surprising had his appointment not created a certain amount of ill-feeling. Indeed, the ethics and the experience of the Spanish officer corps combined to create an ambience that was likely to produce considerable resentment at Wellington's appointment. In the course of the eighteenth century the army had fallen under the influence of an exaggerated cult of honour whose central tenet, expressed in its simplest terms, was that an officer should enjoy a respect commensurate with his status: as the only class of citizens who had voluntarily chosen if necessary to sacrifice their lives for the good of their fellows, it was but justice that they should be accorded a highly privileged position in society. The self-regard produced by this belief was so intense that it encouraged many officers to adopt an attitude of the most insufferable arrogance towards the civilian population. As the army's privileges were the subject of considerable jealousy on the part of the civilian oligarchy, just as conscription, requisitioning, and forced billeting were hated by the mass of the population, the result was the widespread anti-militarism that had been exhibited in the rising of 1808.

The impact of the uprising was redoubled by the Spanish War of Independence. Not only had the officer corps seen itself stripped of its pre-eminence and thrown open to all classes of society, but it was forced to undergo a prolonged period of military humiliation for which it was itself made the scapegoat. Ascribing Spain's many defeats to 'the shameful mania, the barbarous delirium, of believing that the old generals, being already versed

in the art, were . . . those best suited to the . . . implementation of strategy', *El Patriota* argued that 'in a new situation everything should be new . . . nobody should be employed but leaders formed, and almost born, in the revolution'.⁸ Such criticism was unfair, however. For all their faults – and they were many – Spain's generals had been placed in an impossible situation. Although their armies were badly outmatched by the French, in the exalted atmosphere of patriot Spain caution was liable to be confused with treason. For every commander that courted battle, there was another who was forced to take the field by the pressure of public opinion, or the demands of his political superiors. Yet the defeats that followed were invariably blamed upon the generals. Encouraged to believe that 'a people numerous and armed' would inevitably triumph over the 'slaves' and 'mercenaries' fielded by Napoleon, public opinion could find no other explanation for defeat than betrayal. Fugitives who wished to camouflage their own cowardice with stories of treachery were therefore provided with a ready audience, leaving the generals to be murdered by their own troops or recalled in disgrace.

The outlook and experiences of the officer corps were therefore such as to make some sort of protest against Wellington's appointment all but certain. As the work of the liberals, it also had all the appearances of a calculated insult, for it could reasonably be argued that their stress on a 'people's war' bore much of the responsibility for the army's humiliation. Nor could Spanish soldiers be expected to like the British: aside from the unhappy record of the years before 1812, the officer corps was permeated with the same residual anglophobia as the rest of Spanish society. For example, even General Girón, who was to prove one of Wellington's most loyal subordinates, accused the British of deliberately fomenting the French Revolution to facilitate their own ends.⁹ The importance of such feelings is suggested by the fact that the revolt was captained not by some embittered general of the *ancien régime*, but by one of the new commanders so much in favour with the liberals, Francisco López Ballesteros. In 1808 Ballesteros had been a retired infantry officer who was employed in the state tobacco monopoly. Promoted to the rank of major general by the Junta of Asturias, he came to prominence in May 1809, when he launched a successful raid on the French base at Santander. In the wake of this exploit Ballesteros was given the command of an Asturian division that was sent into León to reinforce the Army of the Left.



This force having been transferred to Badajoz, in February 1810 Ballesteros and his division were sent still further south with orders to harass the northern borders of French-held Andalucía. Operating from remote villages in the Sierra de Aracena, for the next fifteen months he conducted an incessant guerilla campaign against the forces of Marshal Soult, whilst also being present at the battle of La Albuera (16 May 1811).

Ballesteros' record had by no means been discreditable, but he was neither a military genius nor a paragon of all the virtues, whilst his troops gained an evil reputation for indiscipline. When they retreated into Portugal in January 1811, they committed so many disorders that Ballesteros was rebuked by the Duke of Wellington.¹⁰ Significantly enough, the Spaniards took this as a personal insult: denying that his men could possibly have been responsible, he demanded that he be given satisfaction, and his detractors punished.¹¹ However, for all his self-righteousness, he did nothing to prevent his troops from seizing supplies that were intended for other units during the Albuera campaign, nor from plundering the Portuguese frontier.¹² Indeed, so arbitrary did his conduct become that the Regency decided to transfer his divisions from its usual zone of operations to a new base at Algeciras.¹³

The move made little difference, for Ballesteros had been displaying considerable talents as a self-publicist. As the press was only too eager to laud a general who was a product of the revolution, 'it thus occurred that news of extraordinary victories were circulating to his credit without anybody even knowing the name of the place where they were supposed to have taken place'.¹⁴ As a result, when Ballesteros passed through the capital in August 1811, cheering crowds flocked to greet him and present him with a public subscription of 164 000 *reales*.¹⁵ Once he had reached Algeciras, the Spanish general launched a fresh series of raids that were to keep the French under constant harassment until they evacuated Andalucía in August the following year. Useful though these operations may have been to the allied cause – as was admitted even by so critical an observer as the Duke of Wellington¹⁶ – Ballesteros continued to show signs of inflated personal ambition. His dispatches were as exaggerated as they were bombastic;¹⁷ he made repeated attempts to have a force of British troops placed under his command;¹⁸ and in November 1811 he sent two of his *aides-de-camp* to London with the task of raising a public subscription for the upkeep of his division.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the press

continued to fill its pages with reports of his victories, whilst playing down such defeats as the one which he suffered at Bornos on 1 June 1812: for example, on 23 February 1812 the *Diario de la Tarde* reported that he had defeated 25 000 French troops outside Málaga, and on 12 April that he had captured Seville.²⁰

In 1812 his pride was flattered still further by his appointment to the command of the Fourth Army, which comprised all the troops in Andalucía, and Ballesteros began to entertain dictatorial ambitions which were even shared by certain British officers.²¹ Alarmed at his continued independence, in the summer of 1812 the Regency sought once again to uproot him, only to be forestalled by Henry Wellesley, who was concerned that such a move would prevent him from co-operating with the strategy Wellington had worked out for the campaign of Salamanca.²² Ballesteros was therefore left free to win fresh laurels from the French evacuation of southern Spain. Although his troops in fact did very little to hasten their departure, a number of adulatory poems appeared, acclaiming him as the liberator of Andalucía, and in at least one case demanding that he should be given supreme power.²³ Ignoring the orders of the Regency to pursue the retreating French and place himself in communication with the other allied armies, Ballesteros merely advanced as far as Granada where he established himself as a dictator, and embarked upon a fresh campaign of self-aggrandisement, remarking that the Regency should be hung from the nearest tree.²⁴

Bathed as he was in delusions of grandeur, Ballesteros' reaction to the news of Wellington's appointment as commander-in-chief was predictably violent. On 24 October 1812 he dispatched an open letter to the War Minister, José María de Carvajal, in which he made a great display of his services to Spain, and proclaimed his belief that she possessed sufficient resources to fight on alone against the French. As she was not 'the little kingdom of Portugal', but rather 'the greatest nation in the universe', Wellington's appointment constituted a national humiliation. In view of what had occurred in 1808, when Spain had been betrayed by a country with whom she had been allied as closely as she now was to Great Britain, it must also be regarded as a threat to her independence. Ballesteros therefore demanded that the government consult the opinion of the rest of the army, as well as of the nation at large, and announced that, should Wellington's appointment prove acceptable to them, he would tender his resignation.²⁵

As this document had within a few days been published throughout Andalucía, it was clear that it was intended as a call to arms. Recognising the challenge to its authority, the Regency acted with commendable promptitude. Orders were immediately dispatched to all Ballesteros' subordinates, informing them that he had been dismissed and that his instructions were henceforth to be disregarded. An officer named Díez de Rivera was in the meantime sent to Granada to secure the arrest of Ballesteros himself. Making contact with a number of the latter's subordinates, on 30 October Rivera had the troops that were stationed at Granada drawn up outside the city. In the meantime, detachments of the first battalion of Guardias Españolas were set to watch the gates. Although it seems incredible that all this activity should have been kept hidden from Ballesteros, the first he heard of it was when he awoke on the morning of 30 October. Hastily assembling his personal guard, he galloped through the streets of the city to the Elvira gate, shouting, '¡Viva la Patria!'. He apparently hoped to win the support of his troops by a timely harangue, but the Guardias Españolas, whose honorary colonel was the Duque de Infantado, stood firm: trapped within the city walls, Ballesteros was left with no option but to return to his residence. Despite several civilian demonstrations in his favour, the rebellion was effectively at an end.²⁶ Its leader was not yet finished, however: with astonishing aplomb, he protested that his arrest was a serious breach of discipline and an insult to his honour. At the same time, he announced that he had developed a sudden illness that prevented him from complying with the Regency's orders that he should be exiled to Ceuta. Finding that the government stood firm, he continued to delay his journey by every possible pretext, and produced a stream of manifestos in which he boasted of his great patriotism, protested his innocence, demanded a fair hearing, and warned that he was now so ill that the journey might actually kill him.²⁷ As all these documents quickly found their way into print, it is clear that Ballesteros hoped that he might yet be rescued from his predicament, but it was to no avail: early in December he was finally forced to embark for Ceuta.

Although the general had not succeeded in blocking the Duke's appointment, still less in achieving his own elevation in Wellington's stead, his rebellion precipitated the outbreak of public controversy of which the new commander-in-chief's supporters had been so afraid. Yet at first it appeared that the outcome would be wholly

favourable, Henry Wellesley being most emphatic as to the general condemnation of Ballesteros in Cádiz.²⁸ His opinion was sustained by the appearance of a series of manifestos and newspaper articles denouncing the rebellion. Among the earliest of these was that written by an anonymous *andaluz* bearing the date 1 November 1812. Maintaining the pious fiction that Ballesteros must have been led astray by the advice of a traitor, the author criticised his audacity in openly opposing the government, pointed out the illusory nature of the danger that Wellington represented to Spanish liberty, and stressed the indispensability of the alliance with Great Britain. After ridiculing Ballesteros' pride, he poured scorn on his revolt, and denounced all those who attempted to drive a wedge between the Spaniards and their allies. Even should the British eventually take over Spain, he claimed that their rule would be infinitely preferable to that of France, which was the only alternative offered by the supporters of General Ballesteros. In conclusion, the manifesto begged Ballesteros to see the error of his ways, praised the skill that had been shown by the government in bringing his rebellion to an end, and reminded the soldiers of the Fourth Army that it was their duty to fight not for their commander, but for Spain.²⁹

The arguments put forward by an anonymous manifesto published by the Estado Mayor General were even more damaging, for they suggested that Ballesteros was unlikely to obtain the support of the army. After first pointing out the need for the army always to be subordinated to the civilian authorities, the author described how Ballesteros had consistently disobeyed the orders of the government, and denounced the manner in which he had disrupted the unity of the nation and defied the will of its legitimate representatives on a matter of such importance. As there was no possible justification for the fears which Ballesteros had expressed, it was clear that his sole motive had been to 'obtain the slavery of his fellow citizens as the reward for his valour'.³⁰ Unattractive though the overt liberalism of this document may have been as far as the majority of officers were concerned, there was so powerful a military case against Ballesteros that he was unlikely to obtain their support. Yet it was not put forward by any organ belonging to the army, but rather by the Cádiz newspaper, *La Abeja Española*. The editor of this paper, José Mejía, had been one of the first proponents of Wellington's appointment. Horrified that the government should have remained silent in the

face of the growing storm of controversy, he took it upon himself to publish all the documents that were relevant to the affair, accompanying them with a scathing denunciation of Ballesteros' conduct in which the military arguments in favour of Wellington's appointment went hand-in-hand with an exposition of the manner in which the rebel general had placed at risk the whole edifice of constitutional liberty.³¹ Similar articles appeared in numerous other papers of all shades of political opinion, although in many cases it is apparent that the condemnation was made more in sorrow than in anger, with many writers being prepared to accept that the coup had been the fruit of patriotism rather than pride and ambition.³²

Nor was Ballesteros without his friends. Early in November a representation was made to the Regency by an anonymous citizen of Granada begging that the general be restored to the command of his army. Although the author made no attempt to defend the rebellion, he begged the Regency in the name of the Fatherland to pardon Ballesteros on the grounds that he could make 'the devastating hosts of that infernal and horrible monster, Napoleon, flee at the mere sound of his name'. This piece of bombast was accompanied by an affecting description of Granada's sorrow, as well as of the disorder and neglect with which it was now threatened. To save Spain from being deprived of so brave a general, or Granada of so caring a father, the author offered to be punished in his stead if only the Regency would allow him to resume his command.³³ A more serious protest was made in a pamphlet entitled *Vallesteros*, which took as its starting-point the claim that Britain's intervention in the Peninsula had been motivated by her own national interest. To have appointed the Duke of Wellington to the command of the Spanish armies was therefore a grievous error: as the Duke would remain the agent of a foreign government, Spain's destiny had been placed entirely at the mercy of Great Britain. Even if Spain was not betrayed, the decree of 22 September would dissipate the patriotic enthusiasm that had hitherto been the motor of the Spanish struggle. At the very least, it would also allow the British to ensure that the Spaniards, whose sacrifices had been the foundation of Wellington's success, remained 'the first for danger and the last for glory'. As Spain had an excellent army of her own and was in no way dependent upon Great Britain, the command-in-chief should therefore have been awarded to a Spanish general such as General Castaños. Far from

being a traitor, Ballesteros was not only a great soldier, but also a hero who should at least have been accorded a fair hearing.³⁴

Such arguments merely produced a fresh storm of condemnation. For example, 'El Verdadero Español' pointed out that Ballesteros could not save Spain, but was dependent on the British for his very survival. In the same way, Spain herself would have been overcome without their assistance. The three nations allied against the French were all mutually interdependent, for Wellington needed the Iberians as much as the Iberians needed the British. As there were in any case many precedents for foreigners being given the command of Spanish armies, the decision to appoint the Duke of Wellington did not degrade the Spanish nation in the slightest.³⁵ An even more devastating indictment came from the pen of 'El Patriota Madrileña' who demolished Ballesteros with thirty-six rhetorical questions. After establishing that the Cortes had the right to appoint the Duke of Wellington and to punish Ballesteros, the author pointed out that Spain was completely dependent on Great Britain, and that it was a *quijotismo ridículo* to boast of her great means when she had nothing. As for Wellington, he had no possible competitor among the Spanish generals, whilst there was no evidence that either he or his government wanted to enslave Spain. On the contrary, they had done everything possible to sustain her independence, and would be swayed even further in her favour by the decree of 22 September. In any case, Spain had nothing to fear, for if she could defy Napoleon, then she could also defy the British. As for those who attempted to drive a wedge between the allies, they were evidently French agents, for no patriotic Spaniard could possibly countenance such an intrigue. Finally, there was no sensible Spanish general who did not see the military necessity for Wellington's appointment, and who had not been willing to sacrifice his own ambition to the good of the nation.³⁶ Similar arguments were put forward by 'El Ciudadano Cordobés', whilst the Regency also joined the fray with a long and detailed account of how Ballesteros had been defying its authority for months.³⁷

These counterblasts were not sufficient to quell support for Ballesteros altogether, for his protagonists were defended in their turn by yet another anonymous pamphlet entitled *Defensa de la defensa del valiente general Vallesteros*.³⁸ Whether it was because Wellington's intentions had not yet become generally known, or because the Spaniard had attracted the jealousy of his fellows, hardly a

sabre rattled in his favour. A few officers shouted, 'Viva Ballesteros!' at a parade in Córdoba, whilst the governor of Ceuta received him more as an honoured guest than as a prisoner.³⁹ It was also rumoured that Ballesteros had been plotting to overthrow the government in conjunction with the old Junta of Seville.⁴⁰ Yet if such a plot existed, it can have had little support in the army: far from joining the rebellion, several Spanish commanders wrote to Wellington to congratulate him upon his appointment.⁴¹ In view of the events at the front, this must be regarded as somewhat surprising, for by the third week of November the Duke had been driven from most of his earlier conquests.

Despite a steady increase in the size of his army, which by the end of 1811 numbered 63 000 men, the Duke of Wellington was heavily outnumbered. In June 1811, for example, there were over 354 000 French troops in the Peninsula. Such odds made it impossible for Wellington to do more than hold his ground. In spite of the divisions that hampered the French high command, not to mention the difficulty which the invaders found in subsisting heavy troop concentrations for more than a short space of time, on every occasion that the Anglo-Portuguese army crossed the Spanish frontier, it had sooner or later been forced to retreat. On each occasion such a threat had been posed to the equilibrium of French conquest that the invaders had abandoned everything else in favour of crushing the Anglo-Portuguese. Yet if the allies could not invade Spain, the French could not invade Portugal. Thanks to Wellington's construction of the lines of Torres Vedras, the French could only have amassed the massive army needed to achieve success by evacuating a large part of their Spanish conquests. Not only was this politically impossible, but an army larger than that taken into Portugal by Marshal Massena in 1810 simply could not have been fed. The result was a prolonged stalemate that persisted throughout the year 1811. Wellington's army was unable to carry on protracted operations against the crucial border fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz without attracting the attentions of irresistible concentrations of French troops. Yet the 'non-battles' on the river Caya (22–28 June 1811) and at Alfayates (28 September 1811), in which Wellington's opponents refused to attack him in a defensive position of his own choosing, strongly suggested that the French lacked the will to carry the war across the Portuguese frontier. There was no such lack of offensive spirit in Wellington's headquarters, but the Duke could do nothing until

some change in the French dispositions allowed him to break the deadlock.

Given the course of events in the rest of the Peninsula, such an opportunity could not be long delayed. With the British immured in Portugal, there had been nothing to prevent the invaders from concentrating their attentions upon the areas of Spain that had remained in patriot hands after the fall of Andalucía in January 1810. During the next eighteen months Oviedo, Lérida, Tortosa, Tarragona and Badajoz had all been occupied at the cost of enormous Spanish casualties. In the autumn of 1811, moreover, Marshal Suchet's Army of Aragón had embarked upon the invasion of the Levante. Much criticism has been heaped upon the French commanders for this incessant pressure, for every step that they advanced actually rendered their position *vis-à-vis* Wellington's army that much more precarious. However, although first priority should ordinarily have been given to the elimination of this force, the continuing Spanish resistance could not be ignored. In short, the defeat of the Spaniards was a prerequisite for the expulsion of the British from the Peninsula. At the same time, it was also a political necessity: not only was it essential that a measure of reality should be imparted to the phantom reign of Joseph Bonaparte, but fresh conquests seemed to offer the only hope of satisfying Napoleon's demands that the Spanish war should be made to pay for itself.

Military and political factors in this manner combined to ensure that the French remained on the offensive in Spain whilst merely containing Wellington on the Portuguese frontier. Yet unless the invaders were to become badly over-extended, such a strategy required a constant stream of reinforcements. Not only was it imperative that a large force should be left to watch the Anglo-Portuguese, but the areas of French conquest had to be garrisoned against the continued Spanish resistance. Had the only danger been from the guerillas proper, then this need not have imposed too great a strain upon French resources: as long as the bands remained small and disorganised then they could be contained by a network of small posts and punitive columns. However, by 1812 many of the *partidas* had evolved into regular divisions that were capable of storming French strong points and beating their columns in the open field. At the same time, Napoleon's subordinates frequently had to contend with raiding forces of allied regulars. It was therefore not enough that they should merely garrison their

territories: in addition, they had no option but to retain small field armies in every occupied province. To add to their difficulties, the war in Spain was exceedingly costly, for thousands of troops died from the effects of diseases or privation, or were killed in the incessant fighting. In short, even a static bridgehead in the Peninsula would have represented a heavy drain on French manpower. Fresh conquests could only accentuate the need for reinforcements. Not only would the new gains have to be occupied and protected, but the French spearheads would also have to be kept up to strength: otherwise they would eventually become so weak that they would no longer be able to attain their objectives. In 1810 and 1811 this was no problem, for the Peninsula represented Napoleon's chief priority, but towards the end of the latter year his attention turned increasingly toward Russia. The troops who had once been sent across the Pyrenees now began to march eastward to form the Grande Armée, whilst the Peninsula was actually raided for reinforcements for the Russian expedition. As Napoleon had simultaneously been stressing that Marmont should march against Elvas and Suchet against Valencia, catastrophe could not be long postponed.

When Suchet commenced his operations in the Levante, it soon became apparent that he might not have enough troops to achieve success. Unable to send any reinforcements himself, Napoleon authorised him to draw in the two divisions which had occupied Aragón, replacing them with troops shifted eastwards from the area held by Dorsenne's Army of the North. In addition, Marmont was ordered to send an expeditionary force to threaten Valencia from the west. With his army badly weakened, Marmont would clearly be vulnerable to an allied counter-attack, but Napoleon insisted that Wellington was too weak to assume the offensive. Such was his confidence that he even ordered Marmont to disperse what remained of his army over a much wider area than before by taking over the western half of Old Castile from the Army of the North, the latter having been weakened by the removal of troops for service in both Russia and Aragón.

With the Army of Portugal so dispersed that it would be unable to meet an offensive, Wellington invested Ciudad Rodrigo. Conscious of the need for celerity, he took it by assault on 19 January 1812 after a siege of just twelve days, and thus inaugurated the series of campaigns that were to culminate eight months later in his triumphant entry into Madrid. Throughout these operations it

is apparent that Wellington was advancing into a position of ever greater danger, for in proportion to the extent to which he drove the French from their conquests so more and more enemy troops were enabled to concentrate against his armies. For a long while the inability of the French generals to co-operate with one another saved Wellington from having to contend with the full weight of the French armies. Yet the precarious nature of the Duke's position was reflected in the efforts which he took to launch a series of diversionary operations in which the Spaniards necessarily played a major role. When he marched on Badajoz, for example, he requested that the Spanish forces stationed in Galicia – then denominated the Sixth Army – should invade Old Castile should the Army of Portugal march to the aid of its colleagues in the south. At the same time, he suggested that the various Spanish forces in southern Spain threaten Seville so as to prevent Soult from relieving Badajoz.⁴² The offensive against Marmont later in the year was supported by an even more complex array of diversions. Aided by an amphibious force of sailors and marines under Sir Home Popham, the Seventh Army, which was composed of the guerillas of the Cantabrian mountains, was to neutralise the Army of the North; the Sixth Army was to besiege Astorga; the Fourth and Fifth Armies were to collaborate with the detached corps of General Hill in pinning Soult down in Andalucía; and an Anglo-Sicilian force was to be dispatched from Sicily to join with the Second and Third Armies in preventing Suchet from sending any troops to central Spain. For Wellington's strategy to have any chance of success, it was above all essential that the Spanish forces remained 'armies in being'. As he wrote to the British commander of one of the divisions of the Second Army, General Roche, after the defeat of Castalla, 'I only request that you may not be defeated again, and to accomplish this object you must not attack the French if success is not quite certain. Threaten as much as you can, but do not engage in serious affairs.'⁴³ The role of the Spaniards was simply to contain a part of the enemy forces, more than which Wellington did not expect. As he wrote to Lord Liverpool:

I have adopted every measure in my power to prevent the enemy from collecting their forces against us . . . But I am apprehensive that I can place no reliance on the effect to be produced by these troops. The guerillas, although active and willing, and although their operations in general occasion the

greatest annoyance to the enemy, are so little disciplined that they can do nothing against the French troops unless the latter are very inferior in numbers, and if the French take post in house or church of which they only barricade the entrance, both regular troops and guerillas are so ill-equipped . . . that the French can remain in security till relieved by a larger body.

Then General Castaños, although I believe he is equipped with a few guns for the attack of Astorga, has no pecuniary resources to enable him to collect and keep together the Army of Galicia. And if the enemy should abandon Astorga to its fate, and should withdraw General Bonnet from the Asturias, I am very apprehensive that the advantage of my march into Castile will be confined to regaining the principality of Asturias for General Castaños, and to the little advantages which the guerillas will derive from the evacuation of different parts of the country by the enemy's posts.⁴⁴

Co-operative though his allies may have been during the campaigns of January-August 1812, their performance had done little to lighten Wellington's forebodings. Yet having advanced to Madrid, the Duke was forced to place even greater reliance upon them than ever. After liberating the capital, it was impossible for him to give it up without a serious loss of face. Instead, he could only continue with the offensive in the hope that he could inflict such damage upon the enemy that they would never be able to recover the initiative. After the euphoria of 12 August the Duke was soon plunged into an ever deepening gloom. Not only was his army heavily outnumbered by its opponents, but it was also short of money.⁴⁵ As for the Spaniards, they seemed to be either unwilling or unable to take the war seriously. On 16 August he complained to Henry Wellesley, 'The time of the Spaniards here has been spent in *regocijos*, and never did I see such joy as there is in all ranks. We shall now, however, proceed to business, I hope, and shall think of raising and disciplining troops, and of finding means to pay and support them.'⁴⁶ His confidence in the Spaniards was in the meantime being further undermined by events before Astorga. Though only a minor fortress, this position had defied the Sixth Army since the siege began on 2 July. For want of sufficient artillery, the assailants had been forced to rely upon mining, and such slow progress was achieved that the senior officers of Sixth Army showed less and less willingness to take

the responsibility for the conduct of operations. In despair, Castaños wrote to the governor and offered him any terms he chose in exchange for his surrender. With his food supplies exhausted, the Frenchman decided that this was too good an offer to refuse, and at last gave up the fight.⁴⁷ Ironically enough, a relief column had only been a day's march away: finding that Wellington had not pursued him beyond Valladolid, Marmont's replacement as commander of the Army of Portugal, General Clauzel, had decided to launch a raid with the aim of relieving the beleaguered garrisons of Zamora, Toro and Astorga. Although the last was beyond help, the first two were rescued safely, and a large quantity of stores and military equipment removed from Valladolid. Though understated, Wellington's reaction was heartfelt: 'It is not very encouraging to find that the best army in Spain, that of Galicia, cannot take such a place as Astorga after a siege of more than two months, that every important operation must be performed by the allied British and Portuguese army, and that it would be imprudent to risk the best army in Spain alone in operations against the enemy, even after the enemy have sustained such a defeat as that near Salamanca.'⁴⁸

Although the Duke claimed that he 'was not discouraged by these facts', this is not the impression that is gained from the letters which he wrote to his brother, Henry. On 18 August he complained that the government had replaced the vital Intendant of Old Castile with an official whom he remembered from the Talavera campaign as being 'not only the most useless and inefficient of all God's creatures, but . . . an impediment to a business' who could not 'speak one word of truth'.⁴⁹ In the Duke's eyes, prospects for the future seemed bleak:

I do not at all like the way in which we are going on, particularly in relation to appointments to offices and great situations, in which branch of the government alone it is, I am afraid, in the power of the existing Regency to do much good.

They have sent an inefficient person, a Marqués del Palacio, to command in Extremadura, displacing Monsalud with whom we have hitherto got on well. Another equally inefficient, and without character, General Gallego, has been sent to supersede Don Carlos [de España] in Old Castile, and . . . they have appointed . . . to command in New Castile . . . which is at present by far the most important post in the country . . . an idiot

of between seventy and eighty years of age . . . What can be done for this lost nation? As for raising men or supplies, or taking any one measure to enable them to carry on the war, that is out of the question. Indeed there is nobody to excite them to exertion, or to take advantage of the enthusiasm of the people, or of their enmity against the French. Even the guerrillas are getting quietly into the large towns and amusing themselves, or collecting plunder of a better or more valuable description, and nobody looks forward to the exertions to be made, whether to improve or secure our advantage.

This is a faithful picture of the state of affairs, and though I still hope to be able to maintain our position in Castile, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do anything, and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards, or, I must say, from any individual of the Spanish nation . . . I am apprehensive that all this will turn out but ill for the Spanish cause. If . . . I should be overpowered or obliged to retire, what will the world say? What will the people of England say? What will those in Spain say?⁵⁰

Not only did it seem that the government was unable to fulfil its responsibilities, but the nation as a whole had fallen into precisely the same 'vertigo of triumph' that had so paralysed the Spanish armies after the battle of Bailén. For example, the liberation of Madrid was not followed by any influx of its inhabitants into the denuded ranks of the Spanish armies.⁵¹ The general atmosphere was graphically described by Sydenham:

Nothing has disgusted me for a long time so much as the juvenile exultations and absurd fanfaronade with which all the late Cádiz papers are filled. The editors seem to think that the war is at an end, and that nothing more is to be done but to cut their jokes upon the flying and discomforted French. They talk in passing of the *ilustre* Wellington, the *valiente* Beresford, and the *sabio* Silveira (what names to associate!), but they evidently attribute all the great events of the late campaign to the invincible spirit and miraculous exertions of the Spaniards. They do not seem to know that the *ilustre* Wellington has more still to do than any other man but himself could dare to undertake, or that if the British troops were withdrawn for a month, the

French would re-establish their conquests faster than they have been dispossessed of them.⁵²

Wellington lingered at Madrid until the end of August, whilst he rested his troops and endeavoured to strengthen his allies by equipping them with the vast quantities of war material of every kind that had been taken at Madrid. In addition, the Duke was uncertain as to the movements of the enemy: for some time it appeared that Marshal Soult would refuse to abandon Andalucía, and that the Anglo-Portuguese army would have to march south to eject him by force. Towards the end of the month, however, it became known that Soult had decided to join Suchet and King Joseph in Valencia. Wellington was therefore once more free to act; indeed, he had no option but to do so, for to remain in Madrid was to invite the overwhelming French counter-attack which he so much feared. Aside from the proven worth of his own troops, his one advantage was the central position which he enjoyed between the two major French troop concentrations in northern and eastern Spain. If he could but move quickly enough, it might be possible to inflict such a blow upon the weaker of these two opponents that it would be knocked out of the campaign before the other could intervene. Wellington could then return to Madrid, and concentrate all his forces for one last decisive battle somewhere in La Mancha.

Although the plan was excellent in its conception, it was flawed by the forces available for its execution. Some little time would elapse before the French armies would be ready to advance from Valencia towards Madrid, but they could not be left to operate with impunity during the Duke's absence in the north. To hold them back Wellington could rely upon the services of Ballesteros' Fourth Army, which now numbered over 26 000 men: on 11 August, its commander had written to the Duke promising his full support for the forthcoming operations.⁵³ A further allied force was in position around Alicante, where some 6500 Anglo-Sicilian troops had recently disembarked under General Maitland. Acting under Maitland's command was Whittingham's strong and well-trained División de Mallorca. Finally, the Second and Third Armies were deployed in an area stretching from the frontiers of La Mancha to Alicante. All these forces were well placed to hamper any French advance on Madrid, and Wellington requested that Ballesteros support them by threatening to invade La Mancha. In

the meantime, Maitland was ordered simply to remain at Alicante in the belief that his very presence would be enough to force Suchet, at least, to remain in Valencia.⁵⁴

During the weeks that followed, Wellington repeatedly claimed that these dispositions would be more than sufficient to prevent Joseph, Soult and Suchet from launching a counter-offensive.⁵⁵ Yet it is apparent that in reality he placed little trust in their efficacy. General Maitland was '*confoundedly* afraid of the French, and thinks, as all our officers do, that he will some day or other be swept from the face of the earth'.⁵⁶ As for the Spaniards, Wellington still held them in very low esteem, complaining to Lord Bathurst:

The worst of our situation is that the Spaniards can do nothing by themselves. We must have British troops everywhere, and I am afraid that I must be wherever a serious operation is to be carried on. The Spaniards have no cavalry. The guerrillas are almost useless in serious operations, even with our troops, and we have not enough for the extent of the ground we are obliged to occupy, and the system of our operations.⁵⁷

Nor were these fears simply the result of prejudice, for Wellington was well aware that many of the Spanish forces were so short of clothing, footwear and other equipment as to be barely fit for service.⁵⁸ At all events, it would have been foolhardy solely to trust to their efforts for the protection of his southern flank. When he marched for Old Castile on 31 August, he therefore took with him only 28 000 of the Anglo-Portuguese, leaving about the same number to hold Madrid under General Hill. Although he also planned to incorporate the Sixth Army, it is clear that his striking force was dangerously weak. As Wellington wrote to one of his correspondents, 'I must beg you all in England not to fly too fast . . . you must understand that it is impossible to achieve great things quickly with such a disparity of forces'.⁵⁹

Wellington's division of his forces left neither half of his army strong enough to make head against the enemy in their front should the French decide to move, but its effects would only be felt if he failed to secure an immediate success in northern Spain. Yet despite the need for speed, the advance was made in an extraordinarily leisurely fashion, enabling Clauzel to seek safety beyond the fortress of Burgos, which Wellington proceeded to

besiege. Being ill-supplied with heavy artillery, the Duke was reduced to the use of mining, only to find that his troops, which were not the best in the army, were unable to carry the breaches that were eventually blown in the walls. As the whole process had taken considerably longer than Wellington expected, the Army of the North was able to unite with the Army of Portugal, and the Armies of Aragón and the Centre to launch their offensive against Madrid before the Duke could return from his northern campaign. Caught in what he described as 'the worst scrape I ever was in', Wellington fell back from Burgos and ordered the evacuation of Madrid. After a tense few days, both halves of the Anglo-Portuguese army succeeded in uniting in an imposing defensive position near Salamanca. Declining to mount a suicidal frontal assault, the French turned its southern flank, leaving Wellington with no option but to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo. Once there, however, his army was safe, for the supply problems faced by his opponents were now so acute that they could not follow him with enough men to make an attack worthwhile.

Although the Anglo-Portuguese army had been in little danger ever since it reached Salamanca, the last stages of the retreat rivalled that of Sir John Moore for misery and privation. The weather was atrocious, with rain falling in torrents, flooding the countryside, and turning the roads into a quagmire. In addition, thanks to an error on the part of the Commissary General, all the army's supply trains were sent on a different road to any of those used by the troops, who consequently received no bread for several days. Even when food was available - as when several units engaged in a notorious 'pitched battle' with a large herd of pigs - there was no means by which the meat could be cooked, leaving many men with no option but to eat it raw. The result was that many hundreds of men collapsed from hunger, whilst others fell prey to dysentery. In all, the army lost some 5000 men, perhaps 2000 of whom had been taken prisoner. Needless to say, the army blamed its sufferings upon the Spaniards, a typical view being that expressed by Swabey:

The fundamental cause of our giving up Madrid I attribute first of all to the total abandonment by everyone of the slightest hope that the Spaniards will ever do anything to help themselves. The trial was fairly made during our possession of Madrid. The imbecility of their government, but more than all their national

arrogance, blinded them to the necessity of active and efficient measures, and rendered the opportunity useless. The moment of action whilst the country was in possession of their government was lost. They were then too short-sighted to fancy anything further necessary, they failed in their engagements to Lord Wellington, and lost their independence for ever.⁶⁰

The Duke of Wellington would not have been in great disagreement. Although he acknowledged that he himself had made mistakes, he claimed 'that what has at last happened ought to have been expected, and was expected and foretold by me', and defended his strategy as the only one that he could have adopted: 'I played a game which might succeed (the only one which could succeed) and pushed it to the last, and the parts having failed me, as I admit was to be expected, I have at last made a handsome retreat . . . with some labour and inconvenience, but without material loss. I believe I have done right.'⁶¹ In short, the fault was not that of the Duke, but of his allies. Wellington professed himself to be extremely disappointed with the contribution of the Sixth Army, but he reserved the chief share of the blame for Ballesteros, whom he insisted should have been able to check the French advance from Valencia by moving forward into La Mancha, and adopting a flanking position at Alcaraz.⁶²

If this game had been well played, it would have answered my purpose . . . Had I any reason to expect that it would be well played? Certainly not. I have never yet known the Spanish army do anything, much less do anything well. Ballesteros had sometimes drawn the attention of a division or two for a moment, but that is all. Everything else . . . is false and rotten. A few rascals called guerillas attack one quarter of their number, and sometimes succeed and sometimes not, but as for any regular operation, I have not heard of such a thing and successful in the whole course of the war.⁶³

Much of this tirade was unmerited, but it has to be admitted that the Spanish contribution to the campaign had been less than distinguished. Whether or not his presence there would have checked the French advance on Madrid, Ballesteros had certainly refused to occupy Alcaraz. Meanwhile, in northern Spain the commander of the Seventh Army, Gabriel Mendizábal, whom Popham

termed 'the worst military performer on the continent of Europe', had proved less than co-operative in the amphibious operations which he and Popham had been waging against the French positions along the Cantabrian coast.⁶⁴ Finally, the Sixth Army had not improved on its performance before Astorga. Ordered to join Wellington for the advance against Clauzel, it failed to co-ordinate its movements with those of the Anglo-Portuguese, and only brought forward 11 000 infantry and 350 cavalry out of the 30 000 men who were theoretically available for service.⁶⁵ As Sydenham complained:

Lord Wellington declares that he has not yet met with any Spanish officer who can be made to comprehend the nature of a military operation. If the Spanish officers had knowledge and vanity like the French, or ignorance without vanity as our allies in India, something might be done with them. But they unite the greatest ignorance with the most insolent and intractable vanity. They can therefore be neither instructed nor persuaded nor forced to their duty. There is Castaños cracking his stale jokes at León . . . instead of joining with Lord Wellington and consulting upon the operations of the Galician army. He writes that Santocildes [i.e. the commander of the field forces of the Sixth Army] will march towards us by a certain route. Lord Wellington sends his *aide-de-camp* to meet him on that route to hasten his progress . . . But Santocildes changes his route, and the *aides-de-camp* of course misses him. Santocildes was directed to move on to Valladolid, but his progress is so slow that we are nearly half way to Burgos. Yet Santocildes will still move towards Valladolid and yesterday actually made a retrograde movement instead of a forward one. Instead of being on our front, he is on our rear, and Lord Wellington must wait two days to enable Santocildes to join him.⁶⁶

The quality of such troops as did take the field also left much to be desired. Ragged and ill-equipped, Wellington complained that 'they could neither advance nor retreat in order', and instead could only manoeuvre '*à la débâcle*'.⁶⁷ As if this was not enough, their supplies had dried up, and the troops had only survived the last stages of the retreat by plundering the British wagon trains.⁶⁸

In short, the Burgos campaign showed Wellington that he could not count upon the Spanish armies as a reliable factor in his

military planning. Yet at the same time he remained convinced that the Peninsula remained by far the best theatre in which Britain could prosecute the war against the French.⁶⁹ The only problem was that the odds against the Anglo-Portuguese army were so great that 'it is obvious that we cannot expect to save the Peninsula by military efforts unless we can bring forward the Spaniards in some shape or other'.⁷⁰ To do so, it would be necessary to force the Spaniards to accept the need for reform. As Wellington wrote to Lord Liverpool after the great retreat:

If I should find that the French remain quiet during the winter, I propose to go to Cádiz for a short time to endeavour to place matters upon a better footing, at least as regards the armies . . . which must be brought forward in co-operation with us. It will likewise be necessary to apprise the government of the inconvenience and danger of the system in which they have been acting in the provinces which have been freed from the enemy, and of the inefficiency of all the persons for public trusts, and of the inconvenience of loading the resources of all the provinces with the maintenance of such people . . . I can only say that if I cannot by the exercise of fair influence in concert with my brother produce some alteration, it is quite hopeless to continue the contest in the Peninsula with the view of obliging the French to evacuate it by force of arms.⁷¹

If the Burgos campaign led the British to intervene in the internal affairs of their allies, it had at the same time increased the chances of Spanish resistance. Henry Wellesley was firmly of the opinion that the retreat had not resulted in any damage to Wellington's reputation, as it was 'generally attributed to Ballesteros' neglect of his orders', whilst he also claimed that 'there are no powers, however extensive, which Lord Wellington could require which would not readily be granted to him'. Yet he was simultaneously informing Lord Castlereagh that commercial interests in Cádiz were furiously opposed to the proposed mediation with South America, and were spreading rumours to the effect that he had been blackmailing the Regency.⁷² Not only did Wellesley ignore the influence which these tactics were bound to have with regard to Wellington's appointment, but he failed to see that the condemnation of Ballesteros had been postulated upon the belief that Wellington's powers would be limited to the command of the

army in the field. Nor did he notice that the attack on Ballesteros had not precluded a certain amount of criticism of Wellington's conduct of the campaign.⁷³ Disappointment aside, the retreat had been a terrible blow to the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Although Wellington was assured by some of his correspondents that their faith in the allied army remained unshaken, these claims are undermined by events before the battle of Salamanca: fearing that they were about to be abandoned to the French, some of its inhabitants had accused the British of only entering Spain so as to steal the harvest.⁷⁴ As Bragge noted, it would have been extraordinary had there been no disillusionment with the alliance:

The situation of Spain is truly pitiable, being constantly exposed to the ravages of three roving armies and the inhabitants sure to suffer . . . let them enlist under which banner they will. We deceive them, the French impoverish them, and the Spanish troops, regular and irregular, plunder them of every earthly thing they possess.⁷⁵

Nor had Britain's image been improved by the manner in which the retreat had been conducted. Angry at what it saw as its betrayal by the Spaniards, and demoralised by the general air of catastrophe, a large part of the British army completely lost its discipline. As Private Wheeler wrote:

It is impossible for any army to have given themselves up to more dissipation and everything that is bad . . . The conduct of some men would have disgraced savages, drunkenness had prevailed to such a frightful extent that I have often wondered how it was that a great part of our army were not cut off.⁷⁶

In the same style, Dyneley called the army a 'disorganised, plundering rabble'.⁷⁷ Finally, in a letter that was almost totally expurgated from the published editions of his correspondence, Wellington himself complained that 'the soldiers of the army are becoming no better than a band of robbers'.⁷⁸ When the survivors of the retreat reached Ciudad Rodrigo some of them seem to have thought nothing of invading the houses of the inhabitants, ejecting them from their own beds, and forcing them to attend to their wants of food and clothing.⁷⁹ Whatever special pleading can be made to excuse this conduct, it was not calculated to assuage the

feelings of the Spaniards, whose response took the form of a number of armed assaults on isolated British soldiers.⁸⁰

At precisely the moment when the Duke of Wellington accepted the command of the Spanish army, circumstances had arisen that imbued his plans with serious difficulties. The campaign had strengthened his determination not only to command, but to seize control of the Spanish army. As far as the Spaniards were concerned, however, it is difficult to see how the offer of the command could even have been made had they been able to foresee the results of the march on Burgos, which could not but damage Britain's standing in the Peninsula. Once again, the redcoats had marched across the frontier, only to abandon the Spaniards to their fate as soon as retribution threatened, leaving behind them yet another trail of destruction. There was now no possibility that Wellington's terms would be accepted without demur. If the campaign had given further proof that root-and-branch reform was essential, it was still dubious whether public opinion accepted that this was the case. Furthermore, Ballesteros' protests had revealed a wellspring of anglophobia which no government, let alone one based in Cádiz, could afford to ignore altogether. Whether the extent of these problems was apparent to the Duke is unclear, but the confusion and disorder that characterised the patriot zone was by itself enough to make him quail. As he wrote of his visit to Cádiz, 'God knows the prospect of success from this journey of mine is not bright, but still it is best to try something.'⁸¹

4

An Interlude at Cádiz

Wellington's resolve to visit Cádiz dates almost from the moment that he received the dispatch authorising him to accept the command of the Spanish armies.¹ Conscious of the sacrifices that he intended the Spanish government to make, he was well aware that only his personal prestige would be enough to overcome the resistance that his proposals would inevitably engender. Such feelings were undoubtedly strengthened by a letter from Henry Wellesley stressing the advantages that would result from a visit to the capital.²

Although the ambassador did not anticipate any difficulties with regard to the visit, it was clear that the Duke would be heading into a situation of great tension, for his plans to reform the Spanish army relied upon a reinforcement of the civil authorities as the only means by which it could be paid and fed. As the events had shown that Spain was in such a state of confusion that even the most diligent Intendant could not operate effectively without the support of the military, Wellington could see no option but to give greater power to the army. His determination in this respect was strengthened by his refusal to accept that patriotic fervour could ever take the place of orderly government. Denouncing enthusiasm as 'no aid to accomplish anything, and . . . an excuse for the irregularity with which everything is done, and for the want of discipline and subordination of the armies', he maintained that the triumph of the French Revolutionary armies had been based entirely on 'a perseverance in . . . applying every individual and every description of property to the service of the army by force'.³

Whether or not such views, to which Wellington was obviously predisposed, were justified is a moot point, but nothing could have been more calculated to offend opinion at Cádiz. Nor were matters helped by his conviction that the Spaniards were incapable of governing themselves. In August 1812, for example, he complained to Lord Bathurst:

I do not expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards, notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry *viva*, and are very fond of us and hate the French, but they are in general the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have known, the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country . . . I am afraid that the utmost we can hope for is to teach them how to avoid being beat. If we can effect that object, I hope we might do the rest.⁴

The following month he wrote to Henry Wellesley that, 'It appears to me that everything in which the Spaniards is concerned is going as badly as possible, and I really believe there is not a man in the country who is capable of comprehending, much less of conducting, any great concern.'⁵ According to the Duke, the problem had been compounded by the revolution of 1808, which 'instead of having caused an improvement in this respect has rather augmented the evil by bringing forward more inexperienced people, and giving to men in general false notions entirely incompatible with the nature of their business'.⁶

In visiting Cádiz, the Duke's objects were therefore twofold. As he told Lord Bathurst in his subsequent report, although he was primarily concerned to provide 'for the organisation of the army . . . and the degree of power which I was to have over it', he also wanted 'to establish some authority in the provinces which should exercise the powers of government, . . . superintend the realisation of the resources of the country, and . . . be responsible for their application to the service of the army'.⁷ The campaign to achieve these goals was opened by a long dispatch which Wellington sent to the Spanish Minister of War, José María de Carvajal, on 4 December 1812. After first promising the government that it should always receive 'an accurate representation of facts as they shall appear to me', Wellington began by remarking that 'the discipline of the Spanish armies is in the very lowest state, and their efficiency is in consequence much deteriorated'. This, he admitted, was only to be expected with troops who had not been properly paid, equipped or supplied for months or even years, but it was unfortunately the case that 'the habits of indiscipline and insubordination are such that even those corps which have been well clothed and regularly paid by my directions, and have . . . seldom, if ever, felt any privations for more than a year,

are in as bad a state, and as little to be depended upon as soldiers as the others'. It was therefore clear that 'the evil . . . requires a stronger remedy than the mere removal of the . . . want of pay, clothing and necessities', especially as 'the officers of the army in general . . . take but little pains to apply a remedy to these evils'. For all these reasons, Wellington could not but consider that 'I have undertaken a task of which the result is as little promising as that which was ever undertaken by any individual'. Indeed, he went on to say that 'I was certainly not aware till very lately of the real state of the Spanish army, or I should have hesitated before I should have charged myself with such a herculean labour as its command.' Nevertheless, the Duke assured Carvajal that he would not 'relinquish the task because it is laborious and the success unpromising', and promised to 'exercise it as long as I have the confidence of the authorities who have conferred it upon me'.

Yet Wellington made quite clear that his co-operation would not be without its price. In particular, he required:

First, that officers should be promoted, and should be appointed to commands, solely at my recommendation.

Secondly, that I should have the power of dismissing from the service those whom I should think deserving of such punishment.

Thirdly, that those resources of the state which are applicable to the payment or equipment or supply of the troops should be applied in such a manner as I might recommend.

Fourthly, in order to enable me to perform my duties it will be necessary that the Chief of Staff and such limited number of the staff officers of the army as may be thought necessary should be sent to my headquarters, and that the government should direct that all military reports of all descriptions shall be sent to me . . .

Nor was this an end to the new commander-in-chief's demands. In line with his determination to reduce the immense cost of the army's existing structure, Wellington also outlined plans for a major reshuffle of its organisation that would have truncated the excessive number of headquarters and higher formations. As he complained, its current order of battle was 'most expensive and burdensome':

For instance, Castile and Extremadura are the territory of the Fifth Army, and, besides Captain General Castaños, who is most usefully and deservedly employed, there is a Captain General with a large staff in Extremadura, and a Captain General with a large staff in Castile. There are not in the former province as many troops as will form the garrison of Badajoz, nor in the latter as many as will form the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo . . .

Then in the same manner the Second and Third Armies do not altogether compose two divisions, and yet they have attached to them all the staff, military as well as civil, of two complete armies.

The Seventh Army in like manner is composed almost entirely of bands of guerrillas, and the only corps that I know of in Spain that at all approach in numbers to the size of armies are the Fourth and the Sixth.

In order to put an end to this situation, Wellington proposed to unite the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Armies into a single force under the command of General Castaños, who was also to be the Captain General of the provinces from which his troops were drawn and to unite the entire civil and military authority in his person. In principle, the Duke continued, a similar arrangement might be applied to the Second, Third and Fourth Armies, although he was prepared to defer consideration of this plan 'till I shall have seen more of the detail of their state'.

In the same way, he also deferred discussion of 'the alteration which the existing state of the country requires should be made in the powers of the Captains General of the provinces, and the Intendants', but it was abundantly clear that the Duke intended that the actual business of government should be overseen by the army. Aware that such proposals were likely to arouse the ire of the liberals, Wellington concluded his letter with a further reference to the collapse of authority in patriot Spain:

We must not conceal from ourselves that there is but little authority of any description whatever in the provinces which have been occupied by the enemy, and even that little depends on the exercise of military power. It is vain to expect that a gentleman called an Intendant will exercise the power to realise the resources of the country . . . without the assistance of a military force, which military force in the existing state of the army will

destroy more than its effects would produce . . . I am aware that it is wrong in principle to invest military men with civil powers, but when the country is in danger that must be adopted which will tend most directly to save it . . . whatever may be the constitutional principles which may be invaded by those measures.⁸

Five days later Wellington reinforced his argument by reference to a letter that had been sent to him by the Intendant of Old Castile, Estebán Mejía. According to Mejía, the Intendant attached to the Fifth Army had seized a store of grain which had been collected for the supply of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and applied it to the support of the headquarters of the Fifth Army, whose forces amounted to little more than a single division.⁹

Wellington's diagnosis of the Spanish army's numerous deficiencies cannot be gainsaid. For example, the endless difficulties that had been encountered with regard to the garrisoning and provisioning of Ciudad Rodrigo after its recapture in January 1812 provided a graphic testimony to the physical inability of the Spaniards to mobilise their resources. Nor could Wellington be faulted in his views on the army's top-heavy structure. The Spanish revolt against Napoleon had been accompanied by an expansion of the armed forces that was as massive as it was uncontrolled. Eager to consolidate their rule and enjoy the fruits of office, the new authorities had showered commissions on their protégés, as well as rewarding those officers who had supported the rising with greatly accelerated promotion. At the same time they had also created large numbers of new regiments. The result was an overblown officer corps for which it was impossible to find full employment. Some of the surplus was absorbed by attaching extra officers to supernumerary battalions, of which one such in January 1814 had no fewer than seven colonels, eight lieutenant colonels, two majors, seven adjutants, twenty-four captains and thirty-one subalterns.¹⁰ However, the majority gravitated to such cities as Cádiz or to the headquarters of the various armies. As Wellington wrote to Henry Wellesley on 14 May 1812, 'There are 1500 officers and no soldiers at Castaños' headquarters at Valencia de Alcántara, each of whom has received more pay than those officers now doing duty with their regiments at Ciudad Rodrigo. These are the abuses that have sunk Spain, and there is no Spanish government equal to the task of getting the better of them.'¹¹

The army had never been able to escape from the effects of the disorganisation consequent upon its expansion. In addition to the surplus of officers, it also suffered from a superabundance of regiments, and thus of expensive regimental headquarters. To make matters worse, the absence of any mechanism for providing the army with a constant flow of recruits meant that most regiments could barely justify their continued existence. Not only were there too many regiments, but the numerous generals could only be accommodated by a corresponding increase in the number of higher formations. Throughout the war, therefore, Spanish brigades and divisions tended to be smaller than their counterparts in other armies. The nature of the war also tended towards a multiplication in the number of headquarters. Driven into a number of isolated enclaves around the periphery of Spain, the army had had to be divided into several provincial forces, an arrangement which had been formalised in December 1810 by the creation of six military districts, each of which was to have its own field army (a seventh was added in the spring of 1811).¹² Yet although the decree laid down that the army commanders would have the absolute command of all the military resources of their region, it was not made clear whether they were to take the place of the Captains General who had hitherto stood at the head of the territorial administration. In some cases, the field and territorial commands were united in the hands of a single person, but in others the two remained separate. In the latter instance the Captains General found that they were entirely redundant: during the allied occupation of Madrid in 1812, for example, its Captain General had been left without any function at all, a situation which Wellington seized upon as one more justification for the abolition of a separate territorial command.¹³

Faultless though Wellington's logic may have been, his dispatch of 4 December came as a grievous shock to the Regency, which saw that it was to be deprived of the control of its own revenue, stripped of much of its patronage, and prevented from having any say in the conduct of military operations. However, if the Duke was certain to face opposition in official circles, there is a certain amount of evidence to suggest that public opinion was beginning to realise the need for a fundamental reform of the armed forces. As news spread that Wellington was on his way to Cádiz, both the *Diario Redactor de Sevilla* and *La Abeja Española* carried articles that examined the reasons for Spain's recurrent defeats, and the

measures that had to be taken to ensure that they were not repeated. Indeed, the latter went so far as to argue that the Duke of Wellington was the only man with the strength to implement the sort of root-and-branch reforms that were needed.¹⁴ Even the Regency seemed less intransigent than might have been expected. In line with the recommendations of a cogent memorandum emanating from the Estado Mayor General, on 4 December it had issued a decree that went some way towards meeting Wellington's requirements with regard to the army's organisation. The number of field armies was now reduced to four. The forces in Catalonia retained the denomination of the First Army, but the Second and Third Armies were amalgamated to form the Second, the Fourth and Fifth to form the Third, and the Sixth and Seventh to form the Fourth. In addition, two new Armies of Reserve were created in Andalucía and Galicia. All the Spanish forces, including the guerrillas, were to form a part of one or other of these six armies, whose commanders were specifically prohibited from forming any new regiments. Standard organisations were laid down for divisions and brigades, though it is noticeable that these were still much smaller than elsewhere: with a maximum size of eight battalions, Spanish divisions would only be two-thirds the size of their French counterparts.¹⁵ Meanwhile, a placatory response was made to the dispatch of 4 December. In answer to Wellington's demand that commands should only be filled in accordance with his recommendations, the Regency promised that these would be treated with 'a just deference'. Similar consideration would be given to any requests the Duke might make for the promotion of individual officers, but it was insisted that cashiering should only take place in accordance with the provisions of the army's Ordenanzas. With regard to the distribution of the government's revenue, the Regency agreed to follow Wellington's advice with regard to those funds which it actually intended to apply to the conduct of the war. Finally, it agreed that a number of staff officers should be sent to Wellington's headquarters, and that he should receive 'the regulations, returns, and other documents that may be considered necessary upon which His Highness [i.e. the Regency] will take such measures and send such orders as may be considered necessary'.¹⁶

It was never likely that Wellington would accept this answer. Not only did the decree of 4 December do nothing to unify the territorial and field commands, but Carvajal's letter was extremely

disingenuous: though couched in the fairest of terms, it made it quite obvious that the Regency had no intention of devolving absolute control of the army to the Duke, and still less of relinquishing its influence in the conduct of operations. Nor was Wellington's temper improved by the 300-mile journey from his headquarters at the village of Freneda in northern Portugal. Though he had hoped to reach Cádiz within six days of his departure on 12 December, flooded roads and a painful attack of lumbago combined to delay his arrival until Christmas Eve. Far from giving way, he renewed his demands, and threatened that he would resign from the command unless they were conceded:

The government and the Cortes have done me the honour to confer upon me the command of the Spanish armies, and at the same time that they have thus manifested to the world the confidence they repose in me, they have imposed on me the performance of duties for which I am responsible not only to Spain, but to my own country and to the world.

It is impossible to perform these duties as they ought to be performed unless I shall possess sufficient powers, and I request that you will inform the government that if they do not feel themselves authorised, or have not confidence in me to trust me with the powers which I think necessary, I beg leave to relinquish the command of the Spanish armies which has been conferred on me.¹⁷

At the same time the Duke took issue with the decree of 4 December. As he rightly pointed out, the new Third Army, comprising as it did the troops from Andalucía and the frontiers of Old Castile, could not possibly function as a single force. To remedy this defect, he proposed that the First Army and the two Armies of Reserve should be left as they were, but that the Second, Third and Fourth, and Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Armies should be amalgamated to form two new forces. Each of the five armies that would result should then be assigned a certain area of the country from which to draw its supplies. None of this was particularly controversial, but Wellington also returned to the question of the separation of the civil and military authorities:

Experience has shown that wherever there exist authorities independent of one another, they must clash and the service must

suffer unless their acts should be vigorously controlled by the superintending authority of the government.

I shall not contend for the expediency of the contrary practice in a well regulated state, but it cannot be expected that any province of Spain should be in a state fit to be governed according to the best principle . . . Even in countries where these systems and principles are perfectly understood, and have been put in practice for centuries, and of which the tranquillity has not lately been disturbed by a foreign enemy, it has frequently been necessary to place the civil and military authorities in one hand. How much more necessary, therefore, must it be in provinces just recovered from the enemy in which the authority of the government is imperfectly established, with which the government has but little or no communication, to provide against the clashing of individual authorities in the administration of local affairs?

In Wellington's opinion the only remedy for this situation was to appoint the various army commanders to be the Captains General of the provinces allotted to the support of their troops, and to give them 'the political as well as the military power of those provinces'. The generals concerned should then 'select to command in the provinces and places from which they will be absent such officers as they shall approve of'. To ensure that the armies were properly supported, they should each be given an Intendant General, who should also be the Intendant General of the provinces allotted to that army. Though regular reports were to be submitted to the Spanish Ministry of Finance, final control of the system would rest in the hands of the Captains General, who would be the only authorities permitted to sanction any payment.¹⁸

Faced by Wellington's obduracy, the Regency had no option but to capitulate. As the Duke drily observed, 'there was but little difference of opinion between the government and me after they understood I was in earnest'.¹⁹ On 1 January 1813 the Regency duly agreed that all appointments were to be made at Wellington's recommendation, that the Duke was to have the power to send undesirable officers away from the army and to determine the employment of the military budget, and that the government would send all its communications with the army through the Chief of Staff, who in future would be attached to Wellington's headquarters.²⁰ The only point on which the Spaniards refused to

give way concerned the power to cashier officers, which they still insisted should be carried out according to the Ordenanzas. Accepting that this was the most that he could expect, on 2 January the Duke accepted the Spanish terms with the proviso that the Inspectors General of Infantry and Cavalry should also be attached to his headquarters in addition to the Chief of the General Staff.²¹

Matters were not so simple with regard to the question of the relationship that should exist between the civil and military authorities, and it was agreed that the matter should be referred to the Cortes. Having already been invited to speak to that assembly, the Duke was afforded an ideal opportunity to propitiate the deputies, which he showed considerable skill in turning to good account. On 30 December, watched by a huge crowd, Wellington processed to the Cortes dressed in the uniform of a Captain General, wearing the insignia of the orders of the Golden Fleece and San Fernando, and accompanied by a Spanish guard of honour. Having been admitted to the Cortes, he then delivered a short address in Spanish, which was received with tumultuous applause.²² Temporarily, at least, the ceremonious welcome that he received from the authorities was matched by the adulation of the press. Its reaction was typified by a letter that appeared in *La Abeja Española* on 27 December:

Today I had the pleasure of meeting the illustrious Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo. His presence filled my heart with the liveliest sentiments of gratitude: I told myself that this was the man who has trampled the French eagles underfoot so many times, and has always been crowned by victory, that because of him a large part of my beloved country breathes the air of freedom, and that thanks to his vast talents and wise combinations this refuge of Spanish liberty tranquilly enjoys the sweet independence of which the . . . armies of the Tirant wished to deprive it.

I watched the British hero and in the composure and simplicity of his person and the wisdom of his expression displayed a great soul that is capable of bringing to fulfilment the noblest projects of a nation that has earned its liberty . . . With the ever-victorious Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo at the head of its armies, who would dare to threaten its independence? The wise, the politic, decision . . . of our immortal Cortes to trust the virtues of this warrior with the direction of our armies was completely

justified, and there can be nobody . . . who dares to think otherwise.²³

Edited as it was by one of the leading proponents of Wellington's appointment, *La Abeja Española* could be expected to enthuse about his presence in Cádiz. Yet even *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español*, whose editor, Alvaro Flórez Estrada, had consistently displayed an obsessive suspicion of any measure that might threaten the constitutional system, welcomed the Duke's visit and scoffed at fears that it might be connected with the intrigues of the *serviles*.²⁴

The general air of harmony was soon to be shattered, however. The first problems arose over a grand ball that was given in Wellington's honour on 3 January by those grandees who were resident at Cádiz. Leaving aside the suspicion that it was unwise of the Duke openly to associate with a class that was despised and distrusted by the radical bourgeoisie who dominated the Spanish capital, from the very start the affair was dogged with an air of farce. Presumably because it was the only building that was large enough to accommodate all the guests, it was decided to hold the ball in the city's asylum, whose inmates were temporarily moved elsewhere to make way, as one of them was heard to remark, for 'more important lunatics'. An anonymous letter was then received by the hostess, the Condesa de Benavente, claiming that all the food had been poisoned. The Countess's fears were soon dispelled, but so many people were invited that the only way in which space could be cleared for the dancing to begin was for the Duque del Infantado to order a company of infantry to force back the crowds. Meanwhile, it is alleged that Wellington himself had shut himself up with all the women 'like a cock in a barnyard, if not a sultan among his wives', and dined with them alone, leaving their outraged menfolk to wait for a second serving. Insult was added to injury when it was discovered that there was not enough food left for them. Not even the fortuitous arrival in the very midst of the festivities of the news of the destruction of Napoleon's army in Russia was enough to rescue the evening: according to Alcalá Galiano, Wellington disclosed the news to the ladies at dinner, and neglected to tell the male guests until afterwards, even though they included many of Spain's most prominent leaders.²⁵

It is difficult to know what weight should be given to these stories, most of which come from the pen of Antonio Alcalá Galiano, who was a decided opponent of Wellington's appointment.

At all events, far more disruption was caused by the revelation of the Duke's demands with regard to the subordination of the civil authority to the Captains General. At the Regency's insistence this question had been passed to the Cortes, which discussed the question in secret session and then referred it to a special committee charged with the task of proposing a course of action. At this point, however, 'the trumpet of alarm was sounded in a libel in one of the daily newspapers respecting the danger to be apprehended for the union of powers in the hands of military officers at the suggestion of a foreigner'.²⁶ The 'libellers' having set to work, Wellington confided to Sir Charles Stuart that 'I am apprehensive that the Cortes will take the alarm, and I shall not be able to do all the good I might otherwise.'²⁷

The 'libeller' in question was none other than that very Alvaro Flórez Estrada who had earlier expressed such confidence in Wellington's visit to Cádiz. One of the most radical of the Spanish liberals, Flórez Estrada had been a leader of the Asturian insurrection in 1808 and had occupied a prominent position in the provincial junta that had been formed in its wake. As a result he had good reason to suspect the imposition of military authority, having been one of the victims of La Romana's *putsch* of May 1809. A persistent opponent of civilian rule, the Marquess had subsequently become an object of considerable British patronage. Not only had he found an enthusiastic partisan in John Hookham Frere, but Wellington came to regard him as 'a very good, excellent man'.²⁸ When La Romana was recalled to Seville in 1809, the British general had therefore provided him with a letter of introduction to Marquess Wellesley that described him as being 'more intelligent and reasonable upon Spanish affairs than most Spaniards', and asked the ambassador to protect him against the ire of the Junta Central.²⁹ Whatever may have been the reasons for this friendship, Wellington certainly mourned his passing when he died suddenly in January 1811, writing to Lord Liverpool, 'In him the Spanish army has lost their highest ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged.'³⁰ On a more personal note, he told General Mendizábal, 'I have lost a colleague, a friend and an adviser with whom I have lived on the happiest terms of friendship, intimacy and confidence, and I shall revere and regret his memory to the last moment of my existence.'³¹

Innocent though this friendship may have been, it could not

but associate Wellington with the cause of reaction, and cause liberal zealots to display considerable alarm at his proposals to give the army a greater role in the governance of Spain. Their fears were vocalised by Flórez Estrada who was already embroiled in a fierce controversy concerning the relationship that should exist between the Captains General and the civil authorities, and the position that the army should occupy in society as a whole. Flórez Estrada opened the argument by a long article that appeared in *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español* on 18 December 1812, in which his basic argument was that military discipline was amongst the foremost pillars of despotism. Because its first principle had been that of blind obedience, rulers had everywhere been able to transform their armies into instruments of oppression, especially once the soldiers had been separated from their fellow citizens by the emergence of professional armies. The soldiery having thus become the implacable enemies of liberty, the conclusions were obvious:

As long as the military form a body that is separate from the rest of society, and do not understand that their rights as citizens are more important than their rights as soldiers, they will be no more than the passive automata of tyranny, and their fellow countrymen will not be able to regard them as anything other than the satellites of despotism.

It was therefore necessary to teach the army that there had to be limits on its obedience, and in particular that to support a military coup was an act of high treason. Furthermore, the greatest case would have to be taken to ensure that the troops retained their links with civilian society. If this was done, then liberty would be assured, and with it national independence: under the existing system the soldier had no reason to exert himself, for he was no more than the 'miserable instrument' of his rulers and was fighting for his own enslavement. As for the civilian population, not only did they have no interest in the national defence, but they 'became accustomed to the effeminate pleasures, and indecent intrigues that are the fruit of an idle life'. After all, had not the greatest glories of Greece and Rome been achieved by citizens' armies? If any further proof were needed of the importance of the abolition of blind obedience as the foundation of the military constitution, Flórez Estrada continued, it was to be found in Spain's present

situation, for 'nothing is more common . . . in times of revolution than to see turbulent military commanders who have won the love of their troops by a thousand licentious abominations . . . assassinate the legitimate authorities and usurp an unlimited and absolute command'. Such a régime could not be other than despotic and violent, and the only defence, Flórez Estrada repeated, was to ensure that the soldiers placed the law and civil rights above their duties as soldiers. This in turn required that, if a regular army was needed at all, 'all the citizens should be soldiers, or, at the very least, all the soldiers citizens', for which reason the author concluded his argument by heaping praise upon the civic militia that had provided the garrison of Cádiz throughout the siege of 1810–12: as free citizens they could not only be trusted to stand firm against external aggression, but also to resist the emergence of domestic tyranny.³²

As if this was not incompatible enough with the intentions of the Duke of Wellington, Flórez Estrada published a further article, demanding that 'the political, financial, judicial and military authorities should be entirely separate', in response to a pamphlet that had been published by an officer named Benito Díaz. In essence, Díaz had alleged that the Constitution of 1812 would destroy the Spanish army, and thus put an end to Spain's independence. By excluding the officer corps, and in particular the Captains General, from the exercise of political and judicial authority, it had supposedly deprived the military profession of one of its chief rewards. As men could not be expected to sacrifice their lives for their country without a substantial material incentive, it followed that nobody would want to be an officer any more, so that the army would eventually wither away to nothing, leaving society to disintegrate and Spain to languish at the mercy of her foreign enemies.³³ Flórez Estrada could not let this pass. After claiming that the Captain Generalcies were inadmissible as rewards because they were damaging to the interests of society as a whole, he maintained that services rendered by army officers were not worthy of special reward, that it was essential that men in government service should have the specialist knowledge that was necessary to carry out their duties, and that, far from the survival of society depending upon the army, it was actually the other way about. For all Flórez Estrada's claims that there would be nothing to stop generals from being appointed as judges or civil governors, it is clear that he was predisposed to exclude the military from all

political power, and to ensure that the civilian oligarchy enjoyed a monopoly of the perquisites of office. Rather than openly advancing so sectional an argument, however, he camouflaged his jealousy by ridiculing the efficacy of the Captain Generalcies as a means of government, denouncing them as the instruments of despotism, and arguing that their abolition would be beneficial to the army: not only had the old system been postulated on the insulting idea that its officers had been motivated by greed and personal ambition, but it had also encouraged idleness and vice.³⁴

When this diatribe was followed within two days by rumours that the Duke of Wellington was demanding that the civil authorities should once again be subordinated to the Captain Generalcies, Flórez Estrada was furious. In a special issue of his newspaper he announced that it was rumoured that the new commander-in-chief had proposed that 'the monstrous and despotic union of political, civil, and military authorities should be kept on their former footing'. Affecting not to believe these reports, Flórez Estrada proclaimed:

Is it credible that Lord Wellington, who was born and brought up in a free country, where such a union of authorities is entirely unknown because it is contrary to the liberty of the citizens, could have made such a proposal? How could a general destined to have the glory of bringing liberty to a nation which esteems it so much . . . have made so absurd a mistake? Could this illustrious soldier have persuaded himself that a proposal so degrading to a nation that has sacrificed itself for its liberty . . . could have been adopted by our worthy representatives, or heard by the heroic Spanish people without the author of so impertinent, so improper, so shocking an idea having aroused their anger?

The author's disbelief was reinforced by his conviction that Britain would be exposed to defeat were it not for the continued war in Spain. As it was imperative for them to maintain resistance in the Peninsula, it followed that the British had a strong vested interest in Spain's political liberty as the real backbone of her war effort, and would do nothing to place it in jeopardy. Wellington was therefore doubly unlikely to have put forward such a plan, but if it was true that he had done so, then the proposal was entirely unacceptable:

Let us not delude ourselves: the Spaniards have not only shed their blood to free themselves from the yoke of Napoleon; they have shed it so as not to suffer any yoke at all; they have shed it . . . so that no authority can rule them with a monstrous power that is incompatible with civil liberty. If it is true, such a step on the part of this warrior would tarnish all his glorious actions for ever, and discredit him in the eyes of his own nation, which has not given us its aid so that we can be enslaved. Whatever are the services he has rendered in our favour . . . they are not sufficient to make up for the damage that so pernicious a project would cost us. The only option which remains to him to repair his ill-considered action is therefore to make haste to withdraw his proposal, frankly confessing his . . . mistake.

As for the Regency, if it was true that it had given its support to the Duke, then its conduct was reprehensible, as there could be no possible excuse for thinking that the proposal could redound to the general good. In consequence, the Cortes should press it to watch over the cause of liberty, and, in particular, to force Wellington to take an oath of loyalty to the Constitution as 'the first functionary of the Spanish nation'. If the Regency should refuse to do so, Flórez Estrada concluded, then it would have to be overthrown.³⁵

Flórez Estrada's fulminations notwithstanding, on 6 January 1813 the Cortes issued a decree whose salient points were that the Regency could appoint the commanders of the field armies to be the Captains General of the areas assigned to them; that the civil authorities should be responsible to the generals in those matters relating to the conduct of the war; that every army was to have an Intendant General to whom the provincial Intendants should be responsible; and that the government should assign a proportion of the revenue of each area to the support of its army.³⁶ Moreover, in a letter of 8 January Carvajal informed the Duke that the Regency were agreed not only that the military command and the various armies should be organised more-or-less as he desired, but that it had decided that ninety per cent of its revenue should be allotted to the support of the war effort.³⁷ Although there was therefore still some question as to the independence of the civil authorities, Wellington decided that this would have to be sufficient:

It appears to me . . . that this decree goes sufficiently far to enable me to act. I saw enough of the state of affairs at Cádiz to be quite convinced that I should not be able to prevail on the Cortes to do more, and I had no alternative excepting to resign the command, which I was aware would have had the worst effects at that moment in Spain as well as throughout Europe. If the system is not fairly acted upon by the government, or for any reason whatever should fail, it will always be time enough to resign the command, and affairs cannot be in a worse state than that in which I found them, or than they would have been if I had resigned when the Cortes modified my proposition. In the meantime, I have the merit of having submitted to the Cortes, and if the system should fail the responsibility will rest with them, and I have given them to understand that I shall take care to let Spain and the world know why it has failed.

I trust, however, that it will not fail, and that I shall still be able to place in the hands of the generals of the Spanish armies those powers which must secure the resources of the country for the troops.³⁸

Yet caught between the wrath of liberals such as Flórez Estrada on the one hand and generals such as Ballesteros on the other, not to mention the constraints imposed upon them by the Constitution of 1812, it is difficult to see how the Cortes could have gone any further. Indeed, Henry Wellesley was prepared to take a far more generous line, remarking of the decree of 6 January that although 'not exactly conformable with Lord Wellington's ideas' it was 'as nearly so as could be made without destroying the authority of the Political Chief who, in compliance with an article of the Constitution, is vested with the civil authority in each province'. As he continued:

I mentioned upon a former occasion the beneficial consequences which I expected would ensue from Lord Wellington's visit to Cádiz. Nothing short of his personal influence could have effected these arrangements without which it would be in vain to hope for any advantage from his holding the chief command of the Spanish armies. If the decree of the Cortes of the sixth inst. is not exactly conformable to His Lordship's proposal, it is to be attributed to their unwillingness to infringe an important article of the Constitution, and to their jealousy of conferring

unlimited authority upon the principal officers of the army who are generally supposed to be adverse to the Cortes, and to be dissatisfied at the restraints imposed upon them by the regulations of the Constitution.

It is due to the government and to the Cortes to declare that throughout the negotiations they manifested the most anxious desire to meet Lord Wellington's wishes, and I am desirous in particular to call Your Excellency's attention to the sacrifices made by the Regency whose authority over the army and the revenues of the provinces is much circumscribed in consequence of the new arrangements.³⁹

On 4 February Wellesley received a copy of the somewhat gloomy letter which Wellington had sent to Lord Bathurst on 27 January, from which he learnt that the Duke by no means shared his assessment of the situation. Rather than backing down, however, he reiterated his belief that the Cortes had been as generous as it could in view of the provisions of the Constitution, and Britain's unpopularity at Cádiz on account of the latest news from Latin America, where Lord Strangford, the British ambassador in Brazil, was reported to be on friendly terms with the rebels.⁴⁰

Needless to say, the Duke was not impressed:

I am quite certain your view of the subject is erroneous. First, there is not a word in the Constitution bearing upon the subject. Secondly, Mejía and La Vega . . . acknowledged that there was nothing inconsistent with the Constitution in what I had proposed. Thirdly, the practice in Cádiz itself, under the eyes of the Cortes, is exactly in conformity with what I had proposed. And fourthly, if I am not misinformed, the Cortes refused not a fortnight before I went to Cádiz to divide the civil and military powers in America.

Of course we must be unpopular in Cádiz if we allow such blockheads as Lord Strangford to write letters in the name of the government, and to pledge the authority of his government to treaties with the American rebels; and, if we act in relation to Spanish America on the principle of struggling merchants instead of as a great nation, we must be unpopular. But so far from being unpopular in Spain, or that anything that I have done is unpopular, there is not an authority in the country of any description, whether civil or military, that has not written

to congratulate me, and express their satisfaction at my appointment.⁴¹

It is difficult to agree with this analysis, however. In the first place, if the Constitution did not specifically subordinate the army to the civil power, it made it quite clear that the responsibility for the exercise of the civil authority lay in the hands of the *jefes políticos* rather than the Captains General. Furthermore, whilst it was true that the military government and the *jefatura política* of Cádiz were held by the same person, on 18 December the Cortes had voted that they should be separated.⁴² Nor could the adulation which the Duke continued to receive disguise the fact that the terms of his appointment had given rise to considerable hostility. On 15 January *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español* had returned to the charge, denouncing the powers which he had been given as not only unconstitutional but anti-constitutional: Spain had been placed under the tutelage of a foreign power and was exposed to a further betrayal of the sort which had taken place in 1808; there was no means by which the Duke could be made responsible for the exercise of his functions, still less be dismissed from office; constitutional liberty had been forced to depend upon the will of a single individual when its only real safeguard was the law; and the administration had been placed in the hands of the army. To make matters worse, the provisions of the decree of 6 January were as unnecessary as they were liable to prove harmful to the conduct of the war. As the Constitution laid down specific instances in which the *jefes políticos* and Intendants should assist the military authorities, there was no reason why they should be ordered to obey the Captains General: the law had only to be observed for all to be well. The contrary argument that a general's military success was directly related to the powers that he had been given was decried by Flórez Estrada as a dangerous fallacy. Aside from the fact that it posed the threat of military dictatorship, Spain's generals had in practice enjoyed absolute power and yet, far from winning the way, they had achieved nothing other than to incur the odium of their fellow citizens. Such powers had now been confirmed, but there was no evidence to suggest that the Captains General would be able to turn them to any better use, for they would not have the means to mobilise the resources of the vast districts placed under their authority, still less the physical capacity to govern them effectively. The fact was that the system

established by the Constitution was actually more effective, for it placed the supply of the army in the hands of the local authorities rather than in those of generals who might be hundreds of miles from the source of the provisions that were required. The logistical system would therefore collapse, whilst the despotic authority wielded by the army would sap the national enthusiasm on which rested Spain's salvation. Having thus established the basis for his opposition to the decree of 6 January, Flórez Estrada moved on to consider the reasons for its promulgation, which he ascribed to a desire to placate the British at all costs for fear that they would otherwise withdraw their support from the Spaniards. According to Flórez Estrada, such fears were groundless, for the struggle in Spain was so essential to British interests that London would have no option but to continue its aid. The decree of 6 January was therefore catastrophic in its effects on Spanish liberty and independence, militarily and politically unnecessary, and harmful to the war effort. Furthermore, Flórez Estrada maintained, it would never have been passed at all had not the negotiations been carried out in secret. In future, all laws should be published in advance of being voted on in the Cortes, and secret sessions outlawed, but that would not remedy the concessions that had already been made. To prevent the Duke from overthrowing the liberty of the Spanish nation, Flórez Estrada demanded the formation of a constitutional guard composed of all adult males aged from sixteen to sixty that would be at the disposal of the civil authorities.⁴³

The core of Flórez Estrada's argument was that Spain was threatened with military dictatorship. As well as being backed by his own troops, the Duke of Wellington had complete control of the Spanish army, and had been empowered to appoint his own nominees as military governors. In addition, he had also been given unlimited civil authority. As Flórez Estrada demanded, 'What more could a warrior have demanded from a nation whose liberty he intended to conquer so as to establish the throne of tyranny upon its ruins?'⁴⁴ In order to reinforce his argument, he wrote yet another denunciation of 'the monstrous reunion of political, military, economic and judicial authority', in which he again stressed that army officers deserved no greater reward than any other member of society, that the Captain Generalcies were inimical to civil liberty, and that Spain would be more prosperous and better governed under a system of separated powers. In addition, he went to great lengths to prove that Spain's heroic

past had been free of any such accumulation of authority, and that the coming of the Bourbons had led to a radical change in her governance – 'The creation of the Intendants . . . , the establishment of permanent bodies of troops . . . and the creation of military governments in . . . Aragón, Valencia and Catalonia as a means of ensuring their docile submission . . . opened the gates to a reunion of authorities that had always been separated.' Yet the coming of the Bourbons had also witnessed a decline in Spain's military prowess, making it ridiculous to argue that her security and prosperity were in any way dependent upon the survival of the Captain Generalcies.⁴⁵

Flórez Estrada's perorations cannot be discounted as the views of an isolated fanatic. The Minister of the Interior, García de León y Pizarro – 'a very mischievous fellow and a great enemy to England' – resigned his post in protest at the appointment.⁴⁶ On 12 January Flórez Estrada was also able to print a letter written by 'El Amante de la Independencia Española' praising his vigilance, castigating Wellington's appointment as commander-in-chief and the decree of 6 January – 'a gigantic step that will destroy forever civil liberty . . . and Spain's political independence' – and alleging that from 1808 onwards Britain had been constantly intriguing to reduce Spain to the status of a protectorate.⁴⁷ In the same way, the *Diario Mercantil de Cádiz* published a most inflammatory manifesto which complained that 'the most heroic people in the world' had not endured a savage war of independence to be made 'the slaves of Albion', and that it would have been preferable for them to have surrendered to the French immediately could such a fate have been envisaged.⁴⁸ In commenting upon this diatribe, the *Diario Redactor de Sevilla* assured its readers that it had no intention of saying anything that might offend either the British nation or the Duke of Wellington, but that it was its patriotic duty to point out that 'any pretension on the part of the British government whose effect would be . . . to injure Spain's national pride or to induce suspicions that it harbours ambitious or ignoble views . . . would be disastrous to ourselves, to the British and to the inhabitants of the entire world, whose fate depends upon the success of our struggle'. In addition, it also claimed that the decree of 6 January was unconstitutional, that its effect was 'to subordinate Spain to the will and caprice of a foreign general and government', that 'a people which regards the foreign yoke with indifference . . . is completely degenerate', and that, to add insult

to injury, Britain was the least powerful of all the European Powers.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, of course, the French were doing all in their power to foment Spanish discontent, spreading rumours that 'Lord Wellington by the means of arms has made the Cortes agree to all he demanded at Cádiz, and that of course we are the bitterest enemies of the Spaniards, and are going to play the same trick the French did'.⁵⁰

When Wellington rode away from Cádiz on 9 January 1813, it was with mixed results. On the one hand, the Spaniards had conceded many of his demands: henceforward no brigade, divisional or army commanders were to be appointed other than at Wellington's suggestion; the Duke had the power to suspend unsatisfactory officers and send them away from the army, as well as absolute control of the military budget; and the Spanish government would theoretically be prevented from communicating with its forces except through Wellington's headquarters. Furthermore, the Spanish armies and logistical system had been remodelled more-or-less as he desired, and the civil authorities partially subordinated to the Captains General. Yet this was not enough. In the first place, Wellington had specifically been denied the power to conduct a purge of the officer corps: if he could rid the field armies of junior officers whom he considered to be unsatisfactory, he had no guarantee that he could replace them with men who were any better, still less reduce the army list to more manageable proportions. Furthermore, although he could fill commands with generals whom he trusted, he had no means of preventing their removal, nor of compelling the government to honour its agreements. Sensing the problems that could result, the Duke remained as pessimistic as ever. As he wrote to Sir Thomas Graham, 'I . . . have placed military affairs on a better footing than they were before in the way of organisation, and I have provided some means to pay and subsist armies, and we are beginning with discipline. I am not sanguine enough, however, to hope that we shall derive much advantage from Spanish troops early in the campaign.'⁵¹

In view of the circumstances surrounding his visit to Cádiz, it was particularly unfortunate that the Duke should not have done his utmost to ensure that the Regency would not be able to interfere in his activities. In coming to Cádiz, Wellington had presented the Spaniards with a *diktat* which they found it all but impossible to resist: for all the bombast of such men as Flórez Estrada, with

a large part of Spain still occupied by the French armies the alienation of either the Duke or the British government would have been a political and strategic disaster of the first magnitude. Yet neither the Regency nor the Cortes had had any previous intimation of the sort of powers that the new commander-in-chief would be likely to demand. Having thus been trapped into signing away a considerable portion of the national sovereignty, it was only to be expected that the Spaniards should have done so with ill grace, and that from the start they should have sought to exploit the loopholes in Wellington's arrangements. The manner in which Spain had supposedly been laid open to military despotism and foreign domination made such interference all the more probable, for the Regency could not allow the risk of further damage to its political credibility. If only to safeguard its continued existence, it would be forced at the very least to establish its patriotic credentials by a display of resistance. In short, the Duke had achieved his objectives at the cost of jeopardising his relationship with the Spaniards, and had thereby put at risk any benefit which he had hoped to glean from his appointment. For all the hopes that had been raised by his visit to Cádiz, the auguries for his command remained as bleak as ever.



5

From Cádiz to Vitoria, January–June 1813

The Spanish army was officially informed of its new commander-in-chief in a proclamation of 1 January 1813, in which Wellington laid out the keystones of his policy. After stating that he had 'long been acquainted with its merits, its sufferings and its state', he commenced by assuring his new subordinates of his earnest desire 'to enable them to serve their country with advantage', and to ensure that the government paid 'the utmost attention . . . to the comfort of the . . . army'. In return, he expected that 'the discipline established by the Royal Ordenanzas should be maintained, as without discipline and order not only is an army unfit to be opposed to an enemy in the field, but it becomes a positive injury to the country by which it is to be maintained'.¹ This was hardly the language of a would-be military dictator, but the reality was that nothing could have been further from Wellington's mind. From the days of his governorship of Seringapatam, he had been convinced that a soldier should have no part in the civil administration. Lamenting his *de facto* responsibilities in this respect, he had remarked: 'I long for the return of the civil government. Although a soldier myself, I am not an advocate for placing extensive civil powers in the hands of soldiers merely because they are of the military profession, and I have always opposed the idea except in cases of necessity.'² In the Duke's eyes Spain was just such a necessity. Observing that 'we must not allow these people to go to ruin as they are doing', he had seized control of the national revenue, and placed the civil power in the hands of the army.³ True to his principles, he eschewed a dictatorship, and refrained from interfering with the constitutional régime. Yet conflict could hardly be avoided, and was in the event seriously to damage the advantages that might have been expected from his appointment as commander-in-chief.

Enough has already been said of the general condition of the

Spanish army to show that it was in a sad state of disrepair, but no details have been given of its strength or organisation. Following the decree of 4 December 1812 and the Duke's subsequent visit to Cádiz, the forces at Wellington's disposal were divided into four field armies, namely the First Army based in the hinterland of Catalonia, the Second in the region of Alicante, the Third between Granada and Córdoba, and the Fourth between Ciudad Rodrigo and Astorga. In addition, a number of surplus troops who had been left behind at Cádiz and La Coruña were being formed into the Armies of Reserve of Andalucía and Galicia. The Second Army was supported by the independent División de Mallorca under the command of the British general, Samuel Whittingham. Also included in the total were the numerous guerrilla bands of the interior, many of which had by now acquired some semblance of military discipline and organisation: in September 1812, for example, Merino's *partida* consisted of the Arlanza infantry regiment and the Husares Voluntarios de Burgos.⁴ In all, the total number of regular troops may have numbered as many as 130 000 officers and men, but the number of effectives was far smaller: in the winter of 1813, the First Army could field less than 8000 men out of a total of 15 700, and the Fourth Army 14 800 men out of 26 400.⁵ Their weakness was hardly surprising in view of the privations that they had to undergo. Notwithstanding the fact that his division had been regularly paid from the British subsidy, even Whittingham complained to Henry Wellesley that 'troops have never suffered such privation as these have done, nor has hunger ever been endured for such a length of time . . . our means, poor as they are, are daily decreasing, and . . . in a very short time we shall literally die from hunger'.⁶

Such continued penury could not but undermine the army's fighting qualities, which were further reduced by the deficiencies of its composition. For all their ragged appearance – the Galicians, for example, were described as 'an army of mendicants'⁷ – the infantrymen who composed the vast majority of the Spanish forces no longer consisted of the undisciplined levies of the first years of the war. Years of incessant campaigning had reduced the ranks to a core of hardened veterans who were to give repeated proofs of their courage in the campaigns of 1813. Moreover, even the physical appearance of the troops had begun to improve thanks to the wholesale distribution of complete uniforms on the part of Great Britain: between 24 July and 9 October 1812 alone no fewer

than 43 950 such uniforms arrived at Lisbon and Cádiz.⁸ Yet the infantry could not be supported with sufficient artillery or cavalry. The quality of such gunners as there were was remarkably high, but they had very few cannon: the Spaniards had lost enormous numbers of guns in the disastrous defeats of the period 1808 – 12, and simply did not have the resources to make good the damage.⁹ The problems faced by the Spanish cavalry were far more severe. To quote from Whittingham once again, 'The Spanish cavalry have done nothing during the war. It is in a state of complete disorganisation: immovable from want of discipline and instruction; sunk and depressed from misery and want; accustomed to defeat, and almost deprived of the hope of success!'¹⁰ The state of the Spanish cavalry was examined in more detail by a report that was submitted to the Regency by the Inspector General of Cavalry, Juan O'Donoju, and a memorandum that was sent to Wellington by the commander of the cavalry of the Second Army, Manuel Freyre. O'Donoju placed the number of mounted troops at 17 430 men. Although they were theoretically organised into twelve line, twelve dragoon, four chasseur and four hussar regiments, each of which should have had four squadrons, the Inspector General identified no fewer than forty-one different units. Because it had proved so difficult to keep the cavalry up to strength, most of these units had only two or three squadrons, whilst some were so weak that they could only muster the equivalent of one. As a result, in some armies the cavalry had been amalgamated into a number of provisional regiments. Both O'Donoju and Freyre condemned this development, but they did agree that the cavalry's fundamental problem was the manner in which it had been dispersed into more and more units without any regard for system or form. Amongst the other deficiencies which they identified were the weakness of the officer corps, the chronic shortage of good horses, and the failure of the supply system. Such problems were by no means easy of solution, but the two generals recommended that a start might be made by a complete reorganisation of the cavalry according to a common system under the direction of experienced officers. The number of regiments was to be reduced by a policy of amalgamation. Freyre suggesting that surplus troopers should be sent to form a large training depot in Andalucía which might be drawn upon as a source of reinforcements.¹¹

Having once obtained the command of the Spanish army, the Duke of Wellington certainly did not remain inactive in the face

of its many problems. In some instances, such as the Spaniards' notorious habit of selling their equipment, he was able to take direct action. On 12 February he wrote to Castaños, the commander of the Fourth Army, ordering him to investigate the seemingly endless issue of uniforms to the Spanish troops in Extremadura, and announcing his intention of holding every company commander responsible for the clothing and equipment distributed to his men.¹² In the same vein, he attempted to find a cure for the immense desertion experienced by the Spaniards, by transferring regiments away from the areas in which they had been recruited on the grounds that doing so would make it harder for the soldiers to escape.¹³ Nor was his attention confined to the rank and file: at the beginning of May the Duke ordered that every army commander should send out proclamations enjoining the numerous absentees amongst the officer corps to return to their regiments by 1 June on pain of public disgrace.¹⁴ Not surprisingly, the Duke was also deeply concerned with matters of military organisation, and soon became involved in a long discussion with Castaños over the structure that should be given to his command, which stretched from Extremadura to the Bay of Biscay and incorporated no fewer than three of the armies that had existed prior to the reorganisation of 1812, as well as a large number of more-or-less undisciplined guerrilla bands.¹⁵ As in all such matters, Wellington's chief concern was to impart a more rational structure to the Spanish army. A considerable start had been made at Cádiz, but he now turned his attention to its individual arms. The artillery was functioning as well as could be expected given its material wants, but the same could not be said of either the cavalry or the infantry. After receiving Freyre's memorandum, Wellington decided to withdraw most of the former from the field armies and to concentrate it in a general depot in Andalucía where it might be supplied with proper uniforms and equipment, and reformed into the 'old established regiments of the service'.¹⁶ Yet these plans were disrupted by the actions of the Regency, which was soon showing signs of a disposition to interfere in the army's internal affairs, whilst those troops that did reach the Guadalquivir discovered a shortage of fodder and stabling facilities that soon put paid to many precious horses; indeed, so serious was the problem in one regiment that many of the troopers eventually had to be trained as infantrymen.¹⁷ In addition to these obstacles, Wellington had to contend with the resistance of the officers of those regi-

ments which were threatened with amalgamation into other units: the commander of the two provisional cavalry regiments attached to the old Fifth Army, the Conde de Penne Villemur, waxed particularly furious against their disbandment, an attitude in which he was supported by General Castaños who feared that their removal would leave him without any cavalry support.¹⁸ The result was that little progress was made with the reform of the mounted troops until later in the year when the Regency agreed that a number of regiments could be placed under the command of General Whittingham, who by dint of much hard labour was able to effect some improvement in their quality.¹⁹ By then such progress was hardly relevant: with the French driven into the Pyrenees, there was no employment even for the British cavalry, let alone for the much maligned Spanish troopers.

For all Wellington's efforts with regard to the cavalry, the backbone of his new command would always remain its infantry, in whose reform he was equally quick to display an interest. In July 1812 the Regency had introduced new regulations for the infantry, which until then had been organised into three-battalion regiments. Many battalions having fallen so far below strength that it was no longer possible to operate them as separate units, the Regency had decreed that they should now be amalgamated. Henceforward each regiment would be formed of a single battalion of one thousand officers and men, consisting of one grenadier, six fusilier and one chasseur companies.²⁰ The Duke disapproved of this form of organisation, however. As he complained to the Conde del Abisbal, the regiments were so large as to be unmanoeuvrable, whilst they could not be brought up to strength without enlisting men who were unfit for active service. To make matters worse, they also lacked any means by which this could be done: in the absence of depot battalions, it was only possible to refill the ranks of depleted regiments by sending them to the rear. Furthermore, their absence deprived Spain of any force that could maintain order and enforce the dispositions of the civil and military authorities. In consequence, Wellington proposed that each regiment should be divided into two battalions of six companies, of which the second should be left at home, for which system he claimed manifold advantages:

The regiment would thus become much more manageable in manoeuvre. If the commander of the army should have any

occasion to leave any troops in his district, he would have the facility of leaving behind the least disciplined and [most] weakly men . . . who would be in a state of organisation to perform some service. The second battalion of a regiment left behind in cantonments would be a reserve for the first, and would furnish it with trained recruits to keep up its numbers.²¹

The Duke laid this plan before both the Conde del Abisbal, who had been appointed to the command of the Army of Reserve of Andalucía, and General Castaños, of whom the latter proposed a rival scheme whereby each regiment should have four battalions, each brigade two regiments, and each division two brigades. Although he agreed on the need for a depot battalion and a reduction in the number of regiments, he also suggested that the size of each company should be increased and the number of officers reduced, and opposed the use of the depot battalions for the repression of bandits and the collection of revenue on the grounds that this would interfere with their training.²² Yet Wellington was unimpressed with this plan, informing Castaños that 'I believe that the only thing that we can do will be to adopt that which I have suggested.'²³ Having dismissed all the alternatives, on the same day the Duke sent a memorandum containing his proposals for the reform of the Spanish infantry to the Minister of War.²⁴

No response was forthcoming, and the infantry retained its old organisation. The Duke betrayed no signs of anger at this snub, however, having long since come to the conclusion that it was inadvisable to press reforms upon the Spaniards which were not absolutely essential. As he advised Lord William Bentinck, 'Generally speaking . . . it is very desirable, and will save us both a good deal of trouble, if you will keep yourself clear of the details of the Spanish service. The Spaniards will not allow either of us to interfere much in their concerns, and will adopt but unwillingly any suggestions which we may make for their improvement.'²⁵ In any case, Wellington was less interested in minutiae than in reforms designed to facilitate the central thrust of his programme, which was to ensure that the Spanish army was properly paid and supplied. As he wrote to Abisbal, 'It will answer no purpose to bring to the . . . Duero or Ebro crowds of starving soldiers. We shall lose them by desertion, and with them our own characters, and increase our difficulties without reaping any advantage from the

trouble taken in forming them.²⁶ It was soon apparent that the Duke's hopes were to be disappointed, however: from every side reports poured in complaining of the difficulties that were being found in feeding and paying the troops, and providing them with the requisite transport. The desperate state of affairs is captured by a representation sent by the Intendant of the Army of Reserve of Andalucía, Francisco Laborda, to the Minister of Finance on 9 March, in which he protested that his Intendancy was suffering a deficit of four millions of *reales* every month, and that no help had been received from either the government or the local authorities; with 'my means, my resources and even my hopes . . . at an end', Laborda warned the government that he would be unable to fulfil his responsibilities beyond the end of the month unless he received 'the most rapid and effective assistance'.²⁷

The reasons for such difficulties are manifold. Never a wealthy country, Spain had been devastated by years of warfare, the scale of the damage having in some instances been increased by the imposition of scorched-earth tactics. In August 1812, for example, the French imposed a levy of twenty million *reales* on Madrid on the eve of its evacuation and forced Toledo to supply them with 300 000 rations.²⁸ In addition, they had stripped Segovia of most of its cattle.²⁹ Conscious, perhaps, that their defeat was near, the French pursued their requisitioning with particular vigour throughout the winter of 1812 – 13, giving rise to complaints that they had 'never shown so much insolence towards the inhabitants'.³⁰ Once Wellington had launched his offensive in 1813, the French acted in the same manner as they had the previous summer: on 12 May they imposed a contribution of 310 000 *reales* on Salamanca, whilst in July there were reports of pillage and destruction from Tafalla and Zaragoza.³¹

Whilst some difficulties were certainly imposed upon the allies by the French activities, Spain had not been entirely stripped of its resources. In September 1812, for example, Sydenham observed:

As long as we can help ourselves well advanced in Spain, the Spanish armies will always be able to subsist themselves. Here in the neighbourhood of Burgos, in a country which has for four years been sacked or plundered by the French, from which the French have lately taken all that they could carry off . . . where a horde of guerrillas live at free quarters, and where Castaños' commissariat . . . is feeding the Galician army, we continue to

procure 30 000 rations of bread a day, and as much corn and forage as all the horses and animals of the army can consume.³²

Lest it should be thought that Sydenham was being over-sanguine, it should be noted that his opinion was supported by Spanish observers.³³ The Duke's own opinion was given to the Spanish War Minister in a letter of 30 August 1813, in which he pointed out that as 'the enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain at the expense of the Spanish nation infinitely larger than are necessary for its defence . . . it cannot be pretended that the country does not produce the means of maintaining the men necessary for its defence'. As 'the rich provinces of Extremadura, and Castile, and Asturias, and León, and Galicia have literally supplied nothing to the Fourth Army, and others but little or nothing to those which their resources were destined to maintain'. It was equally clear that 'the deficiency must be attributed to the want of ability, or want of power, or to both those wants, in those persons employed to realise and apply these resources to the public service'.³⁴

In thus reviling the Spanish bureaucracy, Wellington was certainly not alone, both Castaños and Abisbal bemoaning the unco-operative and lackadaisical attitude shown by the civilian officials of their respective districts: when the latter's forces arrived in Seville in February 1813, for example, it was only with the greatest difficulty that the authorities were persuaded to supply the troops with billets.³⁵ The commander of the División de Mallorca, General Whittingham, took the argument one stage further: claiming that the Spaniards experienced such difficulties precisely because they relied upon 'a long train of commissaries, factors etc., a practice only good to enrich those employed', he called for the army to take its supply entirely into its own hands and to make requisitions directly from the countryside as the French did.³⁶ On a general level, Wellington certainly agreed with this assessment, bemoaning the manner in which he had been forced to accept the continued independence of the Intendants. As he wrote to Bentinck, 'I and all the Spanish generals conceive that the Captains General of the provinces have not power sufficient to realise the resources of the country for the armies. This is one of the points which the jealousy of the democracy at Cádiz for the military power prevented me from carrying to the extent I wished . . .'.³⁷ Despite his

dissatisfaction, he nevertheless realised that living off the country was no solution:

General Whittingham complains with great reason that the French by means of their system live in countries . . . in which the Spaniards starve, and it is likewise true that the starvation of the Spanish armies is more burdensome to the country than the plentiful mode of living of the French . . .

To what are these facts to be attributed? Certainly not to the inclination of the inhabitants . . . to the enemy . . . Let any person attend to the detail of a French operation of this description, he will see the use of the bayonet in almost every part of it; he will see the compulsory quartering of individuals called refractory and the necessity of incurring large expenses laid upon these individuals, besides serious inconveniences; he will see women and children . . . taken as hostages . . . and in short everything done to compel the individual and village to obey the requisition, and to instil terror into others who might be inclined to resist.

In what country, excepting in France during the first days of the revolution, could such a system be carried into execution by its own government and army? In what country could we, as allies, venture to follow such an example?³⁸

Laudable though Wellington's dislike of military despotism may have been, it is nevertheless hard to see how the problems facing the Spanish army could have been resolved except by the ruthless and efficient use of force, especially as the traditional view of civilian support for the war effort is open to serious question. Numerous examples may be found of Spanish civilians who risked their lives to aid the allied armies.³⁹ Yet liberation from the French seems nowhere to have awakened any eagerness to enlist in the regular army, whilst attempts to avoid conscription by the traditional means of flight or marriage remained widespread.⁴⁰ British accounts of the campaigns of 1812 and 1813 certainly complain of Spanish apathy and indifference as often as they praise popular enthusiasm, and frequently maintain that the inhabitants' dislike of the French was purely passive, and did not extend to a willingness to take up arms against them.⁴¹ Even in such areas as Catalonia, where the civilian population had always taken an active role in the war thanks to the survival of the *somatenes*, a primitive

form of home guard, there is some evidence to suggest that popular participation in the struggle was on the wane by 1813.⁴²

The behaviour of the guerrillas who infested the liberated areas certainly does not suggest the degree of commitment to the struggle that might have been expected from their reputation. The problem of the Spanish guerrillas has already been discussed at length elsewhere.⁴³ For the present, it is sufficient to note that many of the guerrillas had taken to the hills for reasons other than patriotism or revenge. A certain proportion of the *partidas* had not been composed of freedom-fighters at all, but rather of bandits and deserters who preyed upon the allies, the French and the civilian population alike.⁴⁴ At the same time, even in those bands which had been genuine participants in the struggle, many of the rank and file had become guerrillas out of greed for plunder or a desire to evade service in the regular army.⁴⁵ During the campaign of 1812 a number of the more organised guerrilla formations, such as Julián Sánchez's Lanceros de Castilla, had joined the allied regular armies.⁴⁶ Military opinion had always held that the *partidas* should be incorporated into the regular army in this fashion as soon as the French had been driven from each province.⁴⁷ An equally patriotic alternative would have been for them to follow the retreating enemy to fresh hunting grounds. The actual conduct of many of the guerrillas outside those areas that were still occupied by the enemy was very different, however. In northern Spain, irregular resistance reached fresh heights in the winter of 1812–13, whilst in the Levante it was inflamed by the emergence of new leaders, such as the friar, Agustín Nebot.⁴⁸ Yet whilst the 'little war' continued to rage elsewhere, the liberated territories presented a sorry picture. The conduct of the guerrillas had always been the subject of complaint.⁴⁹ From the autumn of 1812 onwards discontent on this subject underwent a noticeable increase: deprived of the cloak of patriotism which had been provided by the struggle against the invaders, the more disreputable *partidas* now revealed themselves for the bandits which they had always been.⁵⁰ Even such units as were incorporated into the regular army acted in a most arrogant fashion, and were abandoned by many renegades who resented the imposition of military discipline.⁵¹ So great did the problem become that regular troops had to be sent against the 'banditti'.⁵² Some guerrilla units performed useful service in helping to put down the marauders, but there were also reports that even those *partidas* that had remained loyal had fallen

into a state of torpid inactivity, whilst devouring resources that were needed by the regular army.⁵³

Not only had large parts of the country been reduced to anarchy, but Wellington's logistical arrangements were often impossible to reconcile with conditions on the ground. Relations between the different Intendants were often very confused, a large part of the revenue was absorbed by its very collection or by the salaries of government officials, supplies that were destined for one army were monopolised by another, and the state's many creditors took the settlement of their accounts into their own hands by the simple measure of withholding their taxes.⁵⁴ Nor did the re-establishment of the military power as the apex of the local administration provide a guaranteed solution, for many of the generals were at odds with one another thanks to the reforms of December 1812, as in Extremadura where the authority of General Castaños was challenged by the Marqués del Palacio.⁵⁵ Even had the situation been less complicated, the bureaucracy had long since been overwhelmed by the pressures created by the titanic struggle against the French.⁵⁶ Immense disruption had also been caused by the revolution of 1808, for many experienced officials had been murdered or become *afrancesados*, to be replaced by men whose only recommendation was their favour with the new authorities, and who regarded their positions solely as a source of personal gain.⁵⁷ On 8 February the confusion and disorder which characterised the Cádiz régime was dramatically revealed in the Cortes. In the course of a debate on the government's conduct of the war since the French evacuation of Andalucía, it emerged 'that the returns of the army presented by the Minister of War were incorrect, that the Minister of Finance had not been apprised of the number of troops to be maintained by the government, and that the Regency had recruited the army without reference to the resources at their disposal for its maintenance'. On being called to account for this situation. Carvajal, whom Wellington later described as 'a weak, foolish creature, who did not know what he was about, or the mischief he was doing', claimed that 'such was the system pursued in the different departments that their time was entirely occupied in listening to the complaints and pretensions of private individuals, all of which they were required to report to the Regency, and to receive their orders upon them, and that in this manner the time of the Regency . . . was occupied by trifling details'.⁵⁸

The difficulties that beset the patriot cause would have taxed the abilities of a far more efficient government than that which ruled in Cádiz, but the Regency showed little interest in meeting its responsibilities. By all accounts its members were a collection of mediocrities, whose president, the Duque del Infantado, 'distracted every discussion with irrelevancies, and spent his time looking at his sword, his braid, an engraving, or the like'.⁵⁹ Even such leadership as it might have afforded was diluted by the determination of the more anglophobic of its members to limit the impact of its concessions to the Duke of Wellington. It was, for example, no coincidence that Palacio, whose refusal to accept the authority of General Castaños has already been recorded, was amongst its clients. In seeking revenge for their humiliation, the Regents were encouraged by an ever-growing wave of anglophobia that had already received much stimulation as a result of the outcry over the conditions attached to Wellington's appointment. The fears of British bad faith which these had provoked were encouraged by the latest news from the colonies. As Henry Wellesley complained to Lord Castlereagh on 16 February 1813:

Every fresh arrival from America brings advices which tend to increase the jealousy and irritation occasioned by our intercourse with the insurgents. It is well known here that numbers of Englishmen have accepted commissions in the insurgent army of Venezuela . . . It is impossible to make the Spaniards understand that the British government have no control over their proceedings. It is alleged that every individual is powerfully influenced by the sentiments and wishes of his government, and that, so far as the trade is concerned, every possible encouragement has been given to promote a commercial intercourse between Great Britain and the insurgent colonies, to which intercourse the latter are indebted for the resources which have enabled them to persevere in their resistance to the mother country.⁶⁰

The particular news to which the ambassador referred concerned events in Venezuela and the Banda Oriental (present-day Uruguay). At the end of November 1812 the Regency had alleged that the British had not only rescued a party of refugees from the port of La Guaira at the time of its recapture by the loyalists, but that they had been behind the entire Venezuelan insurrection.⁶¹

Wellesley had protested at these accusations, which he attributed to partisans of the Princess of Brazil, and succeeded in extracting a partial apology.⁶² Similar reports continued to circulate, however, and on 29 May the Spanish Secretary of State presented the ambassador with evidence that the refugees from La Guaira had been given shelter on the British-held island of Trinidad, from which they had launched a further expedition against the port in January 1813.⁶³ Wellesley was most disconcerted by these allegations, especially when London confirmed that such an expedition had indeed sailed from Port of Spain. The British authorities claimed to have had no knowledge of it, and, further, to have prohibited all insurgent activity.⁶⁴ Such explanations were unlikely to carry much weight in Cádiz, where Spanish suspicions had been further aroused by events in the south. Following the outbreak of revolution at Buenos Aires, Portuguese troops had crossed the frontier from Brazil and driven the rebels away from the loyalist stronghold of Montevideo. Fearful that the continued Portuguese occupation – which stemmed from a desire to extend the frontiers of Brazil all the way to the river Plata – would damage the alliance with Spain, the British ambassador to Rio de Janeiro, Lord Strangford, had succeeded in negotiating an armistice between the Portuguese and the Argentinians. The scale of his miscalculation could hardly have been greater: the Portuguese retreat merely opened the way for a renewed attack upon Montevideo, and thus opened the British to further charges that they were secretly abetting the rebels.⁶⁵

With matters in this state, it would perhaps have been better to leave the questions of free trade and British mediation in abeyance. Impelled by the force of Britain's financial difficulties and commercial interests, on 24 March 1813 Wellesley was once again constrained to propose a trade agreement.⁶⁶ A month later, he also renewed the offer of British mediation, only to receive a stinging rejoinder to the effect that, as the Constitution of 1812 had conceded equality to the colonies, they could have no legitimate cause for their rebellion, which Spain had every right to crush by force of arms.⁶⁷ The Duke of Wellington had long been convinced of the dangerous nature of Britain's Latin American policy. In August 1810 he had written to Henry Wellesley denouncing the demands for free trade on the grounds not only that Britain had no right to such a claim, but also that by advancing it she would ruin Spain in just the same way that her unrestricted trade with Brazil had

ruined Portugal – 'Portugal would now be in a very different situation as an ally if our trade with the Brazils was still carried on through Lisbon, and I would only ask is it liberal or just to destroy the power and resources, and absolutely to ruin our allies in order to put into the pockets of our merchants the money which before went into their treasuries, and would now be employed in the maintenance of military establishments against the common enemy.'⁶⁸ Well aware of the 'load of suspicion and prejudice' that had been engendered by 'our smuggling merchants and sea captains', he now suggested that the restrictions on commercial contacts with the rebels should be enforced with renewed severity.⁶⁹ Even Henry Wellesley was driven to question the sense of British policy, complaining to Lord Castlereagh:

I should not so often recur to the subject of America if the affairs in that quarter were not viewed here with much greater interest than the events of the war in the Peninsula and in the north of Europe, and did not influence the conduct of this government and of the Cortes in all their transactions with Great Britain. Even those who have given unequivocal proofs of their attachment to Great Britain . . . consider it to be our policy to establish a commercial intercourse with the Spanish colonies, and they think that in the pursuit of this object we have given a degree of countenance to the insurgents which by exciting jealousies here has considerably weakened our influence.

Such is the tenor of the conversation in all societies both public and private even among our friends, and every effort is made by the emissaries of France, and by the merchants who conceive it to be their interest to prevent the trade with South America from being declared free, to aggravate these feelings and to lower us in the public estimation.

It is to this that we are to attribute the libels with which we are so frequently assailed, and for which it is impossible to obtain any redress.⁷⁰

The response of the British government to this criticism was that, whilst British policy was certain to be unpopular in Cádiz, it refused to believe that 'this feeling is very general amongst the Spanish nation, or even that it exists in any great degree in the minds of the most enlightened members of the government', especially as 'the liberal principles on which His Royal Highness

has repeatedly offered his mediation will always be a sufficient answer . . . to the aspersions which have been cast upon our sincerity'. To remove the tension that was currently undermining the alliance, it was therefore only necessary to remove 'the seat of the government into a part of the country less swayed by habits of monopoly and exclusive trade'.⁷¹ Lord Bathurst had been pressing this solution upon the Duke of Wellington since March, and on 7 July Henry Wellesley was instructed formally to propose that the capital should be transferred to Madrid.⁷² In principle, both the general and the ambassador supported such a measure, but Wellington, at least, was well aware that it was but a partial solution to the problem. In his eyes, the root of the evil lay not with the merchants of Cádiz, but rather with the press, of which he remarked, 'We have done the Spaniards a great deal of mischief by encouraging them to establish what is called a free, but what is really a licentious, press, and so we shall find to our cost!'⁷³ On 21 April he made a similar point, complaining to Lord Bathurst that because 'the writers of the newspapers . . . are, in fact, the government', it followed that 'wherever the Cortes and the government should establish themselves, the press would follow them, and would exercise the same control over the proceedings of both, and in a very short space of time the mob of Seville, of Granada, or even of Madrid, would be as bad as that of Cádiz'.⁷⁴

Simply removing the government would be no solution because the question of Latin America was not the only issue currently to bedevil the course of Anglo-Spanish relations. For all the difficulties which they had experienced with the Spaniards, until 1812 the British had enjoyed a certain psychological advantage in the Peninsula in that they could argue that Spain's cause had been truly desperate. Not only were the French in occupation of most of her territory, but the rest of Europe was at peace with the Emperor. Spain and Portugal stood alone, and could not but rely upon the help of Great Britain. By 1813 the situation was very different, for Napoleon had been defeated in Russia and was now faced by a renewed coalition of the European powers. After so many years of sacrifice, it was but natural for nationalistic Spaniards to feel that they themselves had played some part in the impending downfall of the Emperor. As early as 26 December 1812 the *Diario de la Tarde* had published an article entitled 'What has Spain done?', praising the triumph of the Spanish people over 'the monstrous abortion of Corsica'.⁷⁵ This was followed in early

1813 by a claim in the new periodical, *Los Ingleses en España*, that, for all that Spain owed the British in terms of their assistance, she could have held out against the French without them, and, further, that the balance of obligation actually lay with Great Britain: had the Spaniards succumbed to Napoleon or, still worse, allied themselves with him, a 'horrible tempest' would have been unleashed against the British, the wealth of Latin America – the backbone of the British war effort – would have gone to support the Emperor, and there would have been no further resistance in the rest of Europe. In short, Britain owed her salvation to Spain, and not the other way about.⁷⁶ Finally, in mid-June the *Diario de Gobierno de Sevilla* proclaimed Spain to be 'the liberator of Europe'.⁷⁷ These examples of national pride may be countered by the letters which Wellington continued to receive from assorted Spanish generals and authorities, assuring him of their gratitude and devotion.⁷⁸ Odes and panegyrics in praise of the Duke also continued to appear in the press, and sometimes even in the very newspapers that had carried anti-British articles.⁷⁹ Finally, anglophiles such as Andrés Angel de la Vega continued to assure the British of the loyalty of the mass of the Spanish people, and to attribute the unrest solely to the intrigues of the so-called 'French party' at Cádiz (for which read the liberals).⁸⁰

It is difficult to know how much value is to be placed upon such allegations. Henry Wellesley certainly set much store by them: in August 1812 he had solemnly informed Lord Castlereagh of intelligence that he had received from Madrid informing him that several leading liberal deputies were involved in an *afrancesado* plot to disrupt the alliance with Great Britain.⁸¹ Furthermore, various French commanders were seeking to exploit the divisions that had been revealed in the allied camp.⁸² Since the liberals drew much of their inspiration from French models, however, to accuse them of *afrancesamiento* was an obvious tactic for their opponents. Whilst there may have been French agents at Cádiz, the equation of liberalism with treason was completely unjust, especially as anti-British feeling was not restricted to the liberals, nor even to Cádiz. It found expression in *servil* newspapers such as the *Diario de la Tarde* which in December 1812 had alleged that England was the seat of world freemasonry, and the Prince Regent its Grand Master.⁸³ In the same way, in February 1813 reports were received of anti-British demonstrations at La Coruña.⁸⁴ Already inflamed by the American question, resentment of the British was encour-

aged by the inaction occasioned by Wellington's determination not to risk a repetition of the failure of the previous year. In line with this thinking, the Duke postponed an attack until such time as he could be certain of outnumbering the forces opposed to him in northern and central Spain, the offensive being further delayed by the need to bring up his pontoon train to the river Duero, and to wait the appearance of the green fodder needed by the army. In the meantime, of course, the British received repeated pleas that they should move forward at once.⁸⁵ When Wellington replied in the negative, *El Conciso* accused the British of deliberately prolonging the war so as to undermine Spain's position in the world.⁸⁶

Though completely without foundation, the charges brought by *El Conciso* were symptomatic of the paranoia that had afflicted Spain ever since the treachery displayed by Napoleon in 1808. In view of these fears, nothing could have been more unfortunate than the proposal that surfaced at this time for the dispatch of a Russian expeditionary force to the Peninsula. The origins of this affair are a little hard to trace, but it seems that a British agent at Malta named Mackenzie had somehow acquired the completely erroneous impression that the commander of the Black Sea fleet, Admiral Greig, was authorised to land a Russian army in Spain. Ordered by Lord William Bentinck, who was now the British commander at Palermo, to carry the news to England, Mackenzie arrived in London to discover that the Russian ambassador in London denied all knowledge of the supposed offer.⁸⁷ The British government immediately wrote to its representatives in Spain ordering them to disabuse the Spaniards of any hopes of Russian aid, but by then Wellington had long since written to the Regency, having previously been sent a message by Mackenzie. Despite the Duke's injunctions that the matter should be kept secret, it was immediately laid before the Cortes and leaked to the press, whereupon the prospect of the arrival of yet more foreign troops created a storm of protest.⁸⁸ Not surprisingly, the offer was rejected, the Regency suggesting that the British should instead undertake to feed and pay an equivalent number of Spanish troops. Meanwhile, plans were also canvassed for the introduction of legislation to prohibit the entry of foreign troops into any Spanish fortress.⁸⁹

Spanish sensitivity on the question of foreign domination was further illustrated by the praise that continued to be lavished upon the imprisoned General Ballesteros.⁹⁰ Indeed, a periodical was started on the Isla de León with the sole purpose of advancing

his cause.⁹¹ The most dramatic expression of support came in a representation sent to the Cortes by the Aragonese deputy, Juan Romero y Alpuente. After a long defence of Ballesteros' rebellion, the deputy launched into a denunciation of the British record in the Peninsula. Britain was accused of despoiling Spain, and furthermore of failing to provide her with adequate support. Some of the arguments which Romero used in this respect were simply ludicrous (to have pretended that the British could have relieved Zaragoza in January 1809 was to fly in the face of reality), but his references to Moore's retreat touched upon a genuine sense of betrayal. Having thus demonstrated that Britain had not complied with the duties of an ally, Romero went on to argue that she had actually taken the part of an enemy: her troops had devastated the countryside and sacked Spanish cities; she had persistently sought to seize Spain's ports, and destroy her trade; she had enriched herself at her expense; and, finally, she had sought to install a puppet government under the leadership of the Princess of Brazil. Pointing to Sicily and Portugal as examples of countries that had already fallen under the British yoke, Romero concluded by demanding Wellington's immediate removal, the appointment of a Spanish general to command the Anglo-Portuguese army and its reduction to a size of 30 000 men, the release of Ballesteros, the restoration of the Spanish navy, an increase in the British subsidy, and the deployment of as many Spanish troops in Gibraltar as there were British troops in Spanish fortresses.⁹²

Much to the annoyance of Henry Wellesley, a similar argument was advanced in 'an atrocious libel' that appeared in *El Español Libre*.⁹³ The gist of this diatribe was essentially that the advantages derived from the Anglo-Spanish alliance had been far greater on the part of Britain than on the part of Spain. But for the rising of 1808, Britain would have been in a desperate predicament: 'totally deprived of her commerce with Europe, she would have seen disappear her manufactures and her industry; she would have beheld a maritime power . . . arising out of the combined efforts of the powers of the continent'. Having rescued her from certain calamity, it followed that Spain had every right to ask for help of the sort that she most needed, which was not men but money. Yet the Junta Central had made no effort to ensure that this was forthcoming in sufficient quantities. Instead, it had signed a humiliating treaty of alliance, and had allowed Spain to become more and more dependent upon the services of the Anglo-Portu-

guese army. As enthusiasm for the war diminished, her fortunes had gone from bad to worse, much to the delight of the British, who 'from their entrenchments looked upon our disasters with great composure, insensibly reinforced their armies and avoided every encounter with the enemy'. If Spain now owed them 'the probability of throwing off the French yoke', *El Español Libre* continued, it was only 'as I should owe the preservation of my life to a physician who . . . artfully enfeebled my health in order to keep me always at his command'. Far from receiving financial support, Spain had been forced to apply her own resources to the service of Britain, who had meanwhile been subverting the Spanish empire. Even supposing her reasons for doing so to have stemmed from a quixotic desire for all men to be free, such a motive had not been visible with regard to its conduct towards its own colonies, still less towards the Irish Catholics. As the Americans already were free, it followed that the British were only motivated by their own selfish interests, to further which they had been using every means available to abet the insurrection. In the meantime they had also seized control of the conduct of the war, carrying it on without any regard for Spanish interests. That they could do so was the result of Wellington's appointment, without any regard for the honour of the nation, as commander-in-chief – 'Our Cortes have snatched from us the flattering hope of enjoying one day the glory to owe the freedom of our provinces to a Spaniard . . . limit, beyond what can be perceived, the powers of our government with respect to the direction of the war, and . . . in fine make the fruit of our sacrifices depend upon a foreign government.' By doing so, they had needlessly prolonged the war, and thus run the risk of allowing the people to fall prey to French seduction out of sheer despondency. The answer was clear – if the British persisted in meddling in America and failed to supply the Spaniards with the money that they needed to fight the war, 'Let us look among ourselves for the commander we want, let us reanimate the enthusiasm of the people, and let us consolidate the throne of justice proclaimed by the wisdom of our constitution. Let us resolve to accomplish alone . . . the enterprise which we sustain alone, and afterwards enter into negotiations with our allies.'⁹⁴

Whatever the rights and wrongs of these allegations, it is apparent that, in Cádiz at least, those members of the administration who resented the concessions that had been made to the Duke of Wellington could count upon considerable public support. Thus

encouraged, they commenced their campaign of sabotage and harassment by delaying the implementation of the decree of 6 January.⁹⁵ Nor did the Regency hesitate from sending orders directly to the various Spanish commanders in defiance of the agreement that it should only communicate with its forces through Wellington's headquarters. Proceeding without any regard for the Duke's own attempts to reform the cavalry, it established a depot for that arm, and withdrew several regiments serving with the armies.⁹⁶ Acting on a number of pretexts, it also recalled substantial forces to the vicinity of Cádiz, where it placed them under the command of a General Abadía who until then had been serving under Abisbal.⁹⁷ Yet in doing so, it was not simply acting out of a desire to be obstructive. According to Carvajal, its aim was to prepare another expedition for dispatch against the American rebels, an argument which is lent some credence by the demands that were currently being made for such a venture in the press.⁹⁸ Yet it may also have had more sinister motives: tension had been growing between the Regency and the Cortes ever since the autumn of 1812, and the liberals, at least, were convinced that preparations were afoot for a military coup. Matters came to a head on Sunday 7 March, when, contrary to an order of the Cortes, the clergy of Cádiz refused to read their congregations a manifesto justifying the recent abolition of the Inquisition. At the same time, the Regency suddenly replaced the liberal governor of Cádiz, General Cayetano Valdés, with the *servil* José María Alos. As the supporters of the Princess of Brazil had once more been gathering strength, it seemed that the counter-revolution was at hand. Yet if it was, then the coup had been remarkably ill prepared: when the Cortes met the following day, it voted that the Regency should immediately be dismissed in favour of the three most senior members of the Council of State, Cardinal Borbón and Admirals Ciscar and Agar. Overawed by vociferous demonstrations in support of the liberals, the ousted Regents made no resistance.⁹⁹

The events of 8 March placed the course of Anglo-Spanish relations under still more strain. Wellington was much disgusted by what had taken place, observing to Henry Wellesley, 'It appears to me that the Cortes have again outdone themselves in their proceedings on the change of the Regency. I have never known a shoe-black dismissed in such a style!'¹⁰⁰ He accordingly did his best to secure a command for Infantado, only for his efforts to be

rebuffed.¹⁰¹ By doing so, however, he once again identified himself with the enemies of reform, which was unfortunate, as the liberal press had quickly come to the conclusion that the British had been unhappy with the change of government.¹⁰² Furthermore, the liberals were determined that there should be no more threats to their position, with the result that the new Regency intervened in the organisation of the army: not only was Valdés restored to his former position, but Cádiz was made an independent Captain Generalcy with its own army.¹⁰³ All these measures contravened the agreement that had been made with the Duke of Wellington, but the latter accepted the situation without protest.¹⁰⁴ Nor did he make any representations on the continued preparations for the dispatch of troops to America.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, a large part of the Spanish forces were still unfit to take the field.¹⁰⁶ In response to the complaints that were forwarded to him by his Spanish subordinates, the Duke had directed a long series of letters to the Spanish War Minister protesting at the wants of the army, the failure of the government to remedy those wants, and the manner in which the conditions under which he had accepted the command had repeatedly been contravened.¹⁰⁷ The replies that he received proved less than satisfactory, however, with the result that the Duke began to contemplate the possibility of resignation: the subject is first mentioned in a letter to Castaños of 25 February, and on 19 March Wellington wrote to his brother, desiring him to inform the Regency 'that the engagements entered into with me must be strictly carried into execution, if it be wished that I should retain the command'. If that was not desired, the commander-in-chief continued, 'it is only necessary to hint a desire that I should resign, or, what is tantamount, to fail to perform the engagements entered into with me, and I will resign with much more pleasure than ever I accepted the command'.¹⁰⁸ To reinforce this threat, on 3 April Wellington wrote to Vega asking him to arrange for the whole affair to be debated in the Cortes. After a long preamble in which the Duke outlined the circumstances under which he had accepted the command, and stressed the absence of any personal ambition on his part, he claimed that his intentions had been 'entirely frustrated by the departure of the government from every article of their engagements with me'. In addition to failing 'to carry into execution the measures . . . arranged with me to provide for the support of the armies' so that 'all the armies are in the greatest distress for want of pay and provisions, nothing can be

realised even from those provinces which have been longest freed from the enemy, and the expectations of the country and of the allies that we should have a good Spanish army in this campaign have been disappointed', the crimes of the Regency were threefold:

First, they have removed officers from their stations and have placed them in others without any recommendation from me or any other senior officer, and without even acquainting me, or the superiors of those officers, that they had made such arrangements.

Secondly, they have appointed officers to stations without my recommendation, or that of any other superior officer . . .

Thirdly, they have without my recommendation, or sending through me their orders, and without even acquainting me of their intentions, moved corps of cavalry and infantry from the army to which they belonged to other stations, and this without any reason that I am acquainted with of a public nature . . .

Despite the fact that he had 'frequently remonstrated upon these breaches of agreement with me, and on the evils likely to result from them', Wellington had 'hitherto been unable to obtain from the government any satisfactory reply whether they intended to conform to their agreement with me or not'. As a result, his tolerance was at an end:

I am fully alive to the importance which has been attached throughout Spain, as well as in England and in other parts of Europe, to my having been entrusted with the command of the Spanish armies, and the officers of the Spanish staff who are here with me will, I am convinced, do justice to the interest, the devotion and the diligence with which I have laboured to place the military affairs of the country in the state in which they ought to be. But I have a character to lose, and, in proportion as expectation has been raised by my appointment, will be the extent of the disappointment . . . at finding that things are no better than they were before.

I confess I do not feel inclined to become the object of those disagreeable sensations, either in Spain, in England, or throughout Europe, and unless some measures can be adopted to prevail upon the government to force the Minister of War to perform

the engagements of the government with me, I must, however unwillingly, resign a situation and trust which I should not have accepted if these engagements had not been entered into.¹⁰⁹

Despite this appeal, it is clear that Wellington was convinced that nothing could be expected from the Spaniards unless they were prepared to undertake significant reforms in the political system. As a landed gentleman, the Duke had always been deeply suspicious of the Cortes of Cádiz: as early as 21 October 1810, he had written to Henry Wellesley, 'I am apprehensive that the Cortes are becoming a national assembly, and they will ruin the cause!'¹¹⁰ His mistrust of the constitutional régime having been confirmed by his visit to Cádiz, he had laid out his feelings with regard to the need for change in letters to both Bathurst and Vega. If the Duke's comments reveal an obsession with the protection of private property, there seems no reason to believe that his criticism was not founded on a genuine concern for the Spanish war effort. In Wellington's eyes Cádiz was in chaos, and nothing could be expected from his command unless order was restored by means of constitutional reform. Nor was his dislike of the Constitution of 1812 founded solely upon its failure to establish a conservative house of peers that might check the excesses of the assembly. As he wrote to Lord Bathurst:

It is impossible to describe the state of confusion in which affairs are at Cádiz. The Cortes have formed a constitution very much on the principle that a painter paints a picture, viz., to be looked at, and I have not met . . . any person of any description . . . who considers the constitution as the embodying of a system by which Spain is, or can be, governed. They, the Cortes, have . . . divested themselves of the executive power, and have appointed a Regency for this purpose. The Regency are in fact the slaves of the Cortes, yet Cortes and Regency . . . have no communications or contact . . . neither knows what the other is doing, or what will be done on any point that can occur. Neither the Regency nor the Cortes have any authority beyond the walls of Cádiz, and I doubt whether the Regency have any beyond the walls of the room in which they meet. Each body, I know, suspects the other . . . The Regency suspect that the Cortes intend to assume the executive power, and the Cortes are so far suspicious of the Regency that, although the leading members

admit the expediency . . . of their removal from Cádiz, the principal reason for remaining there is that . . . if they were to go elsewhere . . . they are apprehensive that the Regency would raise the mob against them!¹¹¹

So long as most of Spain was occupied, Wellington continued, 'their follies have been of little importance, but they will now become a serious misfortune in proportion as the military misfortunes of France will increase the means of communication of the Cortes with the country'.¹¹² It was therefore necessary to embark upon a programme of political reform, whose main points he outlined as being the creation of a permanent government, consisting of a single Regent and a Council of Ministers, all of whom should have seats in the Cortes; the repeal of those articles of the Constitution prohibiting deputies from being re-elected and from holding public office; and the establishment of 'an assembly of the great landed proprietors, such as our House of Lords, having concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes'.¹¹³

Yet Wellington had no intention of doing anything to force these ideas upon the Spaniards, still less any desire to ally himself with the *serviles*: not only did he assure Vega that 'I have certainly nothing to say to your system of government, and I never interfere in concerns with which I have nothing to do', but he stressed that he would 'be sorry if, after all, you were to fail in establishing a system of government founded on principles of justice which should secure the liberty of your country'.¹¹⁴ On being assured that there was 'no probability of any arrangement such as you suggest being made', he made no attempt to press his case, and instead turned to the forthcoming campaign as a means of relieving the tension. As he told General Castaños, 'I do not understand anything about what they were doing at Cádiz . . . In the meantime it is necessary that we should make our arrangements for the opening of the campaign as soon as possible'.¹¹⁵ If he was successful in the field, he told Lord Bathurst that he would then attempt to persuade the Regency and the Cortes to leave Cádiz, for 'the only chance of salvation is to remove the government from thence'.¹¹⁶

In view of the importance which the Duke had placed on the reform of the Spanish army as a *sine qua non* for the resumption of offensive operations, his contemplation of a renewed attack comes of something of a surprise in view of his belief that a large

part of the Spanish forces would be unable to play a major role in the campaign.¹¹⁷ Yet it was becoming increasingly apparent that their services were no longer so essential. With the destruction of the Grande Armée in Russia and the outbreak of general hostilities in Germany, Napoleon would be unable to think of sending reinforcements to the Peninsula. On the contrary, during March news began to be received that the invaders were sending troops back to France, the forces that were actually containing Wellington's army being reduced by some 15 000 men. Had this been the extent of their losses, then all might have been well, for there would still have been 100 000 men to face only 80 000 Anglo-Portuguese. On 12 March, however, King Joseph, who was serving as titular commander-in-chief of the French forces in Spain, had received orders from Paris directing him to send the Army of Portugal to assist in the suppression of the northern insurrection. At the very time that the sometime guerrillas of the liberated territories were wreaking havoc in the allied rear, their counterparts in Navarre, Cantabria, Aragón and the Basque provinces were achieving their greatest successes. Taking advantage of the French concentration against the Duke of Wellington at the time of the siege of Burgos, they had overrun the entire region, cutting communications with France and blockading the enemy garrisons. Ordered to crush the insurgents, the Army of the North became enmeshed in a long series of punitive operations that had little effect other than to attract the derision of the guerrilla leaders.¹¹⁸

By 20 May, five-and-a-half divisions of the six belonging to the Army of Portugal had been drawn eastwards to take part in this struggle. Wellington, meanwhile, was well aware of the northern insurrection, informing Bathurst that 'General Mina appears actively employed against the enemy in Navarre, and he and Colonel Longa have done them great mischief'.¹¹⁹ Freed from his supposed dependence upon the Spanish regulars, the Duke was at last enabled to contemplate a new offensive.¹²⁰ It is Oman's contention that in making his plans Wellington deliberately made as little use as possible of the Spanish forces at his disposal.¹²¹ Such a judgement seems ill-founded, however. If the commander-in-chief did not use all the Spanish forces, it was because he could not do so rather than because he did not want to: two weeks after the campaign had opened, he complained to the Minister of War that Abisbal was detained in his march for want of transport, whilst the Fourth Army 'is unprovided with mules to carry ammu-

munition or anything else . . . and I am obliged to keep it in the rear'. In denouncing this situation, Wellington even showed a trace of his old pessimism:

Thus, this campaign will be fought without the aid of a single Spanish corps, notwithstanding that it is supposed there are 160 000 Spanish troops in arms . . . I earnestly entreat the government to concert with the Cortes the means of establishing in the provinces some authority to which the people will pay obedience, and which will ensure their resources for the purposes of the war; otherwise, notwithstanding all our exertions, the cause of the country will be lost.¹²²

Yet the reality was somewhat less gloomy than he pretended. The Fourth Army's logistical problems cannot be gainsaid: during the advance to Vitoria it suffered from constant shortages, and encroached upon the arrangements the Duke had made for the supply of his own troops.¹²³ Nor was the situation of the other Spanish armies any less penurious.¹²⁴ Despite these difficulties the Spaniards may still be said to have played an important role in the campaign of 1813, at least in so far as it concerned eastern Spain. On 13 April, Whittingham's División de Mallorca, which regular British pay had transformed into a quasi-élite formation, had already played a leading role in the defeat of a French offensive at the second battle of Castalla. In a plan that was dated the following day, Wellington ordered the First, Second and Third Armies to co-operate with Murray's Anglo-Sicilian expeditionary force to prevent the French troops in the Levante and Catalonia from reinforcing King Joseph.¹²⁵ Whilst Copóns' Catalans assisted Murray in an amphibious descent upon Tarragona, Del Parque and Elió were to press in upon Valencia. Caught between two fires, the French commander, Marshal Suchet, would thus be forced to choose between losing either Valencia or Tarragona, as well as being neutralised with regard to the campaign in northern Spain. In the event, these operations did not go according to plan – Murray displayed lamentable incapacity at Tarragona and eventually evacuated his forces, betraying Copóns in the process, whilst Elió and Del Parque failed to make any progress against Valencia – but Suchet was still prevented from interfering elsewhere.

Even in northern Spain, Wellington's forces were initially

accompanied by no fewer than 23 000 Spanish troops, consisting of four infantry and one cavalry divisions from the Fourth Army under the command of General Girón (although he was the titular commander of this army, Castaños remained in the rear, busying himself with such tasks as recruitment). As the allies advanced, a further 5000 troops appeared in the form of the guerrilla divisions of Francisco Longa and Juan Díaz Porlier.¹²⁶ For once the British were impressed: to quote William Bragge, 'Lord Wellington has collected a very powerful Spanish army, all well armed, clothed and equipped, and I very much doubt whether they have had so good and powerful a body acting conjointly for this last century.'¹²⁷ Nevertheless, in employing these troops, Wellington undoubtedly showed considerable caution. One infantry division, that of Carlos de España, was left behind to garrison Salamanca, whilst the bulk of the Fourth Army was allotted a position on the outer flank of the allied array, with the result that it was so far from the enemy that it saw almost no action. The only divisions actually to take part in the battle of Vitoria were those of Morillo and Longa, although these troops did all that was expected of them. On the extreme right wing, Morillo's men headed the assault on the heights of La Puebla, and were instrumental in beating off successive French counter-attacks. Their commander was severely wounded in the contest, but refused to leave the field until the enemy had been defeated. On the other flank of the line, Longa's troops had been attached to Sir Thomas Graham, whose orders were to cut the main road to France and, if possible, break into the French rear. After storming the villages of Durana and Gamarra Menor, these 3000 Spanish infantry crossed the river Zadorra, cut the road as ordered, and advanced some distance towards Vitoria until finally brought to a halt by superior numbers of the enemy. In all, the Spanish losses came to 552 out of an allied total of 5168.¹²⁸

To praise the conduct of those Spaniards who fought at Vitoria is not the same as to pretend that the victory was anything other than an Anglo-Portuguese triumph. With appropriate symbolism, they had been mere auxiliaries in the decisive battle of the war. For Vitoria was indeed decisive: reduced to little more than a mob of fugitives and deprived of all but one of its cannon, King Joseph's army was driven into a headlong retreat for the safety of the French frontier. It was followed by the numerous forces that had been engaged in the struggle with the guerrillas, who immediately

closed in upon the beleaguered French garrison of Aragón and liberated Zaragoza. Meanwhile, terrified that he might be cut off from France, Suchet evacuated Valencia, and fell back on Barcelona. Except in Catalonia, the invaders' hold on Spain had been reduced to a handful of isolated fortresses, such as Pamplona, San Sebastián, Santoña, Tortosa, Sagunto and Lérida. Though fighting was to continue for many months, the war was all but won. With the French in full retreat, it might have been supposed that gratitude for Wellington's victories would now overcome the pride and xenophobia that had disturbed the course of Anglo-Spanish relations since January 1813. Yet it was not to be: barely two months after the battle of Vitoria, a resurgence of Spanish opposition had driven the Duke of Wellington to resign his command. Rather than bringing peace to the alliance, liberation had merely removed the last restraints from hispanic hostility.

6

Crisis in the Pyrenees, July–December 1813

The period from July to December 1813 is characterised by a marked contrast between the course of military events in the Peninsula and the state of Anglo-Spanish relations. Following the decisive victory of Vitoria, the Duke of Wellington brought up his armies to the French frontier, and blockaded the garrisons of San Sebastián and Pamplona. Deploying his troops in a cordon to cover the siege of these places, he repelled two attempts to come to their relief at the battles of the Pyrenees (25–30 July 1813) and San Marcial (31 August 1813). With the French armies in complete disarray, the Duke went on to invade France, defeating his opponents once again at the battles of the Bidasoa, Nivelle and Nive (7 October, 10 November, 10–13 December 1813), and advancing as far as the fortress of Bayonne. In the six months since Vitoria, Wellington had recaptured San Sebastián and Pamplona, defeated the French in five major engagements, and penetrated thirty miles into France. Yet the same period had witnessed the worst outbreak of conflict which the much-tried Anglo-Spanish alliance was ever to endure.

Before embarking upon a detailed consideration of the strains that beset the alliance, it would be as well to consider the part which the Spanish armies had played in the fighting. By the time that he reached the French frontier, Wellington had a large force of Spanish troops at his disposal, including the Fourth Army (eight infantry and one cavalry divisions) and the Army of Reserve of Andalucía (two infantry and one cavalry divisions). Yet rather than using these troops in a single mass, Wellington chose rather to commit them piecemeal. As early as 2 March 1813 he had proposed to General Castaños that the Fourth Army should be split into two wings, each of which was to have its own staff and general officer commanding.¹ Although this measure was never put into effect, it still did not take the field as an independent unit.

In the campaign of Vitoria, Morillo and Sánchez were attached to General Hill, and the rest of the army to General Graham. During the defensive operations that followed, the Spaniards became even more divided: the first division was stationed at Roncesvalles, the second besieged Pamplona together with the Army of Reserve of Andalucía, the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh held the line of the Bidasoa, and the eighth blockaded Jaca. Nor was there any real change in the situation when Wellington finally invaded France: at the Bidasoa and the Nivelle the Spaniards were




Figure 2 The Pyrenean Theatre of Operations

employed in 'penny-packets' of no more than two divisions apiece under the command of British corps commanders.

From these dispositions it is apparent that Wellington preferred to divide the Spaniards into relatively small units that could be interspersed with the more dependable Anglo-Portuguese. If the Spanish concentration on the lower Bidasoa seems to belie such a policy, it should be noted that the divisions involved could field fewer than 15 000 men.² Wellington was to adopt precisely the same policy in dealing with suspect allied troops at the battle of Waterloo, where his Dutch, Belgians and Germans were intermingled with the British troops rather than forming separate corps of their own. In adopting such a policy, the Duke's motives were simple. As he wrote to Henry Wellesley with regard to Abisbal's desire to concentrate the three armies in eastern Spain into a single force under his own command, 'I sent him word that I had not lately heard of any Spanish troops acting together as a single corps that had not been destroyed, and that the last that had so acted had been destroyed by half their numbers.'³ The same proposal having been made to him at about the same time by Bentinck, Wellington admitted that it 'would be much more easy and convenient for me . . . to join all the Spaniards into one corps, all the British into another, and all the Portuguese into a third'. The trouble was, he continued, that 'some fine morning I should find both Spaniards and Portuguese surprised and defeated, and the British would cut but a poor figure alone'.⁴ Wellington had warned Wellesley that Abisbal was likely to pursue his views with the Spanish government, and that he had already informed the Spanish Chief of Staff, General Wimpffen, that 'the Spanish nation and army expected and were anxious that all the Spanish troops acting on this side should be joined together, and should act as one corps'. On 30 August Wellington duly received a letter from the Spanish Minister of War informing him that the Regency were desirous of seeing all the Spaniards united into two large forces, to be known as the Armies of the East and of the West.⁵ In reply, the Duke could hardly cite his continued scorn for the Spanish forces, and instead pointed out that the maintenance of such large forces was beyond the capability of the Spanish commissariat. As he remarked:

I confess that I should not think I did my duty . . . if I were to place a corps of 30 000 Spanish troops to act alone upon any

particular point. There is no tract of country which could be the seat of their operations which would be sufficient to supply the various demands with which they must necessarily come upon it . . . and the only mode in which they can be supplied and rendered useful is, as at present, mixed in a line occupied by a larger number of men.⁶

Whether Wellington's suspicions were justified is a moot point. Evidence that the Spaniards were still prone to the sudden routs that had characterised the early years of the war may be found in an incident at the first battle of Sorauren (28 July 1813). Two Spanish battalions of the Army of Reserve of Andalucía had been deployed on an outlying spur of the ridge occupied by the allied army. In preliminary skirmishing on 27 July they had performed very well, repelling a full-scale French assault. The next day, however, for no apparent reason they suddenly broke and fled at a crucial moment of the fighting.⁷ In the same way the Spaniards proved extremely lax in the blockade of San Sebastián, where they lost many prisoners to a French sortie on 3 July, and showed little enthusiasm for the task of constructing field fortifications.⁸ Nor did they impress Sir Thomas Graham:

I feel a great deal of difficulty in answering Your Lordship's question about the Spaniards being fit to carry on principally the operation of the siege of San Sebastián.

In general, Girón's own troops [the Fourth Army] which appear to be in the *best order* have been very little tried before the enemy. Probably many of them have never fired a shot in action. But those that were employed at Tolosa behaved very well . . . I should, however, have more confidence in Longa's troops as being more *aguerrés* . . .

The Spaniards who blockade San Sebastián at present are part of Mendizábal's force . . . These men do not seem to understand well what they are about. They fire away a great deal of ammunition without seeing the enemy. I believe they were completely surprised the other night and some say they lost a great many . . . prisoners. This corps, consisting of four battalions, I should certainly say *could not be depended upon* without a considerable proportion of better troops . . . I have always observed among the Spaniards . . . a great degree of emulation from pride, and therefore I am persuaded a good proportion of

them might be safely employed in the different duties of the siege. But I would by no means answer for their doing as well if left entirely to themselves in the execution even of the most ordinary duties.⁹

The reference to the Spaniards' poor fire discipline, which is echoed in several British memoirs, is interesting, for to open fire at long range was always a characteristic of troops who were either ill-trained or unsteady.¹⁰ To be fair to the Spaniards, however, the troops of which Graham complained were *ci-devant* guerrillas, who had only recently been formed into regular units and had enjoyed an evil reputation even as irregulars.¹¹ Yet on the whole the Spanish performance in the Pyrenean campaign was highly creditable. The Spaniards had always been at their best when deployed in strong defensive positions where they had no need to manoeuvre, but only to hold their ground. Attacked in its positions overlooking the river Bidasoa on the heights of San Marcial on 31 August 1813, the Fourth Army was therefore able to win a significant victory. Desperate to relieve the beleaguered fortress of San Sebastián, which was actually stormed on that very day, the French threw three divisions across the Bidasoa under cover of a heavy artillery bombardment. Yet the defenders, who consisted of the third, fourth and fifth Divisions of the Fourth Army, stood firm. Waiting until the enemy infantry, whose ranks had become much disordered from the steep climb from the Bidasoa, had reached the crest of the slope, they delivered a single volley and then charged. Two attacks were beaten off in this fashion, but then a third assault was delivered, supported by fresh troops from the reserve division of General Villatte. Although his fellow commanders were once again driven off, Villatte succeeded in making a lodgement upon the western end of the heights above the town of Irun. By this time the Spaniards were exhausted, and seemed to be on the point of disintegration. Believing that all was lost, their commander, General Freyre, who had recently taken over from General Girón, sent to Wellington for help, but the Duke, judging that the French were a spent force, refused to oblige. Indeed by the time that the message reached him, the crisis was already past: ordering Mendizábal's seventh Division out of its position at Irun, Freyre brought it up the slope and attacked Villatte's division in the flank. Demoralised by the repulse of the other two French divisions, Villatte's troops turned and fled.¹²

The battle of San Marcial was not the only occasion on which the Spaniards distinguished themselves in the second half of 1813, the troops who were employed at the Bidasoa and the Nivelle for the most part having given every satisfaction.¹³ On the other side of the Peninsula, Spanish troops showed great courage at the minor allied defeat of Ordal (13 September 1813), which was occasioned, be it noted, entirely by the carelessness of a British officer.¹⁴ For the Duke to have remarked that 'by putting them in third lines and fourth lines we made them something, or at least made the French think them something' therefore seems more than a little unjust.¹⁵ Yet it is nevertheless the case that a large part of the Spanish forces were never again engaged in serious operations. On the eastern front fighting virtually came to an end with Ordal. Whilst Suchet retreated to Gerona, the Anglo-Sicilians and the First Army blockaded Barcelona. Meanwhile, the task of containing the numerous garrisons left behind by the Marshal absorbed the entire resources of the Second Army, with the exception of the single division of General Sarsfield which was sent to reinforce the allies in Catalonia. Mijares lay before Peñíscola, Roche before Sagunto, Villacampa and El Empecinado before Tortosa, and Durán before Lérida, Mequinenza and Monzón. The seventh and eighth divisions of the Fourth Army were similarly engaged, with Mendizábal being sent to blockade Santoña and Mina already watching Jaca. With some exceptions, however, most of these garrisons were still holding out at the end of the war, whilst even those that fell – Jaca, Lérida, Mequinenza and Monzón – were reduced by starvation or stratagem rather than bombardment or assault.

Singularly inglorious though such a *dénouement* may have been, it provides a fitting testimony to the weaknesses that continued to plague the Spanish army. Lacking heavy artillery, the Spaniards could not breach the walls of the French fortresses. An attempt was sometimes made to proceed by the use of mines, but for the most part the attackers could do no more than seek to starve the enemy into surrender.¹⁶ The only other alternative was to attempt to exploit the isolation of the defenders: in February 1813 the Barón de Eroles had sought to capture a large part of the garrison of Tarragona by dispatching to the governor forged orders to send out a sortie that would have marched straight into a carefully prepared ambush, whilst a year later several garrisons were actually captured some months before the end of the war when they

were persuaded that France and Spain had made peace.¹⁷ Yet even had they been able to reduce the fortresses, it is difficult to see how the Spaniards could have undertaken active operations. The besiegers are often reported to have been more distressed for food than their victims.¹⁸ Nor were matters any better with the few units that actually faced the French in Catalonia: too weak to advance, they quickly devoured the resources of the areas in which they were stationed and were soon 'as completely *hors de combat* from the want of provisions as if there had been an actual famine'.¹⁹ Even in the depots of Cádiz and Madrid both officers and men were starving, barefoot and in rags.²⁰ The reasons were always the same: the administration was powerless and inefficient, money was at a premium, and there was never sufficient transport.

Although the Third Army was eventually brought up from Levante to Navarre, it is clear that Wellington would receive no more Spanish reinforcements. For many British observers, nothing could have been more outrageous. As General Whittingham complained:

Lord Wellington's memorable battle of Salamanca put the Spaniards in possession of the best part of their country, and gave them the means of forming great and powerful armies!

Have they taken advantage of these circumstances? Have they done anything for their own salvation? Their whole time has been occupied in the forming of a cursed constitution, and their army has been forgotten and neglected! We have not increased our army [by] 20 000 men in the last year, nor is there in my opinion any hopes of an amendment.²¹

For all Whittingham's fury, it should be remembered that the Spanish generals had done their best to fulfil their role in Wellington's plans, and the Spanish soldiery to do their duty on the battlefield. On the diplomatic level, too, it seemed at first as if Wellington's victories had strengthened the alliance. Even before news of Vitoria reached Cádiz, the Spanish Minister of State, Gómez Labrador, had informed Henry Wellesley that, notwithstanding the suspension of hostilities in central Europe by the armistice of Plasswitz, Spain would not participate in any peace negotiations, nor countenance a separate peace, until the French had been removed and Fernando restored to his throne.²² The

armistice made the defeat of the French all the more welcome, however, and a delighted Cortes rewarded the Duke with the estate of the Soto de Roma. Meanwhile, the city was illuminated for three days and a Te Deum sung in the cathedral.²³ In a further gesture of goodwill towards Great Britain, some days later the Cortes also voted that Labrador should be removed for having alleged that the British had fomented a quarrel that had broken out between the Spanish and Russian ambassadors in London.²⁴ Similarly, General Carvajal, who had been held by Henry Wellesley to be behind much of the opposition to the Duke of Wellington, had already been replaced as Minister of War by Juan O'Donoju, who had previously been attached to the Duke's headquarters as Inspector General of Cavalry.²⁵

Encouraging though these signs were, they had already been superseded by yet another rift in the alliance. The origins of this latest dispute lay in the clerical opposition that had emerged to the abolition of the Inquisition. Acting with the encouragement of the Papal Nuncio, the canons of Cádiz had refused to read out a manifesto explaining the reasons for the Holy Office's demise, much to the fury of the liberal press.²⁶ Meanwhile, six bishops who had fled to Mallorca issued a call to arms against the liberals that was seconded by the Archbishop of Santiago with a denunciation of the attack on the Inquisition.²⁷ Outraged by these activities, the government had a number of the offending clergymen arrested, and, after a long and acrimonious correspondence, succeeded in forcing the Nuncio into exile.²⁸ Yet by doing so they aroused fears of popular resistance in the interior.²⁹ Such fears seem to be greatly exaggerated – on 12 July Wellington remarked that 'Galicia [the supposed epicentre of the unrest] is submitting quietly to the decrees of the Cortes about the Inquisition, and the Archbishop of Santiago has removed into Portugal'.³⁰ Inspired by the memory of the crisis of 7–8 March, the Regency nevertheless decided that it should take action to ensure that the levers of power were firmly under its control, and at the same time strike one more blow against the Duke of Wellington. In defiance of the agreement of 1 January, it accordingly decreed that as General Castaños was not at the head of his troops, he should relinquish the command of his army and return to Cádiz to take up his seat on the Council of State. Meanwhile, his nephew and chief-of-staff, Pedro Agustín Girón, was transferred to Catalonia. Castaños was replaced by General Manuel Freyre, whilst the commander of the



Army of Reserve of Galicia, General Santocildes, was also dismissed in room of Luis Lacy, whose forces were at the same time specifically removed from Wellington's control. In every case, the victims of this purge were associated with the *serviles*, and their replacements with the liberals. Convinced that these actions would produce the Duke's immediate resignation, Henry Wellesley sought desperately for at least some explanation of what was going on, only to be met with a welter of prevarication from which he could only extract a promise that Wellington would be apprised of the reasons for Castaños' removal, to which he would supposedly give his consent.³¹

Far from approving of the recall of Castaños, let alone the other changes, Wellington was furious: not only had the victor of Bailén proved himself to be the most co-operative of subordinates, but the Duke had first learnt of the changes not from the government, but from Henry Wellesley. As he wrote to Castaños, 'For a long time I have not been so angry or so mortified as I was when I received my brother's letter.'³² Although he certainly regarded the Regency's action very much in the light of a personal insult, he was also deeply concerned at the effect that it would have on the war effort: 'If the government or the Cortes cared about the opinion of their ally, or about carrying on in the war, I should acquiesce in the measure, but it is heartbreaking to see that they care about neither the one nor the other, and there is no tie over them. All they care about is the war against the clergy, and it appears as if the measures for carrying on the war against the enemy were incompatible with those for the prosecution of the more favourite hostilities against the priests.'³³ That internal politics were central to the Regency's motives, he had no doubt: 'For my part, I believe that they prefer to make war on the bishops in Galicia than to make it on the French, and that you have been removed because it is supposed that you are mad enough to be of the opinion that it is necessary above all else to hunt the French down.'³⁴ Nor did the Duke have any doubt what the result of such measures would be:

It will now rest with the Archbishop of Santiago whether or no we shall have a civil war in our rear. If we have, we must take leave of our communications and our supplies of all descriptions, and we shall soon feel the consequences. To be sure it will be droll enough if having commenced the war in Spain and

continued it to this moment with the clergy and people in our favour . . . they were to change sides, and after our victories we should be compelled to withdraw by having the clergy and the people against us.³⁵

As far as the Duke was concerned, the government had gone too far, and he now asked Henry Wellesley to call together the deputies who had been most concerned with his appointment to tell them that, unless they intervened with the government to obtain some apology, he should certainly resign.³⁶ The threat of resignation was also repeated in an official protest, which explained the reasons why Castaños had not taken the command of the Fourth Army in the field, and pointed out that the changes were personally insulting, injurious to the generals concerned and the public service, and in breach of the conditions under which he had accepted the command.³⁷

Wellesley needed no prompting in attempting to resolve the crisis, which he was convinced would have the most serious effects on the allied cause: with the Austrians, Prussians and Russians engaged in negotiations with Napoleon, the news of Wellington's resignation might dissuade them from continuing the war. He therefore made repeated attempts to persuade the Spaniards of the need to ensure that the Duke retained the command. Yet all such efforts proved unavailing. The deputies who had originally supported Wellington's appointment denied having any influence with the government – a blatant falsehood since they included many of the leading liberals and the Regency was a liberal creation. Furthermore, although Wellesley protested that he was not pleading the cause of Castaños but protesting at the violation of the agreement of 1 January, they denounced the general as a notorious opponent of the government who had only been retained in the command out of deference to Wellington's wishes. Claiming that the state of Galicia had rendered his replacement essential, they complained that they had been put to 'a cruel alternative' in being forced to choose between that measure and the survival of the Duke as commander-in-chief. Far from supporting the Duke when a number of the more anglophile deputies succeeded in bringing the issue before the Cortes, they insisted that it be debated in public session: suspecting that the *serviles* intended to overthrow the government, the liberals naturally wished to have the support of the public gallery. So heated did the argument become that the

President was forced to adjourn the session, and order that the debate be postponed. Nor was the Regency any more encouraging, Henry Wellesley being informed that it desired a change in the conditions governing Wellington's appointment, and that it was imperative that Galicia should be entrusted to a general who was prepared to take 'prompt and decisive measures'. However, as O'Donoju promised that the official answer to the Duke's complaints would contain a full explanation of what had occurred, and that there was no intention of forcing his resignation, the ambassador felt able to recommend that he should retain the command. Though still suspicious of the government, Wellesley believed that to obtain proper redress it was only necessary to wait until October when the constituent Cortes was due to be replaced by a new assembly elected in accordance with the Constitution of 1812. More representative than its predecessor, it would immediately replace the Regency with a new body that would not be so hostile to British interests.³⁸

Wellesley's efforts to avoid an immediate crisis were not aided by the Regency, which chose this moment to reject all the Spanish promotions which Wellington had recommended after Vitoria.³⁹ Its answer was also by no means so conciliatory as O'Donoju had intimated. Instead of providing the promised explanation, the Regency complained bitterly of the insolent behaviour of certain Spanish generals, as well as of the manner in which it had been deprived of proper information with regard to their operations. From this it concluded that the agreement of 1 January, which it in any case refused to acknowledge on the grounds that it had only been signed by its predecessor, was incompatible with its decorum and authority, especially with regard to the appointment and removal of field commanders. It therefore insisted that the agreement should be renegotiated, and that the generals should in future communicate directly with the government as well as with Wellington's headquarters.⁴⁰ Mortified at having been misled, Wellesley wrote an angry letter to O'Donoju in which he reproached him for his duplicity, and once again begged him to send an explanation to the Duke before it was too late, but this appeal met with no response other than a protest that it had transgressed against diplomatic propriety.⁴¹ Although he begged Wellington to retain the command, Wellesley was in despair: 'So much lying, shuffling and meanness, I have never yet had to contend with . . . I have no hope . . . of being able to make any impression upon

the government or upon the Minister of War. The government is supported by all the clubs in the town, which are composed of all the turbulent spirits and . . . needy adventurers in the place, and their sole object is mischief. These people would rejoice if you were to resign the command, and their next attempt would be to place General Ballesteros at the head of this army.'⁴²

Wellington was no less intransigent. In response to Wellesley's letters, he pointed out that his complaints were not founded on the removal of Castaños and Girón, still less on the refusal to promote the officers whom he had recommended – 'It was ungracious but there is no engagement to me that either all I recommend should be promoted or that none should be removed. It would have been improper to ask such an arrangement and improper to make it.' What he complained of was rather that 'having made an engagement with them without which I neither can nor will hold the command of the army', the Spaniards 'have broken it, not in one, but in a hundred instances, and . . . appear to do it wantonly, because they know my disinclination to relinquish the command'. As they had thereby damaged the influence and respect which were the sole source of his authority, he had no option but to insist upon satisfaction. As for the government's complaints, Wellington professed himself to be nonplussed: the claim that it could not be bound by any agreement that had been made by its predecessors 'is quite a new principle of government which I am convinced cannot be put into practice', whilst the Regency had always been at liberty to dismiss any commander it chose so long as it sent the order through Wellington's headquarters, and allowed the Duke to approve his successor.⁴³

At this point the situation was complicated still further by a somewhat maladroit intervention on the part of the British government. Already incensed at the conduct of the Spaniards in the months preceding Vitoria, Castlereagh responded to the news of the generals' dismissal by directing Henry Wellesley to deliver a stern remonstrance to the Spanish government demanding their immediate reinstatement. Meanwhile, Wellington was ordered to keep them at their posts.⁴⁴ As the Duke pointed out, however, these orders were completely inappropriate, for his agreement with the Spanish government had said nothing to prohibit the removal of particular generals. Yet even had the Regency been at fault in this respect, to have intervened in such a manner would have been totally counter-productive:

The British government give me an order not to obey the orders of the Spanish government on an affair purely Spanish. The enemies of the English, of the connection between the two countries, and of the measure of placing the command in my hands could not desire anything better: they would proclaim this order to the nation as an attack upon their independence, and we know enough of the Spaniards to be certain that there is not one of them who would not concur in thinking that it was not proper that their government should be liable to such interference with the execution of their orders.⁴⁵

Wellington's caution was undoubtedly well-founded: not only had articles begun to appear in the press attacking General Castaños for his delay in coming to Cádiz (he did not bid farewell to his army until 8 August), but the news of the battle of the Pyrenees had been virtually ignored.⁴⁶ Henry Wellesley had accordingly confined himself to protesting at the breach in the agreement with his brother, but even that had provoked angry denunciations of British interference.⁴⁷

For all his irritation, Wellington was still desirous of retaining the command, remarking to Henry Wellesley, 'These fellows are sad vagabonds, but we must have patience with them, and the state of Europe, and of the world, and of Spain in particular, requires that I should not relinquish the command of the Spanish army if I should avoid it.'⁴⁸ On 7 August he had therefore written a more conciliatory letter to the Minister of War, in which he made it clear that he was not complaining of the removal of Castaños and Girón *per se*, but rather of the appointment of other generals in their stead, and of the refusal of the Regency even to recognise the agreement under which he had accepted the command. As for its complaints, he lamented the lack of respect the Regency had allegedly been shown, but claimed that he had always done his best 'to prevent officers in high stations from . . . using language in their addresses to be laid before the government more expressive of their irritated feelings than their respect'. The cure for such behaviour, however, was to ensure that all correspondence passed through Wellington's headquarters. With regard to its supposed ignorance of military operations, the Duke continued, the Regency had already found a solution by ordering that the generals should send duplicates of all their orders and dispatches directly to the Minister of War, to which procedure Wellington

claimed that he had no objection at all. Having thus clarified the issues at stake, Wellington hoped that the Regency would now inform him as to its intentions with regard to the agreement of 1 January, and concluded by promising that, if he was eventually forced to tender his resignation, 'I will do it at the period and in the mode which may be most convenient and agreeable to the Regency, and . . . at all times act most cordially with, and assist to the utmost of my power, any officer who may be named to succeed me'.⁴⁹

The response to these fresh representations was as unsatisfactory as ever. Wellesley was informed by the Minister of State that the Regency stood firm by its decisions on the grounds that the command-in-chief could not be wielded 'in any manner incompatible with the exercise of its supreme authority in the executive part', and, further, that it could not divest itself of the right 'of directing Spanish generals to the points in which the urgent necessity of preventing political convulsions or other motives of public convenience require that . . . they should serve their country in the manner which circumstances may demand'.⁵⁰ The Duke, meanwhile, was told that the Regency had resolved that it was necessary to establish a foundation upon which he could wield his authority, and that, as the decrees of the Cortes of 22 September 1812 and 6 January 1813 did not specify exactly what this foundation should be, he should propose a new set of conditions in accordance with the views that had already been expressed to him by the Minister of War. As for the agreement which Wellington had made with the previous administration, the Regency 'judges it to be deleterious to its dignity as the repository of the executive power that there should exist any agreement between itself and Your Excellency as commander-in-chief, since, for the exercise of this senior position, it believes that, so long as our Ordenanzas and the decrees of the Cortes with regard to the appointment of a commander-in-chief are obeyed in full, there is no need for any private agreement, the functions of the Regency and Your Excellency being defined in all their extension'.⁵¹

The result was entirely predictable. In an extremely long dispatch of 30 August, Wellington commenced by pointing out that he had always had the right only to accept the command under certain conditions, which should then be 'inviolably adhered to' for as long as it was desired that he should continue in his post. As to the nature of those conditions, they were entirely necessary,

consistent with the army's Ordenanzas, and 'conformable with the practice of all the armies in the world'. At the same time, although Wellington had insisted that all communications with the army should pass through his hands, he had taken the greatest care to keep the Spanish government fully informed of the military situation, and had no objection to the recent order that copies of all correspondence should be sent directly to Cádiz. All that he requested in this respect was that 'first, the government should not give any decision whatever till they should have received my report, and secondly that they will convey their decision . . . through me'. On a more general level, he expected the government immediately to state whether or not they would ratify the agreement of 1 January. In the meantime, 'In case the Regency should not think it proper to comply with my requests, I beg leave hereby to resign the command of the Spanish armies.' Whatever its decision, the government should 'turn its attention in the most serious manner to the state of the public authority, and of the financial system in the provinces'. Such food as the Spanish armies were receiving came from allied magazines; no supplies were being received from the liberated territories, even the Anglo-Portuguese forces being entirely dependent on seaborne supplies; and the Intendancy was proving completely incapable of meeting its responsibilities – not only did it lack the power to enforce the necessary requisitions, but its officials were so numerous as to exhaust 'the revenues which ought to be employed in the maintenance of the troops on the frontiers'.⁵² The answer to this dispatch was a flat negative, however, with the Regency maintaining that, as it would be unconstitutional for it to surrender any of its authority, it could not ratify its predecessor's agreement with the Duke of Wellington. The latter was therefore left with no option but to confirm his resignation, although he promised that he would continue to exercise the command until such time as his departure had been formally accepted by the Cortes.⁵³

Before proceeding to the affair's dénouement, it is necessary to examine the manner in which it had influenced British policy. Until the outbreak of this dispute with the Regency, Wellington had set himself against any interference in the internal affairs of his allies. Bombarded with *servile* appeals to take their side against the liberals, he had written in the margin of one such missive, 'I can have no concern in the affairs of Spain excepting the matters which relate to the war with the common enemy.'⁵⁴ Nor was he

much enamoured of the alternatives to the liberals. In November 1810 his 'apprehension of the democracy of the Cortes' had led him to express support for the idea that the Regency should be given to the Princess of Brazil, but by 1813 his opinion had swung firmly against her on account of her intrigues against the alliance.⁵⁵ Already concerned by his experiences at Cádiz, the Duke was shocked out of his neutrality. On 29 June he wrote to Lord Bathurst:

We and the Powers of Europe are interested in the success of the war in the Peninsula, but the creatures who govern at Cádiz . . . feel no such interest. All that they care about is the praise of their foolish constitution. There is not one of them who does not feel that it cannot be put into practice, but their vanity is interested in forcing it down people's throats. Their feelings regarding the Inquisition are of the same description . . . although they knew that the abolition of the Inquisition was disagreeable to the clergy and to the great body of the people . . . The bishops and clergy in Galicia have openly resisted this law and . . . the people in that province are by no means favourably disposed to the new order of things. In Biscay the people positively refused . . . to accept of the constitution as being a breach of the privileges of their province . . . It appears to me that as long as Spain shall be governed by the Cortes along republican principles, we cannot hope for any permanent amelioration. To threaten that you would withdraw your assistance without withdrawing if there was no amelioration would only make matters worse. You must be the best judge of whether you can . . . withdraw, but I acknowledge that I do not believe that Spain will be a useful ally, or at all in alliance with England, if the republican system is not put down.⁵⁶

Within a few days the Duke seemed to have swung back to a more measured view of the situation. Not only did he profess himself to be firmly opposed to the suggestions of Bathurst and Liverpool that the British army should be transferred to Germany, but he cautioned Henry Wellesley to remain aloof from all attempts to form a new government.⁵⁷ Furthermore, he advised Castaños and Girón to curb their anger and obey orders.⁵⁸ Yet this apparent

acquiescence did not mark any lessening in his detestation of the liberals. As he wrote to Bathurst on 12 July:

Jealousy of the interference of foreigners in their internal concerns is the characteristic of all Spaniards, and any declaration of the British government against the liberals would give them more weight and power than they possess already . . . I think it not unlikely that their violent and democratical principles will induce some of the provinces to declare against them, and that would be the time for the British government to come forward, particularly if its support or its opinion should be asked for. But if such a crisis should not occur, I rather believe that it is best for the British government to wait with patience for the termination of all this folly.⁵⁹

The view taken by the British government was less sanguine. On hearing of the removal of Castaños and Girón, Bathurst wrote that 'I have felt strongly inclined to urge the taking of a more decided part against the Regency than it has been thought politic yet to do. The influence which your splendid success must give you throughout Spain might enable us to strike a blow against the present system at Cádiz . . .'⁶⁰ With this in mind, he joined with Lord Castlereagh in sending out the orders for the dismissed generals to be kept at their posts whilst Henry Wellesley demanded their restitution, the two Ministers being quite explicit that their intention was to overthrow the Regency. In a clear indication of the direction in which their thinking was moving, the Foreign Secretary also demanded a report on the political situation at Cádiz on the grounds that 'we shall not find it necessary to stop here'.⁶¹ Wellington's opposition to this policy has already been noted, but his attitude was founded solely upon a belief that British intervention at that moment would be certain to produce massive Spanish opposition. As far as the general principle of intervention was concerned, he promised Bathurst that 'You may depend upon it that I will not miss a fair opportunity . . . to give the democratical party a shake.'⁶² That moment still not having arrived, however, he continued to rebuff the approaches of the *serviles*.⁶³

Yet Bathurst refused to be deterred. On 25 August he suggested that, Spanish resistance notwithstanding, 'I think that we may carry this forbearance too far, and we may lose our influence by

not venturing to exert it'. The old constituent Cortes which had been in continuous session at Cádiz since September 1810 was on the brink of giving way to a new Ordinary Cortes which seemed likely to be dominated by the *serviles*. After immediately removing from Cádiz, it would proceed to the election of a new Regency headed by the Princess of Brazil. Although he admitted that most of his colleagues still favoured neutrality, and that even his own mind was not yet made up, Bathurst now felt that it would be advisable to espouse the cause of the Princess: aside from the fact that to do otherwise would alienate the likely head of the new government and a substantial section of Spanish opinion, it seemed to be the easiest means of establishing a régime that was at one and the same time less revolutionary, more efficient, and less hostile.⁶⁴

The reply was scarcely encouraging. In the first place, Bathurst's arguments had already been proved faulty, for the liberals had succeeded in arranging that the new Cortes should meet at Cádiz.⁶⁵ In any case, Wellington pointed out, 'It may be rather mortifying to our vanity, but I am afraid that a review of our transactions with the Spanish government since . . . 1808 will prove that we . . . have never possessed any influence over their councils.' Citing a long list of disagreements with which to prove his point, the Duke remarked 'I think that our opinion for or against the Princess of Brazil will neither add to nor diminish her success.' Nor was there any need to worry about her: so long as the Constitution remained unchanged, she would be 'the slave of the Cortes', and the Cortes in turn 'the slaves of the mob of the place of their residence'. As the Duke continued, 'You will lose nothing, therefore, by remaining neutral or opposing her claims, and you will gain nothing by supporting them, excepting indeed the discredit of having countenanced placing the government in the hands of the woman of the worst character that exists.' Though long and involved, the rest of this dispatch is of such importance that it is worth quoting in full:

I recommend to the British government . . . to take no part either for or against the Princess of Brazil, to discountenance by every means in their power the democratical principles and measures of the Cortes, and, if their opinion be asked regarding the formation of a Regency, to recommend first the establishment of a system which is to give some authority to the executive

government . . . by the alteration of those parts of the Constitution which have lodged all power in the Cortes, and next the selection of that person of the royal family to fill the post of Regent who shall unite the strongest claim from birth with the best capacity, and, if one cannot be found with sufficient capacity, then that Spaniard . . . deemed most deserving of the situation.

Our character is involved in a greater degree than we are aware of in the democratical transactions of the Cortes in the opinion of all moderate, well-thinking Spaniards, and . . . if the mob of Cádiz begin to remove heads from shoulders, as the newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the assembly sieze upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more to discountenance them.

The question is how shall we discountenance them. It is not easy, possibly, for the persons composing the King's government to do so in public, and you may depend upon it that no public remonstrance . . . will ever have the smallest effect upon the Spanish government. But something may be done to save our character at least by the British embassy at Cádiz, and by the British subjects in Spain in general, to bring democracy into discredit . . . by taking every opportunity to point out to the Spanish nation the inconvenience and the danger of the principle on which the government are acting, and by encouragement . . . to the opposite party.

You have seen lately how the liberals defeated the measure of removing the government from Cádiz. They defeated the Princess in the same way in the winter, not a soul dared to defend her name. They destroyed the Duque del Infantado's government (supposed, by the by, to have been established by our influence), and they . . . recently defeated in the same way Castaños' friends . . . who if they had had any spirit would have saved him, and . . . turned out the government. But . . . they were afraid of the mob of Cádiz.

It is quite impossible that such a system can last. What I regret is that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it, and I am much mistaken if O'Donnell and even Castaños and probably others are not equally ready. If the King should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric if he has any spirit, but . . . I am afraid there must soon be

another convulsion, and I earnestly recommend the British government to keep themselves clear of the democracy, and to interfere in nothing while the government is in their hands . . .

I wish you would let me know whether if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at the democracy, the government would approve of my doing it.⁶⁶

In reply to this letter, Bathurst assured the Duke that, 'You may be assured that if you can strike a blow at the democracy in Spain, your conduct will be much approved of here', but pointed out that it was hard to see how such action could be taken 'without connecting ourselves with those who feel the same inclination'.⁶⁷ So far as can be ascertained, it would appear that Wellington intended to strengthen the opposition to the liberals by the action of Spanish surrogates, such as Castaños.⁶⁸ For the time being, overt British action was to be avoided, but should an opportunity occur for the Duke to influence the course of events then he had every intention of seizing it. He even hinted that such an occasion should be actively provoked: discussing the conduct which Henry Wellesley should adopt with regard to the new Cortes, he remarked, 'It is my opinion that we ought . . . to keep them at arm's length, and to take every opportunity of marking our dislike to their infamous system and rule . . . The country would soon discover the meaning of our coldness towards them, and some part or other would declare themselves in a manner to enable us to declare openly likewise.'⁶⁹

In the period before he wrote this letter Wellington's aversion to the liberals had been rendered yet more acute by the controversy that broke out in the aftermath of the storm of San Sebastián on 31 August 1813. Having already beaten off one assault, the defenders of this fortress inflicted over 2300 casualties on the Anglo-Portuguese forces before they were finally overwhelmed. Breaking into the town, which caught fire and burnt to the ground, the victors indulged in a tremendous orgy of pillage, during which a number of the inhabitants lost their lives.⁷⁰ In response to this atrocity, the Jefe Político of Guipúzcoa sent an angry protest to the Regency, accusing the British of massacre and rapine.⁷¹ Having grown considerably in the telling, the story was taken up by a number of liberal newspapers, including *El Duende de los Cafés*, whose editor was known to be an employee of the Ministry of War. In an apparent attempt to prejudice the Cortes against Wel-

lington, it was claimed that he had ordered that San Sebastián should be destroyed so as to remove it as a threat to British commerce.⁷² The Duke was outraged: 'I do not know how long my temper will last, but I never was so much disgusted with anything as with this libel, and I do not know whether the conduct of the soldiers in plundering San Sebastián or the libels of the Jefe Político and *Duende* made me most angry.'⁷³ To add insult to injury, although Henry Wellesley did succeed in forcing the Regency to publish the British version of events in the official gazette, an attempt to prosecute the *Duende* proved unsuccessful.⁷⁴

The storm of San Sebastián was not the only subject to give rise to anti-British agitation in the interlude before the affair of Castaños and Girón came before the Cortes. On 18 September *El Redactor General* reported that, after consulting the opinion of the grandees, Castaños had offered Wellington the Spanish throne in exchange for a promise to convert to Catholicism.⁷⁵ That such nonsense could be taken seriously was proven when 'those fools, the Duques de Frias and Osuna and the Vizconde de Gand, protest formally that they are not of the number of the grandees who had given their consent to such an arrangement'.⁷⁶ At the same time, the agreement of 1 January was denounced, and fresh calls made for the release of Ballesteros.⁷⁷ Yet in the event the campaign of defamation proved ineffectual. Throughout the crisis certain newspapers had continued to carry items in praise of the Duke, whilst such evidence as there was suggested that he retained much popular support in the country as a whole.⁷⁸ Moreover, when the correspondence relating to his dispute with the Regency was finally laid before the Ordinary Cortes, which had opened its sessions on 1 October, the committee charged with its examination declared itself to be outraged at the Regency's proceedings. As the Cortes had also voted to leave Cádiz, if only in the first instance for the other end of the Isla de León, it would have seemed as if the advantage was at last shifting to the British, except that the committee recommended that, as it did not feel itself authorised either to accept the Duke's resignation or to grant him powers which he required, the affair should be referred to the Council of State (the royal privy council established by the Constitution). At the same time, an outbreak of yellow fever caused the death of two of the most loyal British partisans in the Cortes, José Mejía and Andrés Angel de la Vega.⁷⁹

Although the deliberations of the Council of State delayed mat-

ters for some weeks, its decision entirely vindicated the British: the Regency was informed that it would be most impolitic to relinquish Wellington's services, and that in consequence it should strictly adhere to the agreement that had been made with him. In a minority report two of its members also demanded that O'Donoju should be dismissed.⁸⁰ The matter was then returned to the same committee of the Cortes for resolution. Thanks to the timidity of the *serviles*, a further delay then ensued: fearing the ascendancy of the liberals whilst they remained in the vicinity of Cádiz, they were strongly in favour of waiting until the Cortes had moved to Madrid, when they promised to combine support for the Duke with the removal of the government and a reform of the constitution. Henry Wellesley made strenuous efforts to dissuade them from such a delay, however: even as it was, O'Donoju was attempting to win friends in the Cortes by pretending that the British intended to seize Santoña and calling the Council of State 'bad Spaniards'.⁸¹ Nor was it any coincidence that two liberal deputies rose to condemn the continued British presence at Cádiz immediately after news had been announced of the victory of the Nivelle.⁸² So confident did the Regency become as a result of these efforts that it released Ballesteros in the expectation that it would be able to offer him the supreme command.⁸³

Thanks to Wellesley, it was eventually decided that the question should be debated immediately. On 28 November the committee of the Cortes duly presented its recommendation, which was that Wellington should be confirmed in the command under the original conditions, but that his authority should be limited to the provinces bordering upon France. It soon became obvious that this solution was unacceptable, however, it being proposed instead that until the Cortes came to a final decision the Duke should continue to exercise the command, and that he should continue to do so 'conformably to the conditions under which he now held it'. In the subsequent division, which was taken in the small hours of the 29th, the former proposition was carried against the opposition of just two deputies, and the latter by a margin of fifty-nine votes to fifty-four. The reference to further debate having been inserted solely to provide the *serviles* with a pretext for future attacks on the government, the affair of Castaños and Girón was over. As the Cortes then suspended its sessions preparatory to removing to Madrid, it seemed the end of an era: as Henry Welles-

ley wrote, 'I think we may reasonably look forward to an improvement in our relations with the government of Spain.'⁸⁴

Yet Wellington's problems were far from over, as he had become embroiled in a series of conflicts with the civil and military authorities in northern Spain, for which the blame must be shared by the Spaniards and the Anglo-Portuguese alike. On the one hand, the former had been wounded in their national pride, as witness Abisbal's departure to take the baths after being refused a larger role in the campaign (an event which Wellington turned to his advantage by appointing the far more tractable General Girón in his place). On the other, the allies did little to assuage the Spaniards' feelings. Although the inhabitants welcomed Wellington's troops as liberators, setting aside the storm of San Sebastián, the treatment meted out to them was often decidedly harsh. As Kincaid recounts of the march to Vitoria, 'We were welcomed into every town or village through which we passed by the peasant girls who were in the habit of meeting us with garlands of flowers . . . and it not unfrequently happened that while they were so employed with one regiment, the preceding one was diligently engaged in pulling down some of the houses for firewood.'⁸⁵ The aftermath of Vitoria was marred by a particularly severe outbreak of indiscipline, the governor of that town complaining that 'It is impossible to have any idea of the abuses that are committed in this city . . . by the British soldiers.'⁸⁶ These complaints were acknowledged by the Duke, who remarked that the battle 'has annihilated all discipline', and that he expected the inhabitants of the Basque provinces to shoot 'our vagabond soldiers..as they would the French if they should misbehave'.⁸⁷ His forebodings were soon borne out: Schaumann records that two cavalymen were killed at Olite for having spoken with some local girls, whilst a party of looters from the Ninety-Fifth Rifles narrowly escaped being massacred by a mob of angry peasants.⁸⁸

Notwithstanding their complaints at Spanish hostility, it is difficult to feel much sympathy for the allies. The Spaniards were regarded with widespread hatred and disgust, particularly once news had seeped out of Wellington's quarrels with the Regency, and the frontier districts suffered accordingly despite Wellington's efforts to maintain discipline. Everywhere the troops seemed possessed by the idea that they had the right to seize whatever they needed without any regard for the civilian population.⁸⁹ Nor were matters helped by the arrogant and bullying behaviour that was

affected by certain of their officers.⁹⁰ The reaction of the Spanish authorities, encouraged, no doubt, by the government's intransigence, was to adopt a policy of passive resistance: at Bilbao the Ayuntamiento prohibited the movement of wagons through the town on the grounds that they were breaking up the streets, whilst at Santander, Vitoria and elsewhere the British were denied the use of buildings which they needed as billets, storehouses and hospitals. Meanwhile, the customs officers demanded the right to search British ships for contraband before they were unloaded.⁹¹

As might have been expected, the result of such behaviour was simply to exacerbate the detestation of the British for their allies. In the winter of 1812-13 there had already been several outbreaks of violence between British soldiers on the one hand and Spanish soldiers on the other.⁹² As winter set in and food and billets became in increasingly short supply, so such incidents multiplied alarmingly, with the guilt being shared equally by the two sides.⁹³ Throughout the Pyrenean campaign, meanwhile, the Spaniards endured the greatest misery. Although they were undoubtedly guilty of widespread pillage, the fact was that they literally had no other means of subsistence. As early as 4 August 1813, Carlos de España complained to Wellington that his division had arrived at 'the last extremity', whereafter there was a constant stream of appeals for assistance from the Spaniards whose men were falling sick in thousands.⁹⁴ As the *Diario Mercantil de Cádiz* reported, 'Our armies are neither being organised nor brought up to strength, and, instead of their hunger and misery being remedied, it increases with every day.'⁹⁵ The Spaniards' misery was in the meantime increased by the rigours of the climate, the allies being continually assailed by cold, wind, rain, sleet and snow.⁹⁶ So bad did the situation become that at least one regiment mutinied in protest at its lack of clothing, whilst Freyre tendered his resignation as commander of the Fourth Army, only for it to be indignantly rejected.⁹⁷

Very much against his will, for he had always strenuously opposed supplying the Spaniards, Wellington met some of their wants with grants of food and money.⁹⁸ The alternative was to accede to Spanish requests that they be allowed to send a part of their strength to the rear, a move that would have deprived him of troops whom he needed for his invasion of France.⁹⁹ Once he had crossed the frontier, moreover, he had had to order that such Spanish troops as he retained with him should be given rations

on a regular basis.¹⁰⁰ Yet the Duke was himself very short of money, in part because French privateers operating out of Santoña and Bayonne were causing serious interference to his maritime communications.¹⁰¹ In consequence, he sent a further series of dispatches to the Minister of War, in which he stressed the need to address the army's logistical problems, and outlined the means by which these might be remedied.¹⁰² As usual, the response was totally unsatisfactory: for example, O'Donoghue attributed the want of transport entirely to the heavy demands imposed by Spain's allies.¹⁰³

So long as the allied armies remained within Spanish territory, the problem could be contained within bounds. However, as soon as the Duke advanced across the border, it assumed a new dimension. With his limited numbers of troops, Wellington could not afford to dissipate his forces by leaving behind large numbers of men to protect his lines of communication. To have any chance of success, he would instead have to maintain his field army intact. To achieve that goal, it was essential that there should be no French *guerrilla*. The allied armies would therefore have to pay for everything that they required, and do everything possible to conciliate the civilian population. How this was to be achieved in the case of the Spanish forces posed major difficulties, especially as they were naturally inclined to seek revenge for the horrors that had been inflicted on their homeland.¹⁰⁴ This desire had been inflamed by the language employed by certain of their commanders: on 8 March 1813 the Conde del Abisbal had called for 'a just revenge' on the grounds that 'the very devastation . . . through which we shall have to pass in order to reach the Pyrenees is a living monument to the barbarism of our invaders'; similarly, on 16 June he spoke of 'avenging the atrocities committed by the enemies of humanity in the desolate *pueblos* through which we have passed'.¹⁰⁵ Forgetting their desire for revenge, the Spaniards would also be driven to living off the land out of sheer necessity. As Wellington wrote to Lord Bathurst:

They are in so miserable a condition that it is really hardly fair to expect that they will refrain from plundering a beautiful country into which they enter as conquerors, particularly adverting to the miseries which their own country has suffered from its invaders . . . If I could now bring forward 20 000 good Spaniards paid and fed, I should have Bayonne. If I could bring forward

40 000, I do not know where I should stop. Now I have both the 20 000 and the 40 000 at my command . . . but I cannot . . . bring them forward for want of means of paying and supporting them. Without pay and food they must plunder, and if they plunder they will ruin us all.¹⁰⁶

Wellington's fears about the likely effect of Spanish depredations were borne out in January 1814 when a raiding force from Mina's division pillaged the villages of Bidarray and Baigorri, after which their inhabitants 'have engaged in active operations against us, and have done us more mischief than the French army'.¹⁰⁷ His solution was to order that in future the British subsidy should be withdrawn from the support of such forces as the divisions of Roche and Whittingham and the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and devoted entirely to paying and feeding only those troops who should actually be taken with the army into France.¹⁰⁸ In the meantime, however, he faced the problem of what should be done with the Spanish forces on the frontier. The crossing of the Bidasoa had been accompanied by considerable plunder, but the amount of harm done had been limited by the fact that the Spaniards engaged had not occupied any French villages.¹⁰⁹ Such was not the case with the battle of the Nivelle. Whilst the division of Longa sacked the village of Ascain, that of Morillo revenged itself upon Espelette.¹¹⁰ In consequence of these atrocities, for which a number of Spanish soldiers were executed, Longa was sent back into Old Castile in disgrace, and the whole of the Army of Reserve and the Fourth Army pulled back to cantonments just within the Spanish frontier. Until they had actually re-entered Spain, moreover, the troops were to be kept permanently under arms so that they could not stray from the ranks. The only exception, curiously enough, was Morillo's division: deployed on the extreme right flank of the allied array, it seems that the Duke felt that it could still fulfil a valuable function as a flank-guard.¹¹¹

Necessary though these measures undoubtedly were, they were nevertheless the cause of yet another imbroglio with the Spaniards. General Freyre, in particular, was in a querulous mood, having recently taken offence at the manner in which he had received some orders.¹¹² Wellington's directions for his troops to return to Spain therefore struck him to the quick, especially as they implied that the Spaniards were now to be denied their share of glory. In accordance with these feelings, he protested that

although some disorders had indeed taken place, they were the work of a few individuals, and would not have occurred at all had his army been properly fed. To punish the entire army was therefore a gross injustice, especially as 'the disorders committed by my troops are common to every army, none of which lack for marauders and miscreants'. A similar protest, though couched in somewhat more apologetic language, was entered by General Longa.¹¹³ Freyre's excuses were not entirely without foundation – it is apparent, for example, that the Spaniards were not alone in plundering the border villages¹¹⁴ – but they still provoked an irate response. Denying that he had ever had any intention of disgracing the Spaniards in the eyes of the rest of the army, Wellington wrote, 'I have not come to France to pillage; I have not caused the death and wounding of thousands of officers and soldiers so that the survivors can pillage the French. On the contrary, it is my duty, and the duty of us all, to put a stop to pillage, especially if we want to subsist our armies on the resources of the country.'¹¹⁵

A month later a fresh dispute broke out with General Morillo whose division had allegedly committed further disorders and imposed forced requisitions during the advance on Bayonne.¹¹⁶ In consequence, it was not long before pleas for help were arriving from the inhabitants.¹¹⁷ When confronted with these allegations, Morillo reacted with considerable anger, denouncing them as being 'degrading to an honourable officer'.¹¹⁸ Told in reply that the Duke was very angry with the conduct of his division and that he should make no further requisitions except through the British commissariat, the Spanish general denied that his troops had misbehaved, and claimed that such disorders as had taken place had been the work of Spanish and Portuguese muleteers attached to the British divisions.¹¹⁹ As reports nevertheless continued to reach Wellington that the Spaniards were still pillaging, on 18 December he ordered that Morillo's division should be kept under arms every day from sunrise to sunset.¹²⁰ In complying with these orders, Morillo adopted a strategy of passive resistance, submitting regular reports of the losses from hunger and exposure which resulted.¹²¹

Although it is clear that his troops were far from blameless, Morillo had genuine cause to feel aggrieved. The order of 18 December had accused the Spanish officers of having no interest in maintaining order, and yet on 1 July he had issued a proclamation stressing the need to keep the strictest discipline in France.¹²² Nor was there any sign of the rations which had been promised.¹²³ His

claims that much of the trouble was the work of civilian muleteers who had been mistaken for his soldiers are to some extent borne out by the memoirs of the British Judge Advocate General, Francis Larpent.¹²⁴ In a long and bitter letter to General Freyre, Morillo gave vent to his outrage. The gist of his argument was that, in the midst of all its sufferings his division had been subjected to a cruel punishment, which was as unmerited as it was humiliating. In contrast, for all their years of misbehaviour 'the troops of our dear allies' have never suffered a similar punishment. To be treated in this fashion 'is a reward very different from that which the valiant Spanish soldier should be able to expect'. As Morillo also felt that his word had been doubted, he demanded either that he should be relieved of his command, or that the Spaniards be given greater independence.¹²⁵

On receipt of Morillo's reports, Wellington rescinded the order of 18 December, though not without a severe warning of the need to maintain better discipline in the future, and ordered an investigation of the reasons why the Spanish should have gone hungry.¹²⁶ Morillo's outburst provoked the Duke to fresh anger, however: pouring scorn on his protests, he argued that the order to place the Spaniard's troops under arms was not in any sense a punishment, but rather a means of preventing disorder, and once again stressed that pillage would be fatal, and that he would not command troops who did not obey his orders in this respect. If the Spaniards did not care for these provisions, they could invade France on their own, though he prophesied that they could not remain there fifteen days.¹²⁷ Yet in thus reminding his allies of their subordinate position, Wellington was merely adding fuel to the fire, for it is clear that the heart of Morillo's protest lay in the humiliating manner in which he felt the Spanish army was being treated after so many years of sacrifice. Complaining of an assault on one of his soldiers, he protested that 'the behaviour of the British is nothing like our own: they think themselves superior and always attempt to insult us'.¹²⁸

By the end of 1813, therefore, Wellington's relations with the Spaniards had deteriorated to such an extent that even generals who had cooperated loyally with his forces for several years were seething with resentment. The government had only just been prevented from engineering his resignation, whilst the local authorities along the northern coast had spent the autumn doing everything in their power to obstruct his dispositions. Nor were the

Duke's powers with regards to the Spanish army either effective or intact: not only had the Regency ignored such recommendations as he had made for promotion, but it had succeeded in circumventing the provisions which he had made to exclude it from the conduct of military operations. Orders continued to be sent directly to the army, whilst an attempt was also made to remove the Inspectors General from the Duke's headquarters so as to deprive him of any say in the internal direction of the officer corps.¹²⁹ With most of the Spanish forces starving and immobile, it was not even possible to say that Wellington's tenure of the command-in-chief had achieved the ends for which it had been intended: if the French had been all but expelled from the Peninsula, it was not because the Duke had been able to revivify the Spanish army, but because of the enemy's strategic blunders and the incessant resistance of the northern guerrillas.

Wellington's original design had therefore proved a failure. On one level, such an outcome was always likely, given the problems of patriot Spain. More might have been achieved but for the resistance of the Spaniards, whose hostility was only to be expected in view of their suspicions of foreign domination, and conviction that they had come to the rescue of Great Britain rather than the other way about. Yet the Duke made no attempt to conciliate their feelings. Convinced that he was in the right, he was incapable of compromise, still less of suffering fools gladly, whilst his intransigence was fuelled by a natural determination to protect his military reputation. In approaching the command of the Spanish army, he therefore adopted a maximalist stance that made no concession to the Spaniards. The extent of the powers that Wellington had demanded at Cádiz, the brutal manner in which he had extracted them, and the supercilious tone which he habitually adopted in his correspondence with his allies all made trouble inevitable. In defence of the Duke, of course, it must be said that militarily speaking he was undoubtedly in the right, his diagnosis of the army's problems being as apposite as the solutions which he proposed. Politically speaking, however, his demands were unacceptable in that they were certain to engender such resistance as to render their object unattainable. By asking for less, in fact, it is arguable that he might have obtained more. Instead, the irresistible force of the Duke's personality encountered the immovable object of Spanish pride and xenophobia. The result was a year of misfor-

tune that at times seemed almost to threaten to sunder the alliance against Napoleon.

Victory and Retribution, January–June 1814

Whatever the actual state of Anglo-Spanish relations at the end of 1813, Wellington himself was beset by a feeling of crisis. Writing to Lord Bathurst on 27 November, he remarked, 'Matters are becoming so serious between us and the Spaniards that I think it necessary to draw your attention seriously to the subject.' The Spanish government, he continued, had been responsible for the 'libels' that had been occasioned by the storm of San Sebastián, and had taken advantage of the impression which these had produced 'to circulate others in which the old stories are repeated about the outrages committed by Sir John Moore's army in Galicia', and otherwise 'to irritate the public mind against Great Britain'. Although this campaign had not yet made any impression upon the mass of the population, it had certainly persuaded many civilian officials and army officers that 'we are odious to the government': hence the hostile behaviour of Morillo, Freyre and the local authorities. Nor was there any guarantee that the problem would not spread: 'If the spirit is not checked . . . if we do not show that we are sensible of the injury done to our characters, and of the injustice and unfriendly nature of such proceedings, we must expect that the people at large will soon behave towards us in the same manner, and that we shall have no friends, or none who will dare avow himself as such.' To prevent matters from deteriorating further, as well as to provide for the security of the allied army should the people indeed become hostile, Wellington proposed that the British government should administer a public snub to the Regency by reducing the status of its diplomatic representation in Spain; formally protest at the manner in which the motives for the presence of British garrisons at Cádiz and elsewhere were being misrepresented; and demand the admission of British troops to San Sebastián. If this last condition was not met immediately, then Britain should withdraw her forces from the Peninsula, 'be

the consequences what they may'; not, however, that there was much chance that she would be forced to such extremities – 'You may rely upon this, that if you take a firm, decided line, and show your determination to go through with it, you will have the Spanish nation with you, you will bring the government to their senses, and you will put an end at once to all the petty cabals and counter-action existing at the present moment.'¹

For all their earlier desire to overthrow the liberals, Wellington's political masters were dismayed by this outburst, for they knew that to withdraw from the Peninsula could be disastrous for British strategy. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1813 Lord Castlereagh had been struggling to unite the whole of Europe against Napoleon. Desperate to prevent the Emperor from splitting the grand alliance by offering to come to terms with its less resolute members, the Foreign Secretary was also convinced that the French could only be beaten by the very 'war of masses' which they had unleashed upon the world. In working for these objectives, he was impeded by the fears of Austria, in particular, that such a war threatened the stability of her multi-national empire, as well as by the various conflicts of interest that continued to divide Britain's allies. Furthermore, Britain remained an object of mistrust on account not only of her maritime demands, but also of her inability to guarantee the allies the subsidies which they desired. In defence of the charge that 'perfidious Albion' wanted to fight on to the last drop of allied blood, Castlereagh had only the exploits of Wellington's army. Furthermore, the coalition was still by no means stable: following Napoleon's great defeat at Leipzig in October 1813, Metternich had offered the Emperor a compromise peace on terms that were entirely unacceptable to Great Britain, whilst the morale of the allies remained surprisingly low. When it was learnt that Napoleon was prepared to treat, it seemed that all Castlereagh's efforts might have gone for nothing.² In this atmosphere Wellington's outburst must have come as a great shock. Forgetting the impact of the threat of evacuation in Spain – which the whole tenor of the Duke's earlier correspondence had suggested would be counter-productive – to have implemented such a measure at this point would have been to deprive the Foreign Secretary of his most important *point d'appui*. It was therefore hardly surprising that Bathurst's reply was less than enthusiastic, the Minister merely promising to discuss the Duke's letter with his colleagues.³ The result of his consultations

was an emphatic veto. On 10 January 1814, the Minister informed Wellington that his army would have to stay at its post, although the reasons that he cited were entirely military: 'I doubt very much whether the Spanish army would be equal to defend their own frontiers with all the advantage to be derived from the fortresses of Pamplona and San Sebastián, and the jealousy and pride of Spain will not trust a Portuguese army with the possession of either of them.'⁴

As Wellington was well aware of the importance of events in the rest of Europe, it can only be concluded that his irritation with the Spanish government had become so severe as to deprive him of all sense of proportion. In this instance at least, the British government's detachment from the course of affairs in Spain enabled it to act with greater wisdom than its 'man on the spot'. Had Wellington's suggestions been followed, there seems little doubt that the outcry would have been so great as to sunder the Anglo-Spanish alliance altogether. Nor did the situation require such extreme measures. It was perfectly true that many Spanish officials continued to harass the British with every means at their disposal well into 1814.⁵ Perhaps the worst of these incidents occurred at Santander, which had now replaced Lisbon as Wellington's main supply depot: on the pretext of a contagious fever that was supposed to have broken out at the British military hospital, the entire port was placed in quarantine.⁶ Relations between the allied armies also continued to be as bad as ever. As one officer commented, 'No two nations are more opposite in every particular than the Spaniards and the English, and no two armies can detest each other more.'⁷ As a result of this tension the different nationalities continued to come to blows with one another right up till the end of the war.⁸

Alarming though this friction was, there seems no reason to believe that it was likely to have precipitated an anti-British revolt. On the contrary, diplomatic relations between the allies began markedly to improve. The Cortes' confirmation of Wellington's powers as commander-in-chief had already suggested that anglo-phobia was by no means so widespread as the Duke supposed. Even in the government opinion was divided, the latest Minister of State resigning in protest at the Regency's continued opposition to the agreement of 1 January 1813.⁹ Though the Minister was replaced by a fervent supporter of the government named José Lujando, if only because it had decided that it was no longer

possible to retain so anti-British a figure as Minister of War, one of the first acts of the Regency after its removal to Madrid was to dismiss General O'Donoju.¹⁰ In a further gesture of reconciliation the Cortes also decreed that goods intended for the use of the Anglo-Portuguese army could be imported into Spain free of charge, thereby bringing an end to at least one of the disputes that had so plagued the Duke in northern Spain. At the same time Lujando also expressed a desire to improve Anglo-Spanish relations by a new treaty of alliance and commercial agreement that would allow Britain to trade with Latin America.¹¹

If this was still insufficient to reassure the British as to the fundamental loyalty of their Spanish allies, all their doubts should have been laid to rest by the reaction to the treaty of Valençay. Eager to release more veteran troops for the defence of his shrunken empire, Napoleon decided to offer Fernando VII both his freedom and his throne in exchange for peace. After lengthy negotiations at the chateau where he had been imprisoned since 1808, Fernando agreed to allow all the French forces and prisoners of war to return from Spain, to expel their Anglo-Portuguese opponents, and to deny the allies the use of all Spanish ports. A substantial force of French troops would thus be released for operations elsewhere, whilst Wellington would be left with no other base than the French port of St Jean de Luz, which was too small to meet his wants. The only condition that was made by Fernando was that the treaty should be ratified by the Cortes, to which end two of his personal advisers, the Duque de San Carlos and General José Palafox, were dispatched to Madrid. Though Wellington feared that the treaty might be accepted, the reality was that he had little cause for alarm. As soon as news arrived of Napoleon's offer, Lujando went to see Henry Wellesley, and provided him with a full account of the treaty which he claimed was already 'a dead letter'. As for the Regency, it wrote to Fernando informing him that the Cortes had already decreed that any action taken by the King whilst he was still a prisoner would be considered to be null and void, as well as telling San Carlos that Fernando should look for his salvation to the allies.¹² Nor was this an end to the Spanish response to Napoleon's intrigues: fearing that the King would be released from captivity notwithstanding their repudiation of the Emperor's terms, on 2 February the Cortes passed a decree imposing severe restrictions on Fernando should he cross the border, justifying its actions in a manifesto

which denounced Napoleon's duplicity and accused him of attempting to stir up a civil war in Spain.¹³

Although these actions were strongly influenced by the liberals' determination that Fernando VII should be compelled to accept the Constitution of 1812, even Wellington was forced to admit that the Spaniards 'have conducted themselves remarkably well, and with great candour and frankness upon this occasion'. There was, however, a danger that Napoleon might still attempt to withdraw his forces from the beleaguered fortresses in eastern Spain, to which end the British commander in Catalonia was told that the French garrisons should not be allowed to capitulate except as prisoners of war.¹⁴ Wellington's caution was well-founded, for Marshal Suchet made several last-ditch attempts to persuade the Spaniards to allow the garrisons to rejoin his field army in exchange for the surrender of the actual fortresses. Such a proposal was undoubtedly very attractive to the Spaniards, for it would allow them to end a situation that was becoming ever more embarrassing (at Monzón, for example, 100 Frenchmen resisted 3000 Spaniards for four-and-a-half months before finally being tricked into surrender on 14 February 1814)¹⁵. To Wellington's anger the government showed some signs of being ready to act on these proposals, but in the end no such deal was made.¹⁶ In a final gesture of support for the alliance, moreover, on 21 March Lujando delivered a formal note to Henry Wellesley stating Spain's opposition to a separate peace with Napoleon, and offering to sign a treaty prohibiting her from reviving the eighteenth-century Family Compact with a restored French monarchy.¹⁷

The gradual improvement of Anglo-Spanish relations was accompanied by a renewal of military operations. After the battle of the Nive, the Duke had sent his forces into winter quarters whilst he waited for the allies to formulate their strategy. On 10 January 1814 news arrived that they had embarked upon the invasion of France. Reassured that he would not be left alone to face the entire French army, Wellington was able once more to contemplate taking the offensive, although the weather proved so discouraging that he still delayed taking action for more than a month. When he finally moved on 12 February his plan was first to drive Soult's army away from Bayonne, and then to invest the fortress by sending troops across the river Adour. In addition to 44 000 British and 23 000 Portuguese, he could in theory call upon some 54 000 Spaniards. The two-division-strong Army of Reserve

of Andalucía was cantoned in the Spanish Pyrenees with about 9000 men under the Conde del Abisbal. Of Freyre's Fourth Army, the divisions of Morillo and Carlos de España were already at the front, that of Espoz y Mina was at Jaca and Roncesvalles, and three more were on the Bidasoa with Freyre himself. Not counting the enormous numbers of sick, and the divisions of Longa and Mendizábal, of which the first was still in disgrace at Medina de Pomar and the second engaged in the siege of Santoña, the whole may have numbered some 29 000 men. Finally, the 16 000 men of the Third Army, whose erstwhile commander, the Duque del Parque, had been replaced by the Príncipe de Anglona, were in reserve on the Ebro around Logroño and Tudela. Though better armed, trained and equipped than ever before, none of these forces could be employed in France unless they could be supplied and paid by the British. Following his quarrels with Freyre and Morillo, Wellington had therefore given instructions that the British subsidy should henceforward only be spent on those troops whom he should decide to make use of in France. With money as short as ever, the result was that only a part of the Spanish forces could be employed in the forthcoming operations. For his initial thrust, Wellington used only the Fourth Army, and even then in a secondary capacity. Whilst Morillo's division was assigned to the offensive against Soult's army, Mina was ordered to blockade the border fortress of St Jean-Pied-du-Port, a task that immobilised him for the rest of the war, and the remaining four divisions employed in the investment of Bayonne.

As Wellington advanced deeper into France, it became clear that he would require more troops, especially once Morillo had been detached to blockade the petty fortress of Navarrenx. On 26 February Freyre was therefore ordered to march two divisions from Bayonne to join the Duke's field army. According to Toreno, their absence would have been made good by bringing up the Army of Reserve of Andalucía had not Abisbal defied Wellington's orders and demanded that his troops be allowed to remain in their cantonments, the inference being that he could then use them to overthrow the liberals.¹⁸ This story is without foundation, however: whilst Abisbal certainly suggested that troops should be sent to Madrid to stiffen the resolve of the conservatives, he was eager for his own men to be employed against the enemy.¹⁹ Although the Army of Reserve was never brought up, the real reason was that Wellington was toying with the idea of sending it to Cata-

lonia.²⁰ When the Duke deemed that further troops were needed to protect his communications, the choice fell on Anglona's Third Army which towards the end of March was ordered to occupy Pau and Orthez.

As far as the conduct of these forces is concerned, the problem of pillage was never resolved in spite of the care which Wellington took to ensure that they were properly provided for.²¹ Enjoined by the commander-in-chief of the need to maintain discipline amongst his men, Freyre adopted the same tone of righteous indignation as before.²² Complaints continued to reach Wellington's headquarters, however, prompting the Duke to cries of despair: 'I send you a complaint, and I receive a similar one every hour of the day. I beg you to tell me if there is not a means of putting an end to an evil that will destroy your army, and ours as well . . . I am truly grieved at this subject. I do everything in my power for the Spanish army, and I cannot govern its soldiers as I do others.'²³ No remedy being found, the Spaniards were at first employed in a role that was wholly subsidiary. As Wellington wrote to Freyre, 'No reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops . . . who have been accustomed to plunder.'²⁴

Needless to say, idleness bred unrest. On 15 April 1814, Abisbal wrote to Wellington protesting at the manner in which his army had been left in the rear, and begging that it should be sent orders to march against the enemy.²⁵ Taking pity on the feelings of his subordinates, Wellington decided to allot them an important part in his assault on the French stronghold of Toulouse. After several weeks of marching and countermarching, Soult had adopted an imposing defensive position on the outskirts of that city, and waited to be attacked. Wellington's army now included some 10 000 Spaniards – a brigade of Morillo's division that had been released from the blockade of Navarrenx, and the troops that Freyre had brought up from Bayonne, consisting of Ezpeleta's fourth division and elements of two others formed into a new 'Provisional Division' under General Antonio Garcés de Marcilla. In complying with Wellington's orders, Freyre had chosen to bring up his best troops, Gleig remarking, 'Than some of these battalions I never beheld a finer body of men, and many of them were as well clothed, armed and appointed as any battalions in the world.'²⁶ Having petitioned Wellington for a post of honour, the Spanish general was ordered to attack the northern end of Mont Rave, the lofty ridge which Soult had made the cornerstone of his

position. As Freyre lacked any guns of his own, he was given the support of some Portuguese artillery.

On the morning of 10 April 1814 Wellington's army closed in upon Toulouse. After driving a French outpost from an outlying knoll, Freyre's troops were drawn up for the attack. The ground facing them was very strong, rising steeply in 'a sort of smooth glaxis' to the highest point of the ridge, which was defended by a complex of earthworks armed with a number of heavy guns. Defending these works was the 4500-strong division of General Villatte. To reach the French positions, the Spaniards would also have to run the gauntlet of enfilading fire from other redoubts further to the west. Before commencing his advance Freyre was supposed to wait for Sir William Beresford to attack Mont Rave from the east with two Anglo-Portuguese divisions, but the Spanish general ordered his men forward before Beresford had got into position. Whether this mistake was unintentional or the result of Freyre's thirst for glory, the result was disastrous, for the Spaniards were immediately assailed by a fire which is agreed to have been one of the heaviest of the war. Pressing forward in good order, they were eventually brought to a halt, and took shelter in a sunken lane that ran across the scene of their advance. Counter-attacked by some French infantry, the shaken Spaniards turned and fled, prompting Wellington to remark that he had never seen 10 000 men run a race before. Yet the Spanish performance had been by no means discreditable. Not only did one regiment hold out on the ridge until brought back by an express order from the Duke himself, but Freyre was able to rally his troops despite heavy casualties – 1900 men out of an allied total of 4500 – and launch a second assault on the French line which played an important role in its eventual collapse.²⁷

Whilst the Fourth Army was fighting at Toulouse, other elements of the Spanish forces were engaged in the equally ferocious political conflict that surrounded the return of Fernando VII. It will be remembered that the Ordinary Cortes had finally opened at Cádiz in place of its constituent predecessor in October 1813, before closing its sessions and moving to Madrid. Reopening in the capital on 15 January, it was dominated by the *serviles*, the retreat of the French forces having opened the way for elections in the more conservative districts of the interior. It had generally been expected that the Cortes would immediately proceed to the election of a new Regency headed by the Princess of Brazil. Yet

the liberals succeeded for some time in maintaining their dominance: not only had an officer of their persuasion, Pedro Villacampa, been appointed to be the governor of Madrid, but they still enjoyed a considerable ascendancy in the press as well as the support of some sections of the crowd. Nor were the *serviles* in any condition to take advantage of their numerical superiority, being unable to agree on the composition of a new government.²⁸ The real measure of the *serviles'* impotence came in the debate on the treaty of Valençay. In response to arguments that the movements of the King should be restricted if and when he returned to Spain, the *servil* deputy, Juan López Reina, proclaimed that Fernando was an absolute monarch with complete freedom of action. Despite the majority enjoyed by his fellows, he was shouted down and expelled from the assembly.²⁹ Overawed by the liberal oratory in the press and the assembly alike, and hampered by the divisions in their ranks between outright reactionaries and reformist traditionalists, the *serviles* did not launch their attack upon the government for over a month, even though Henry Wellesley had warned them that they should on no account allow the liberals time to rebuild their powerbase. The ambassador had also advised them not to use Wellington's differences with the Regency as a pretext on which to bring down the government, but the *serviles* ignored him. Summoned to address the Cortes, the Minister of State claimed that the affair had now been settled to Wellington's complete agreement, backing this up with a private letter from the Duke's Spanish *aide-de-camp* which spoke of the commander-in-chief's satisfaction with the Regency. Completely deflated, the *serviles* had no option but to allow the session to be adjourned, leaving Wellesley with no other consolation than that he was not 'in any way committed with a party which with a majority of two to one in the Cortes has neither the courage, the activity, nor the intelligence requisite to effect the object which they have in view'.³⁰

The ambassador may not have been publicly allied to the government's enemies, but there can be no doubt that he still desired its overthrow; indeed, in the same letter he had told Castlereagh as much, attributing the more friendly attitude it had displayed solely to its fear of the *serviles*. As the liberals continued to strengthen their position in Madrid, he became more and more despondent, and complained, 'This place will soon be worse than Cádiz . . . I know not how all this will end, but I wish to God I

was relieved from a situation which is becoming every day more disagreeable.'³¹ Yet for all the violence of his recent outburst to Lord Bathurst, Wellington did not share his opinion. Informed by Henry Wellesley of his conversations with the *serviles*, the Duke replied:

Nothing can be more satisfactory than the whole conduct of the Spanish government regarding the negotiations for peace, and I entertain serious doubts whether it is advisable that the British government should be in any way parties to a change under the existing circumstances. I am certain that no government would act better than they have in this most important of all concerns, and I doubt that any Regency under the existing Constitution would have power to act better in other matters more peculiarly of internal concern. The Minister of War being dismissed makes a great alteration in the state of the question affecting us.³²

The ambassador was not to be dissuaded so easily, however. After reflecting for some days upon his brother's letter, he wrote a lengthy answer laying out the many reasons why he felt a change to be essential, of which he claimed the most important to be the hostility which the Regency had consistently shown towards Great Britain in general, and to the Duke of Wellington in particular. As for O'Donoju, he pointed out that as the Regency had expressed their 'entire approbation' of his services, and promoted him to lieutenant general, it had to be assumed that they approved of the 'persecution of you' which was 'the principal and indeed the only feature of General O'Donoju's administration'. Angry though he was at the Regency's conduct, it is clear that Wellesley was also motivated by ideological considerations: the present government, he argued, were 'the tools of the Jacobin party, and they must stand or fall with that party, and if they once succeed in fixing themselves permanently in their seats at Madrid, there is an end to all hope of checking that propensity to Jacobinism among the people which has already made so considerable a progress here'.³³ Yet Wellington was not to be moved. By the time that he received his brother's letter he had already rebuffed an attempt by the Portuguese ambassador to win his support for the Princess of Brazil, as well as a suggestion from the Conde del Abisbal that troops should be sent to protect the *serviles* in order to allow them

to impose their will on their opponents.³⁴ Dismissing Wellesley's arguments, he pointed out that British intervention would not look well after the Regency's behaviour with regard to the treaty of Valençay. At the same time, it would offer few benefits: 'What prospect have we of any of improvement by a change? You may depend upon it that as long as the Constitution remains what it is no change of persons can make things essentially better.'³⁵

Herein lay the central reason for Wellington's refusal to sanction a coup at Madrid. Yet although the prudence that had temporarily escaped him when he had written to Lord Bathurst dictated that the British should remain neutral, there can be no doubt that the Duke was unhappy with events at the capital. As he remarked to the Conde del Abisbal:

I have a very bad opinion of what is taking place at Madrid. The ill-intentioned, as they always will do, control the press, and everywhere the press governs the multitude. The constitution has not given political influence to the wealthy, and the men of property are not at this moment wealthy enough to have their natural influence. Behold the evil in a few words, and you are right in saying that . . . the majority of the Cortes (who are well intentioned, at least, if they are not always wise) are insulted every day.³⁶

That being the case, Wellington was by no means averse to the idea of intervention *per se*. What he opposed was unilateral intervention that might stir up a nationalist reaction against Great Britain. Rejecting Abisbal's proposal to send troops to Madrid, he wrote, 'To begin with, it is the majority which is insulted; it is for itself to order that it should be protected, and not for us, and above all not for me, to protect it *if it does not cry for help*' (author's italics).³⁷ In other words, the Duke had returned to his old refrain that Britain should wait upon developments in the hope that an unexceptionable pretext would arise for the liberals to be disposed of without incurring Spanish hostility. Such an opportunity was now at last to arise in the release of the exiled Fernando VII.

The return of the King was bound up with the failure of the treaty of Valençay. As it became increasingly apparent that the Spaniards were not going to accede to the agreement, the Emperor came to the conclusion that it might still be worth sending Fernando to Catalonia in the hope that Suchet might be able to use

him as a bargaining counter to secure the release of his garrisons. However, the best that the Marshal could do in this respect was to force Fernando to sign a document promising to send back the forces involved as soon as he should have reached the Spanish lines, and then trust to his good faith. Signing this pledge in precisely the same fashion as he had signed the treaty of Valençay – that is, without the slightest intention of honouring it – on 24 March Fernando rode into the lines of the First Army in triumph. Having returned to Spain, according to the decree of 2 February he was supposed immediately to take an oath of loyalty to the Constitution, and then to proceed to Madrid by way of Tarragona and Valencia. The problem with this arrangement was that no account had been taken of the possibility that the King might rebel against the conditions which had been imposed on him. As Wellington inquired of his brother, 'I do not know what is to be done if he will not swear to the Constitution on the frontier. Is he then to be set back?'³⁸

But Fernando neither took the oath nor returned to France. Travelling through Catalonia, he soon discovered that the liberals were unpopular in the country as a whole, and that the Cortes contained a substantial number of deputies who were opposed to the Constitution. At the same time, he was joined by a number of disaffected *grandees* who were determined to overturn the social changes that had been brought about by the liberals and immediately set about persuading the King to launch a coup. Naturally cautious and calculating, Fernando took some time to agree to this policy, but his decision was assured by the attitude displayed by the garrison of Valencia when he arrived in that city on 16 April. Parading his troops before the King, the Captain General and commander of the Second Army, Francisco Xavier Elió, swore to uphold Fernando in the plenitude of his power. After some delay, forces from this army, together with the independent division commanded by General Whittingham, were set in motion for Madrid. Taking over the capital on the night of 10–11 May, they arrested many leading liberals and published a decree proclaiming all the measures of the Cortes to be null and void. Absolutism, in short, had been restored.

The British part in this process was distinctly ambiguous. Hostile though he was to the liberal régime, Henry Wellesley was convinced that a coup would be disastrous. Writing to Lord Castlereagh on 25 March, he remarked, 'I am persuaded, indeed, that

nothing would be more gratifying to the Jacobins than that the King should decline the acceptance of the Constitution, and throw the kingdom into that state of confusion which would be most favourable to the attainment of the object which they have in view.' To his alarm, however, he had discovered that certain of Fernando's advisers were urging him to take this very course. On being asked whether Fernando could count upon the support of Great Britain and the other allies, the ambassador returned a decisive negative, as well as warning that a coup would lead to 'nothing less than his ruin'. Instead, the King should accept the new system of government, and seek to work for its reform from within.³⁹ In a second letter to Lord Castlereagh of 31 March, he remarked, 'It is not at all clear that he would be supported . . . by the provinces. He has nothing to offer to the nation in its room, nor has he an army of funds to enable him to act with vigour if any disturbances should take place.'⁴⁰ Even when events began to suggest that support for the King was stronger than he had believed, the ambassador refused to change his opinion. Writing from Valencia, where he had gone to greet Fernando, after Elió's *pronunciamiento*, Wellesley continued to prophesy disaster, and announced his intention of avoiding any compromise with either party.⁴¹ It was therefore with some embarrassment that he received a visit from the Duque de San Carlos, who had been appointed to be Fernando's Minister of State. Although San Carlos claimed to have come only to apprise Wellesley of the King's intentions, it was soon apparent that he wanted a declaration of British support, and, in particular, a letter from the Duke of Wellington pledging his willingness to fight for Fernando. Yet the ambassador refused to give any such assurances, either on behalf of the British government or of his brother, and once more took the opportunity to urge caution upon the King's party.⁴² When the coup actually took place, Wellesley also expressed considerable annoyance at the participation of General Whittingham, of whom he remarked, 'As a Spanish or as an English officer I have no authority over him, but he was perfectly aware of my intentions not to interfere myself, and of my opinion that no Englishman should be concerned in this business.'⁴³

The Duke of Wellington does not appear to have learnt of the impending coup until after it had taken place. Yet his attitude was now to become crucial. Fernando's restoration had in the last resort been the result of a military coup on the part of General

Elió's Second Army, to which the other Spanish forces in the country had given their active or passive support. So far circumstances had saved Wellington from being forced to take sides in the conflict, but rumours now began to spread that the two armies that he had taken with him into France were on the point of launching a counter-blow in favour of the liberals, with whom their commanders, the Principe de Anglona and Manuel Freyre, were believed to be in sympathy. Whether this was ever a serious danger is a moot point. It is notable, for example, that Toreno gives it no credence. Although he admits that Anglona was loyal to the Cortes, he claims that the Prince would have been overthrown by a group of his own officers had not the conspiracy been broken up by Wellington. As for the Fourth Army, he says that a number of officers did call upon Freyre to raise the possibility of resistance, only to be told that it was unlikely that the soldiers would follow their lead.⁴⁴ To judge from the alacrity with which Freyre was soon to take service under Fernando, his liberalism cannot have been very strong in any case.⁴⁵ Though the army was by no means monolithic in its political opinions, recent research has suggested that the liberals had little cause to expect widespread military support.⁴⁶ In the face of such evidence, it would seem that the only justification for the rumours lay in the fact that Anglona, who Girón describes as having been uncertain and confused, did not at first publish the decree ordering the dissolution of the Cortes and the nullification of the Constitution.

According to Wellington, this was for no other reason than that Anglona had been waiting until he received an official copy of the decree.⁴⁷ For all that, the Duke took the danger seriously, perhaps because he was not actually present with the army, having travelled to Paris to take up a new role as British ambassador. Convinced that a civil war was imminent, at the urging of Lord Castlereagh he set out for Madrid 'to try whether I cannot prevail upon all parties to be more moderate, and to adopt a constitution most likely to be practicable and to contribute to the peace and happiness of the nation'. In addition, he hoped to cement the alliance between Spain and Great Britain and to press for a just settlement of the South American rebellion.⁴⁸ Calling in at the headquarters of the Third and Fourth Armies, he discovered that the danger of a counter-coup had been greatly exaggerated, but still lectured their officers on the need 'to preserve the discipline of the troops under their command, and to prevent factious per-

sons of any description from influencing the conduct of the officers and troops in order to produce a civil war in Spain'.⁴⁹

On one level, of course, this action must be counted as support for the restoration of absolutism, for it swept away what little chance there had ever been of any serious resistance to Fernando's coup. Nor could it be denied that the Duke sympathised with this event, which he described as a 'great act of vigour'.⁵⁰ Yet Wellington was by no means a rigid absolutist: during his visit to Madrid, which lasted from 24 May until 6 June, he urged Fernando to summon a new Cortes, and introduce significant political reforms.⁵¹ As the restoration of absolutism was already a *fait accompli* by the time that he reached the Spanish armies in France, the Duke's attempts to ensure their submission may therefore be viewed in a different light. By enjoining them to remain quiet, he was advocating an entirely different style of army from that which was personified by the *servil* General Elió. Though he had on several occasions been prepared to use the weapon of British support as a tool with which to exert leverage upon a recalcitrant Spanish government, Wellington had steadfastly refused to interfere in the course of domestic politics. Nor had he shown any interest in exercising direct political power, and had only sought to give the Spanish army greater influence in the governance of Spain for lack of any other means of providing for its needs. In so far as he was able, in fact, Wellington had sought to give the army a non-political character that was very different from that which it was already in the process of acquiring. When he finally resigned the command on 13 June 1814, Spain was losing not only a *generalísimo*, but also an alternative model of military commander whose want she was to feel dearly until far into the present century.

And what of the Duke himself? Despite his troubles with the Spaniards, he came to adopt an increasingly complacent view of his command of their army. A few days before his death in 1852 he remarked:

Much of my ultimate success in Spain was due to my singular position there. I was a . . . *conquérant sans ambition*. I had for a time a sovereign power there, but no one suspected me of any design to become King of Spain or Portugal, like Joseph, or Soult, or Junot. I was almost King of Spain, but I handled my power with the greatest moderation and abstinence and avoided

every unnecessary exhibition of it. All the world knew that I desired nothing but to beat the French out of Spain and then to go home to my own country, leaving them to manage theirs as they pleased. So I avoided offence and jealousy, and was obeyed as willingly as the nature of that people would admit of.⁵²

Distorted though these comments were by the roseate hue of an old man's memory, they are not without some justification: to the best of their ability most of Wellington's subordinates had obeyed the Duke's orders, whilst he had indeed been a 'conqueror without ambition'. Yet the commander-in-chief had by no means been the paragon of diplomacy which he claimed. If it was not in his nature explicitly to admit such a failing, his successful performance as a coalition general during the Waterloo campaign suggests that he recognised that mistakes had been made, and took steps to modify his conduct accordingly. In treating with the Prussians, however, he was dealing with an army to which he could relate far more easily than to its Spanish counterpart. As the commanders of a disciplined, conventional force, Blücher and Gneisenau enjoyed an advantage which was always denied to Morillo and Freyre. The fact was that the Duke could never shake off the at best condescending, and at worst downright contemptuous, attitude with which he habitually regarded the Spaniards, whom he saw in much the same light as the sepoys of the Indian subcontinent. Not even the courage and devotion which he had seen with his own eyes at San Marcial and Toulouse was enough to shake this air of superiority. On the contrary, Wellington is on several occasions recorded as having voiced criticisms of his erstwhile subordinates that are breathtaking in their inaccuracy and injustice.⁵³ Preserved for posterity these comments served only to swell the prejudice with which the Spanish war effort has so often been regarded. Such a result was unfortunate, for, as the Duke himself recognised, the liberation of Spain could not have been achieved without the assistance which he had derived from her forces. Hence his acceptance of a command from which he can have gained neither gratification nor satisfaction, and which in some respects must be regarded as one of the least successful aspects of a most remarkable career.

Appendix 1: Organisation of the Spanish Army, November 1812

FIRST ARMY (CATALONIA) – LACY

First Division	Baza, Fernando VII, Leales Manresanos, Cazadores de Cataluña, Barcelona, Palma
Second Division	Ultonia, Mataró, Tarragona, Cardona, San Fernando, Ausoná
Unattached	Borbón, Tiradores de Busa, Gerona, Tiradores de Cataluña

Total: sixteen battalions, c. 16 000 officers and men.

SECOND AND THIRD ARMIES (LEVANTE-ARAGÓN) – ELIÓ

(a) Second Army

Villacampa's Division	2º de la Princesa, 2º de Soria, 2º de Voluntarios de Aragón, Voluntarios de Molina
Bassecourt's Division	2º de Voluntarios de Cataluña, 2º de Badajoz, Cazadores de Cuenca (two squadrons), Husares de Aragón (two squadrons)
El Empecinado's Division	Voluntarios de Guadalajara, Voluntarios de Madrid, Tiradores de Sigüenza, Tiradores de Cuenca, Cazadores de Guadalajara (three squadrons), Cazadores Voluntarios de Madrid (three squadrons)
Durán's Division	Cariñena, Voluntarios Numantinos, Cazadores de Soria, Voluntarios de Rioja, Dragones de Soria (three squadrons)

Total: fourteen battalions, thirteen squadrons, c. 18 000 officers and men.

(b) Third Army

Vanguard – Freyre	1º de Voluntarios de la Corona, 1º de Guadix, Vélez Málaga, Carabineros Reales (one squadron), 1º Provisional de Línea (three squadrons), 2º Provisional de Línea (three squadrons), 1º Provisional de Dragones, (three squadrons), 2º Provisional de Dragones (three squadrons), 1º Provisional de Husares (two squadrons)
Roche's Division	Voluntarios de Alicante, Canarias, Chinchilla, Cazadores de Valencia, Husares de Fernando VII (three squadrons)
Montijo's Brigade	2º de Guardias Walonas, 1º de Badajoz, Cuenca
Michelena's Brigade	1º de Voluntarios de Aragón, Tiradores de Cádiz, 2º de Mallorca
Mijares' Brigade	1º de Burgos, Alcázar de San Juan, Bailén, Lorca, Voluntarios de Jaén
Unattached/garrisons	Almansa, América, Alpujarras, Almería, Cazadores de Jaén (one squadron), Cazadores de la Mancha (two squadrons)

Total: twenty-two battalions, twenty-one squadrons, c. 22 000 officers and men.

FOURTH ARMY (ANDALUCÍA) – PALACIO

First Division	Granaderos del General, Carmona, 1º de Guardias Españolas, Cantabria, Ronda, 1º de Voluntarios de Cataluña, Irlanda, Ciudad Real
Second Division	1º de Valencia, 3º de Guardias Españolas, 1º de Guardias Walonas, Africa, España, Navarra, 2º de Guadix
Third Division	1º de Zamora, Castropol, Cangas, Infiesto, Rey, Lena, Cádiz
Cavalry Division	Calatrava (three squadrons), Husares de Castilla (three squadrons), Husares de Ubrique (one squadron)
Depot Division	4º de Guardias Españolas, 2º de Zamora, Suizos de Kaiser

Total: twenty-five battalions, seven squadrons, c. 30 000 officers and men.

FIFTH AND SIXTH ARMIES (EXTREMADURA-CASTILE-GALICIA) – CASTAÑOS

(a) Fifth Army

Vanguard – Penne Villemur	Provisional de Linea (four squadrons), Provisional de Ligeros (four squadrons), 1 ^{er} de Lanceros de Castilla (four squadrons), 2 ^o de Lanceros de Castilla (three squadrons)
Morillo's Division	1 ^{er} de León, Unión, 1 ^{er} de la Legión Extremeña
España's Division	1 ^{er} de la Princesa, 2 ^o de Jaén, 1 ^{er} de Sevilla, Tiradores de Castilla, Cazadores de Castilla
Garrisons	Mérida, Trujillo, Plasencia, Tiradores de Doyle, Voluntarios de la Victoria, 1 ^{er} de Mallorca, Hibernia
Cavalry depots	Reina, Borbón, Algarve, Dragones de Sagunto, Cazadores de Sevilla, Husares de Extremadura, Legión Extremeña

Total: fifteen battalions, twenty-two squadrons, c. 20 000 officers and men.

(b) Sixth Army

First Division	Cazadores del Rey, 2 ^o de Voluntarios de la Corona, 1 ^{er} de Asturias, Tuy, Monterrey, Marina, Orense, Compostela.
Second Division	Voluntarios de Asturias, 2 ^o de Murcia, Toledo, Santiago, Columna de Cazadores, Columna de Granaderos, Rivero, Oviedo
Reserve Division	Voluntarios de Santiago, Benevente, 2 ^o de Asturias, 2 ^o de Guadalajara, 2 ^a Legión de Castilla
Cavalry Division	Granaderos a Caballo (one squadron), Cazadores de Galicia (three squadrons), Husares de Galicia (two squadrons), Husares de Cantabria (three squadrons)

Total: twenty-one battalions, nine squadrons, c. 25 000 officers and men.

SEVENTH ARMY (ASTURIAS-CANTABRIA-BASQUE PROVINCES-
NAVARRRE) – MENDIZÁBAL

Porlier's Division	Laredo, 1 ^{er} Cántabro, Tiradores de Cantabria
Longa's Division	1 ^{er} de Iberia, 2 ^o de Iberia, 3 ^{er} de Iberia, 4 ^o de Iberia, 2 ^o de Alava
Mina's Division	1 ^{er} Voluntarios de Navarra, 2 ^o Voluntarios de Navarra, 3 ^{er} Voluntarios de Navarra, 4 ^o

Voluntarios de Navarra, 1^{er} de Alava, Husares
de Navarra (one squadron)

Total: at least thirteen battalions, one squadron.

DIVISIÓN DE MALLORCA (ALICANTE) – WHITTINGHAM

Quinto de Granaderos, 1^{er} de Córdoba, 1^{er} de
Guadalajara, 2^o de Burgos, 2^o de Murcia,
Cazadores de Olivenza (two squadrons),
Dragones de Almansa (two squadrons).

Total: five battalions, four squadrons, c. 4500 officers and men.

Notes

Figures given are total strengths, and should be reduced by as much as fifty per cent to give the number of effectives. Nor have such 'units' as deposits of recruits and military schools been included. In view of the confused and contradictory nature of many of the original sources, the tables should in any case be regarded as being conjectural. This is particularly the case with the Seventh Army which consisted entirely of guerrillas, and theoretically included many more formations than those actually listed.

The regiment listed in Whittingham's division as the Quinto de Granaderos is usually shown as the Fifth Grenadiers. In this instance, however, 'quinto' almost certainly bears its alternative meaning of 'conscript', the correct translation therefore being 'Conscript Grenadiers'.

Appendix 2: Organisation of the Spanish Army, July 1813

FIRST ARMY (CATALONIA) – COPÓNS

First Division (Eroles)	Baza, Fernando VII, Leales Manresanos, Barcelona, Cazadores de Cataluña, Coraceros Españoles (two squadrons)
Second Division	Ultonia, Cardona, Mataró, Palma, Ausona, San Fernando, Tarragona, Husares de Cataluña (four squadrons)
Garrisons	Lérida, Pontevedra, 1 ^{er} del Príncipe, Batallón del General

Total: Sixteen battalions, six squadrons, c. 18 500 officers and men.

SECOND ARMY (LEVANTE) – ELIÓ

First Division (Mijares)	1 ^{er} de Voluntarios de la Corona, Alcázar de San Juan, Voluntarios de Jaén, 1 ^{er} de Burgos, Tiradores de Cádiz, Cuenca
Second Division (Villacampa)	2 ^o de la Princesa, Voluntarios de Molina, 2 ^o de Voluntarios de Aragón, 2 ^o de Soria, Husares Españoles (two squadrons)
Third Division (Sarsfield)	Bailén, 1 ^{er} de Badajoz, 2 ^o de Badajoz, América, Alpujarras, Cazadores de Jaén (two squadrons)
Fourth Division (Roche)	1 ^{er} Voluntarios de Aragón, Canarias, Voluntarios de Alicante, Chinchilla, Cazadores de Valencia
Fifth Division (El Empecinado)	Voluntarios de Guadalajara, Voluntarios de Madrid, Tiradores de Sigüenza, Tiradores de Cuenca, Cazadores de Guadalajara (three squadrons), Cazadores Voluntarios de Madrid (three squadrons)
Sixth Division (Durán)	Cazadores de Soria, Voluntarios de Rioja,

Cavalry Brigade	Cariñena, Voluntarios Numantinos, Dragones de Soria (three squadrons) Cazadores de la Mancha (three squadrons), Husares de Fernando VII (three squadrons)
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Total: twenty-eight battalions, nineteen squadrons, c. 36 000 officers and men.

THIRD ARMY (ANDALUCÍA) – PALACIO

First Division (Anglona)	Granaderos del General, Carmona, 1 ^{er} de Guardias Españolas, Cantabria, Ciudad Real, 1 ^{er} de Voluntarios de Cataluña, Irlanda, Ronda
Second Division (Cuevas)	1 ^{er} de Valencia, España, Navarra, 3 ^{er} de Guardias Walonas, 1 ^{er} de Zamora, Africa, 1 ^{er} de Guadix
Third Division (Murgeon)	Rey, Castropol, Cangas, Infiesto, Cádiz, Lena, Sigüenza
Cavalry Division (Sisternes)	Calatrava (three squadrons), Dragones de Madrid (three squadrons), Husares de Ubrique (one squadron)

Total: twenty-two battalions, seven squadrons, c. 24 000 officers and men.

FOURTH ARMY (EXTREMADURA-CASTILE-GALICIA-CANTABRIA) – CASTAÑOS

First Division (Morillo)	1 ^{er} de León, Unión, 1 ^{er} de la Legión Extremeña, Tiradores de Doyle, Voluntarios de la Victoria, 2 ^o de Jaén
Second Division (España)	1 ^{er} de Sevilla, Tiradores de Castilla, 1 ^{er} de Mallorca, 1 ^{er} de la Princesa, 3 ^{er} de Guardias Españolas,
Third Division (Losada)	Toledo, Voluntarios de León, 1 ^{er} de Asturias, Monterrey, Benavente, Rivero, Oviedo
Fourth Division (Barcena)	2 ^o de Asturias, 2 ^o de Guadalajara, Constitución, 2 ^o de Voluntarios de la Corona, Voluntarios de Asturias, Voluntarios de Santiago
Fifth Division (Porlier)	1 ^{er} Cantabro, Laredo, Tiradores de Cantabria
Sixth Division (Longa)	1 ^{er} de Iberia, 2 ^o de Iberia, 3 ^{er} de Iberia, 4 ^o de Iberia, 2 ^o de Alava
Seventh Division (Mendizábal)	1 ^{er} de Guipúzcoa, 2 ^o de Guipúzcoa, 3 ^{er} de Guipúzcoa
Eighth Division (Mina)	1 ^{er} de Voluntarios de Navarra, 2 ^o de Voluntarios de Navarra, 3 ^{er} de Voluntarios de Navarra, 4 ^o de Voluntarios de Navarra, 1 ^{er} de

	Alava, 3 ^{er} de Alava, 1 ^{er} de Voluntarios de Aragón, 2 ^o de Voluntarios de Aragón, 3 ^{er} de Voluntarios de Aragón
Cavalry Division (Penne Villemur)	Algarve (four squadrons), Husares de Extremadura (four squadrons), Granaderos a Caballo de Galicia (one squadron), Granaderos a Caballo de Cantabria (one squadron), Husares de Rioja (one squadron), Husares de Castilla (one squadron), 1 ^{er} de Lanceros de Castilla (four squadrons), 2 ^o de Lanceros de Castilla (four squadrons)
Garrisons/Unattached	Tuy, Trujillo, Plasencia, Cazadores de Castilla, Hibernia, Cazadores Extranjeros, Legión Extremeña (two squadrons)

Total: fifty battalions, twenty-two squadrons, c. 60 000 officers and men.

ARMY OF RESERVE OF ANDALUCÍA – ABISBAL

First Division (Echávarri)	2 ^o de Guardias Españolas, Galicia, 2 ^o de Voluntarios de Cataluña, Suizos de Kaiser, Almería, Pravía
Second Division (Creagh)	2 ^o de Guardias Walonas, 1 ^{er} de Murcia, Voluntarios de Navarra, 2 ^o de Sevilla, 2 ^o del Príncipe, Madrid, Batallón del General
Cavalry Division (González)	Dragones de Villaviciosa (two squadrons), Escuadrón del General (one squadron)

Total: thirteen battalions, three squadrons, c. 16 000 officers and men.

ARMY OF RESERVE OF GALICIA – SANTOCILDES

First Division (Rojas)	Toro, Aragón, Mondoñedo
Second Division (Escandón)	Zaragoza, Lugo, Betanzos

Total: six battalions, c. 2400 officers and men.

ARMY OF THE PROVINCE OF CÁDIZ – VALDÉS

4^o de Guardias Españolas, 2^o de Guadix, Almansa, Cansados, Málaga, Marina, Gerona, Ribagorza, Campo Mayor

Total: nine battalions, c. 6000 officers and men.

DIVISIÓN DE MALLORCA – WHITTINGHAM

Quinto de Granaderos, 1^{er} de Córdoba, 1^{er} de Guadalajara, 2^o de Murcia, 2^o de Burgos, 2^o de Mallorca, Dragones de Almansa (two squadrons), Cazadores de Olivenza (two squadrons)

Total: six battalions, four squadrons, c. 4500 officers and men.

Notes

Once again, this table should be regarded as being conjectural, and gives total rather than actual strengths. It will also be noted that some units, particularly the Voluntarios de Aragón and Voluntarios de Navarra, appear to have been duplicated, being shown in both the Second Army and the Army of Reserve of Andalucía, and in Mina's division of the Fourth Army. The explanation is that the units in the Second and Reserve armies were descended from light infantry regiments of the old regular army, and had preserved their original names, a fact which did not prevent Mina from making use of the same titles for the troops he raised in northern Spain.

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21. E.g. F. Larpent, *The Private Journal of F. S. Larpent, Esq., Judge Advocate General of the British Forces in the Peninsula attached to the Headquarters of Lord Wellington during the Peninsular War from 1812 to its Close* (London, 1853) vol. I, pp. 257-8; W. Grattan, *Adventures of the Connaught Rangers from 1808 to 1814* (London, 1847) vol. II, pp. 128-9.
22. Porter, *Letters*, pp. 254-6; J. Harris, *The Recollections of Rifleman Harris*, ed. C. Hibbert (London, 1985) p. 100; Gordon, *Journal*, pp. 149-50.
23. J. Hale, *Journal of James Hale, late Sergeant in the Ninth Regiment of Foot* (London, 1826), p. 33; Gordon, *Journal*, p. 196; Schaumann, *Diary*, pp. 134-5; Neale, *Letters*, p. 321; Blakeney, *Services, Adventures and Experiences*, pp. 112, 119.
24. Canning to Frere, 14 January 1809, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers (hereafter PRO. FO.) 72/71, pp. 1-5.
25. Canning to Frere, 23 January 1809, PRO. FO. 72/71, pp. 22-5.
26. Porter, *Letters*, p. 171; Neale, *Letters*, pp. 310-11.
27. Memorandum of J. Caro and M. Avalue, 25 March 1809, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección de Estado (hereafter AHN. Estado) 17-1/2, pp. 62-3.
28. *Diario de Badajoz*, 2 December 1808, p. 696, Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid (hereafter HMM.) AH14-1(2457); *Correo de Murcia*, 26 July 1809, p. 972, Servicio Histórico Militar, Colección Documental del Fraile (hereafter SHM. CDF.) vol. XXXVII.

29. E.g. *Suplemento al Diario de Málaga*, 8 January 1809, SHM. CDF. vol. XLI; *Diario de Granada*, 23 January 1809, SHM. CDF. vol. XXXIII.
30. Frere to Cradock, 8 February 1809, PRO. WO. 1/232, p. 497.
31. J. Aitchison, *An Ensign in the Peninsular War: The Letters of John Aitchison*, ed. W. Thompson (London, 1981) p. 32.
32. Frere to Cradock, 21 April 1809, US. WP. 1/294; *Diario de Málaga*, 13 March 1809, SHM. CDF. vol. XLI.
33. Castlereagh to Wellington, 2 April 1809, US. WP. 1/294; Castlereagh to Wellington, 3 April 1809, CD, vol. VII, pp. 49–50.
34. Wellington to Frere, 24 April 1809, PRO. FO. 72/73, pp. 7–8.
35. E. Costello, *The Adventures of a Soldier, or Memoirs of Edward Costello* (London, 1841) p. 35.
36. Wellington to Frere, 13 June 1809, US. WP. 1/265; cf. also Wellington to Castlereagh, 17 June 1809, US. WP. 1/266.
37. Frere to Wellington, 4 May 1809, PRO. FO. 72/73, pp. 10–16; Frere to Canning, 29 May and 27 June 1809, PRO. FO. 72/73, pp. 104–10, 281–90.
38. Wellington to Frere, 13 July 1809, US. WP. 1/269.
39. Schaumann, *Diary*, p. 170; Aitchison, *Letters*, p. 53; Wellington to Frere, 24 July 1809, British Museum, Additional Manuscripts (hereafter BM. Add. Mss.) 37286, pp. 116–17.
40. Wellington to O'Donoghue, 16 July 1809, PRO. WO. 1/238, pp. 271–2; Wellington to Castlereagh, 24 July 1809, PRO. WO. 1/238, p. 265.
41. Cf. Aylmer to Hill, 7 December 1812, US. WP. 1/353.
42. E.g. Junta of Plasencia to Wellington, 4 July 1809, US. WP. 1/267; cf. also Eguía to Ureta, 18 August 1809, US. WP. 1/291.
43. Wellington to Junta of Plasencia, 18 July 1809, US. WP. 1/269.
44. Wellington to Frere, 24 July 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37286, pp. 118–21.
45. E.g. Schaumann, *Diary*, p. 172.
46. Wellington to Frere, 24 July 1809 (x2), BM. Add. Mss. 37286, pp. 116–17, 118–21; the author owes the suggestion that Wellington may have deliberately been seeking Cuesta's defeat to Dr Rory Muir of the University of Adelaide.
47. Costello, *Adventures*, pp. 33–4; J. Cooper, *Rough Notes of Seven Campaigns in Portugal, Spain, France, and America during the Years 1809–10–11–12–13–14–15* (London, 1869) p. 25; G. Simmons, *A British Rifleman: Journals and Correspondence during the Peninsular War and the Campaign of Wellington*, ed. W. Verner (London, 1899) p. 32; P. Hawker, *Journal of a Regimental Officer during the Recent Campaign in Portugal and Spain under Lord Viscount Wellington* (London, 1810) pp. 102–4, 113–14, 117–19; Schaumann, *Diary*, pp. 189–90; G. Wood, *The Subaltern Officer: A Narrative* (London, 1825) pp. 89–91; W. Lawrence, *The Autobiography of Sergeant William Lawrence, a hero of the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns*, ed. G. Bankes (London, 1886) p. 53.
48. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 26 June 1820, US. WP. 12/1/1.
49. Wellington to Liverpool, 14 July 1810, PRO. WO. 1/245, pp. 92–3.
50. J. Sherer, *Recollections of the Peninsula* (London, 1823) pp. 94–5.
51. Wellington to Wellesley, 1 September 1809, PRO. WO. 1/242, p.

- 147; Wellington to B. Frere, 6 December 1809, *The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington during his Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries and France from 1799 to 1818* (hereafter WD), ed. J. Gurwood (London, 1837–9), Vol. v, p. 335.
52. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 23 February 1811, US. WP. 12/1/3; Wellington to Liverpool, 23 February 1811, US. WP. 12/1/3.
53. Mendizábal to Wellington, 26 February 1811, US. WP. 12/1/3.
54. E.g. Walker to Wellington, 25 September 1810, US. WP. 1/315; Walker to Liverpool, 18 September, 4 October, 23 November and 16 December 1810, PRO. WO. 1/261, pp. 42–3, 87, 124, 149; Walker to Bunbury, 20 February 1811, PRO. WO. 1/261, pp. 200–1; Roche to Wellington, 6 March 1810, BM. Add. Mss. 38244, pp. 243–7; Graham to Liverpool, 24 July, 4 September and 6 October 1810, PRO. WO. 1/247, pp. 460–2, 568, 641–2; Graham to Bunbury, 30 June and 12 July 1810, PRO. WO. 1/247, pp. 408–9, 450–3; Graham to Wellington, 30 August 1810, US. WP. 1/313; Cochrane Johnstone to Wellington, 14 September 1810, US. WP. 1/314.
55. Aitchison, *Letters*, pp. 83–4.
56. E.g. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 20 August and 2 December 1810, US. WP. 12/1/1, 12/1/2; Wellington to Liverpool, 21 December 1810, PRO. WO. 1/246, pp. 565–8.
57. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 23 December 1810, US. WP. 12/1/2.
58. Cf. Wellington to Stuart, 20 May 1811, US. WP. 1/332.
59. Cf. Graham to Liverpool, 9 March 1811, PRO. WO. 1/252, pp. 119–22; A. Barnard to Anne Crauford, 24 March 1811, cit. *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* (hereafter JSAHR), vol. XLVII, no. 191, pp. 135–6; Graham to Wellington, 6 March 1811, US. WP. 1/342; Cadell, *Narrative*, pp. 91–107; W. Dent, *A Young Surgeon in Wellington's Army: The Letters of William Dent*, ed. L. Woodford (Old Woking, 1976) pp. 24–5; T. Bunbury, *Reminiscences of a Veteran, being Personal and Military Adventures in Portugal, Spain, France, Malta, New South Wales, Norfolk Island, New Zealand, Alderman Islands and India* (London, 1861) vol. I, pp. 71–81.
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63. *Gazeta de la Junta Superior de la Mancha*, 8 June 1811, pp. 71–5, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXV.
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66. Wellington to Liverpool, 11 July 1811, PRO. WO. 1/250, pp. 62–5.
 67. H. Wellesley to Bardaji, 15 March 1811, US. WP. 1/341.
 68. E.g. 'Memorandum by Marquess Wellesley on a Spanish army', US. WP. 1/295; A. Cochrane. Johnstone, 'Plan for raising, organising, paying and clothing a Spanish force of 50 000 men', US. WP. 1/315; cf. also Graham to Bunbury, 23 April 1811, PRO. WO. 1/252, pp. 281–7.
 69. Larpent, *Private Journal*, vol. I. p. 37; and vol. III, p. 13; Lady Holland, *The Spanish Journal of Elizabeth, Lady Holland*, ed. Earl of Ilchester (London, 1910) p. 17; Long, *Correspondence*, p. 100; G. Bell, *Rough Notes of an Old Soldier*, ed. B. Stuart (London, 1956) p. 31.
 70. E.g. Aitchison, *Letters*, pp. 188–9.
 71. W. Gomm, *Letters and Journals of Field Marshal Sir William Maynard-Gomm*, G. C. B., *Commander-in-Chief of India, Constable of the Tower of London, etc., etc., from 1799 to Waterloo, 1815*, ed. F. C. Carr-Gomm (London, 1881) p. 17.
 72. Bardaji to H. Wellesley, 25 March 1811, US. WP. 1/341; H. Wellesley to Wellington, 31 March 1811, US. WP. 1/341.
 73. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 23 December 1810, 29 August 1811, 3 May 1812, US. WP. 12/1/2, 12/1/4, 347; Wellington to Liverpool, 1 October 1811, PRO. WO. 1/251, pp. 2–4.
 74. E.g. *El Redactor General*, 23 July 1811, pp. 139–40, HMM. 6/3; *Semanario Patriótico*, 19 December 1811, p. 83, HMM. AH1–6(199); Roche to Wellington, 6 March 1810, BM. Add. Mss. 38244, pp. 243–7.
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 78. J. Severn, *A Wellesley Affair: Richard, Marquess Wellesley and the Conduct of Anglo-Spanish diplomacy, 1809–1812* (Tallahassee, 1981) p. 43.
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 80. Canning to Frere, 10 April 1809, PRO. FO. 72/71, pp. 78–81; Canning to Garay, 20 July 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37286, pp. 104–15.
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 82. Kaufmann, *British Policy*, p. 44.
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86. Bardaji to H. Wellesley, 29 June 1811, PRO. FO. 72/112, pp. 9–25.
87. E.g. Wellesley to H. Wellesley, 4 May 1811, PRO. FO. 72/108, pp. 57–71; H. Wellesley to Wellington, 11 November 1811, US. WP. 12/2/3.
88. E.g. Castlereagh to Manchester, 4 June 1808, CD, vol. VI, pp. 364–8.
89. Douglas to Liverpool, 13 September 1811, PRO. WO. 1/261, p. 446.
90. H. Wellesley to Wellesley, 27 July 1811, BM. Add. Mss. 37293, pp. 70–1.
91. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 27 February 1811, US. WP. 12/2/2.
92. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 18 July 1811, US. WP. 12/2/2.
93. T. Browne, *The Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Thomas Henry Browne*, ed. R. Buckley (London, 1987) p. 198.
94. Sherer, *Recollections*, pp. 130, 132.
95. J. Kincaid, *Adventures in the Rifle Brigade* (London, 1909) pp. 14–15; Donaldson, *Recollections*, p. 53; Larpent, *Private Journal*, vol. I, p. 94.
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97. Simmons, *Journals and Correspondence*, pp. 14, 49, 236–7; F. Robinson to Anne Slade, 3 July 1813, cit. *JSAHR*, vol. XXXIV, no. 140, p. 157; Porter, *Letters*, pp. 30–1, 45–8, 65, 133–4, 148–50, 153–61; J. Leach, *Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier* (London, 1831) p. 115; W. Wheeler, *The Letters of Private Wheeler, 1809–28*, ed. B. Liddell-Hart (London, 1951) pp. 50–1, 94; Grattan, *Adventures*, vol. II, pp. 181–3; Schaumann, *Diary*, p. 80; W. Boutflower, *The Journal of an Army Surgeon during the Peninsular War* (Manchester, 1912) pp. 18–20, 46; Patterson, *Adventures*, pp. 155–6; Bell, *Rough Notes*, p. 7; Neale, *Letters*, pp. 142–4, 197.
98. Boutflower, *Journal*, pp. 38–9.
99. Schaumann, *Diary*, p. 210; Kincaid, *Adventures*, p. 49; Leach, *Rough Sketches*, pp. 243–4; Lawrence, *Autobiography*, pp. 60–1.
100. Sherer, *Recollections*, p. 171; Leach, *Rough Sketches*, p. 73; W. Swabey, *Diary of the Campaigns in the Peninsula for the Years 1811, 12 and 13*, ed. F. Whinyates (London, 1984) p. 180; Porter, *Letters*, pp. 184–5; Bell, *Rough Notes*, p. 18.
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102. W. Fernyhough, *Military Memoirs of Four Brothers (Natives of Staffordshire) engaged in the Service of their Country, as well in the New World and Africa as on the Continent of Europe, by the Survivor* (London, 1829) p. 219; Donaldson, *Recollections*, p. 62; Costello, *Adventures*, pp. 205–6; Bell, *Rough Notes*, p. 34; Porter, *Letters*, pp. 229–30; Leach, *Rough Sketches*, pp. 96–7, 277–8; Simmons, *Journals and Correspondence*, pp. 243–4; Kincaid, *Adventures*, pp. 83–4.
103. Simmons, *Journals and Correspondence*, p. 60; cf. also Bell, *Rough Notes*, p. 71.

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106. Grattan, *Adventures*, vol. I, p. 237.
107. Wheeler, *Letters*, p. 72; Fernyhough, *Military Memoirs*, pp. 230-3; Swabey, *Diary*, p. 146.
108. E.g. Larpent, *Private Journal*, vol. II, p. 68; Bell, *Rough Notes*, p. 37.
109. E.g. Patterson, *Adventures*, p. 215; Sherer, *Recollections*, p. 189.
110. Blakeney, *Services, Adventures and Experiences*, p. 27; Gomm, *Letters and Journals*, p. 251.
111. E.g. W. Stothert, *A Narrative of the Principal Events of the Campaigns of 1809, 1810 and 1811 in Spain and Portugal* (London, 1812) p. 111; Porter, *Letters*, pp. 209, 214-16; Simmons, *Journals and Correspondence*, pp. 49-50.
112. Grattan, *Adventures*, vol. II, pp. 95-6; cf. also Sherer, *Recollections*, pp. 36-7.
113. E.g. W. Tomkinson, *The Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns, 1809-15*, ed. J. Tomkinson (London, 1894) p. 172.
114. Sherer, *Recollections*, pp. 36-7; cf. also, Wood, *Subaltern Officer*, pp. 141-2.

2 THE MAKING OF A GENERALISSIMO

1. Castlereagh to Dalrymple, 20 August 1808, PRO. WO. 1/234, pp. 14-17.
2. E.g. Whittingham to Castlereagh, 26 August 1808, PRO. WO. 1/234, p. 115; Doyle to Castlereagh, 26 September 1808, PRO. WO. 1/227, p. 391.
3. Proclamation of Junta of Seville, 3 August 1808, PRO. WO. 1/231, p. 309.
4. Cox to Dalrymple, 24 September 1808, PRO. WO. 1/234, pp. 249-50.
5. Carroll to Leith, 8 September 1808, PRO. WO. 1/229, p. 234; Doyle to Castlereagh, 28 August 1808, PRO. WO. 1/227, p. 216.
6. Conde de Toreno, *Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España*, ed. L. Augusto de Cueto (Madrid, 1953) p. 131.
7. H. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, 25 March 1811, US. WP. 1/341.

8. Proclamation of Junta Central, 2 October 1808, cit. *Gazeta de la Coruña*, 5 November 1808, p. 432, HMM. A592.
9. Bentinck to Burrard, 2 October 1808, PRO. WO. 1/235, pp. 117-18.
10. Bentinck to Floridablanca, 30 September 1808, PRO. WO. 1/230, pp. 46-50.
11. Cf. Marqués de la Romana, 'Manifiesto del Marqués de la Romana sobre la conducta del la junta extinguida del prinipado de Asturias' (MS), Real Academia de Historia (hereafter RAH.), 2-MS134, no. 5.
12. Quintanilla to Garay, 26 and 28 December 1808, AHN. Estado 17/7, pp. 32, 36-9.
13. Toreno, *Historia*, p. 190; A. von Schepeler, *Histoire de la révolution d'Espagne et de Portugal, ainsi que de la guerre qui en résulte* (Liège, 1829) vol. III, pp. 352-3.
14. *Representación del Exmo. Sr. Marqués de la Romana a la Junta Suprema Central*, 14 October 1809, SHM. CDF. vol. DCCLX, pp. 109-15.
15. B. Frere to Wellington, 24 January 1810, PRO. WO. 1/243, pp. 217-8; notebook in the hand of R. Wellesley II of events in Spain and Portugal, October 1809-January 1810 (MS), University of Southampton, Carver manuscripts (hereafter US. Carver MSS.) no. 53.
16. DC, vol. VI, pp. 523-6.
17. Doyle to Castlereagh, 28 August 1808, PRO. WO. 1/227, p. 218.
18. Bentinck to Moore, 15 October 1808, PRO. WO. 1/230, p. 95.
19. Leith to Castlereagh, 1 October 1808, PRO. WO. 1/229, pp. 351-2.
20. Venault de Charmilly, *To the British Nation is presented by Colonel Venault de Charmilly, Knight of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, the Narrative of his Transactions in Spain with the Rt. Hon. John Hookham Frere, His Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, and Lieutenant General Sir John Moore, K.B., Commander of the British Forces* (London, 1810) pp. 43-4. NB: in his dispatch to Wellesley of 12 August 1809, Canning stated that the offer was made to Moore in person by a member of the Junta Central, but corroboration for this story has proved hard to find.
21. Garay to Canning, 12 March 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37286, pp. 36-44.
22. J. Frere to Wellington, 9 June 1809, PRO. FO. 72/73, pp. 190-1.
23. 'Considerations on the effect likely to be produced by the employment of a British army in Spain', n.d., PRO. FO. 72/73, pp. 18-19.
24. Cuesta to Cornel, 3 May 1809, PRO. FO. 72/73, pp. 18-19.
25. La Romana to Cornel, 5 June 1809, PRO. FO. 72/73, pp. 227-9.
26. Wellington to J. Frere, 10 June 1809, US. WP. 1/265.
27. Wellington to Wellesley, 24 August 1809, US. WP. 1/275.
28. Wellington to Castlereagh, 25 August 1809, US. WP. 1/275.
29. Canning to Garay, 20 July 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37286, pp. 104-15.
30. Canning to Wellesley, 27 June 1809, PRO. FO. 72/75, pp. 25-40.
31. Cf. J. Gordon, 'Memorandum on rank between the English officers in Spain', CD, vol. VII, pp. 3-5.
32. Canning to Wellesley, 12 August 1809, PRO. FO. 72/75, pp. 96-120.
33. Canning to Wellesley, 25 August 1809, PRO. FO. 72/75, pp. 191-3.
34. Canning to Wellesley, 27 August 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37287, pp. 167-8.



35. Canning to Wellesley, 12 August 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37286, pp. 253-6.
36. Memorandum of Whittingham, 4 November 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37288, pp. 323-4. Severn attributes this document, which is initialled but unsigned, to Marquess Wellesley (Severn, *A Wellesley Affair*, pp. 84-5), but seems to have mistaken SW for RW, the author being inclined to agree with the anonymous archivist who annotated the document as having been written by Whittingham.
37. Garay to Wellesley, 17 and 30 August, 13 September 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37287, pp. 21-3, 219-23, 326-9.
38. Wellesley to Canning, 15 September 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37287, pp. 41-70.
39. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 25 January 1811, US. WP. 12/2/2.
40. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 3 February 1811, US. WP. 1/326.
41. Wellington to Liverpool, 2 February 1811, BM. Add. Mss. 38246, pp. 29-30.
42. Liverpool to Wellington, 20 February 1811, US. WP. 1/399.
43. H. Wellesley to Wellesley, 12 January 1811, BM. Add. Mss. 37292, pp. 250-1.
44. Wellesley to H. Wellesley, 18 April 1811, PRO. FO. 72/108, pp. 33-42.
45. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 29 May 1811, US. WP. 1/332.
46. H. Wellesley to Wellesley, 28 October 1811, PRO. FO. 72/114, pp. 83-7.
47. Severn, *A Wellesley Affair*, pp. 176, 192-3.
48. Vaughan to Hamilton, 8 September 1812, PRO. FO. 72/133, pp. 183-6.
49. E.g. *Correo de Valencia*, 25 March 1811, pp. 238-40, SHM. CDF. vol. CXLIX; *Diario Redactor de Sevilla*, 9-11 December 1812, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXII.
50. E.g. *Observaciones sobre los atentados de las Cortes extraordinarias de Cádiz contra las leyes fundamentales de la monarquía y sobre la nulidad de la constitución que formaron* (Madrid, 1814) pp. 19-20.
51. B. Hamnett, *La política española en una época revolucionaria, 1790-1820* (México, 1985) p. 284.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-3; G. Lovett, *Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain* (New York, 1965) vol. II, pp. 426-9.
53. E.g. H. Wellesley to Bardaji, 26 January 1811, US. WP. 1/342; H. Wellesley to Wellington, 21 August 1811, US. WP. 12/2/3.
54. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 24 December 1811, US. WP. 12/2/3.
55. Toreno, *Historia*, p. 397.
56. T. Anna, *Spain and the Loss of America* (Lincoln, 1983) p. 83; J. Canga Argüelles, *Apuntes para la historia de la hacienda pública de España en el año de 1811* (Cádiz, 1811) pp. 5-11.
57. H. Wellesley to Wellesley, 28 October 1811, PRO. FO. 72/114, pp. 83-7; Severn, *A Wellesley Affair*, p. 197.
58. E.g. Schepeler, *Histoire*, vol. III, pp. 482-3.
59. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 22 September 1810, US. WP. 1/315.

60. *Indagación de las causas de los malos sucesos de nuestros ejércitos y medios de removerlos* (Cádiz, 1811) pp. 7, 20-31, 37-40.
61. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 8 January 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3; Toreno, *Historia*, pp. 396-7.
62. J. García de León y Pizarro, *Memorias* (Madrid, 1953) vol. I, pp. 154-61.
63. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 31 January 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3.
64. *Gazeta de la Junta Superior de la Mancha*, 23 May 1812, pp. 73-5, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXVI.
65. 'A nuestros aliados', *Diario de la Tarde*, 16 June 1812, p. 712, SHM. CDF. vol. CLX; *Gazeta de la Junta Superior de la Mancha*, 18 July 1812, pp. 169-72, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXVII.
66. Swabey, *Diary*, p. 96; R. Knowles, *The War in the Peninsula: Some letters of Lieutenant Robert Knowles of the Seventh, or Royal, Fusiliers, a Lancashire Officer*, ed. L. Knowles (Bolton, 1913) p. 73.
67. Aitchison, *Letters*, p. 177; Grattan, *Adventures*, vol. II, p. 73; Tomkinson, *Diary*, p. 162.
68. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 6 August 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3; cf. also Roche to Wellington, 4 September 1812, US. WP. 1/350.
69. *Gazeta de la Junta Superior de la Mancha*, 22 August 1812, pp. 223-4, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXVI; Simmons, *Journals and Correspondence*, p. 248; E. Cocks, *Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula: Letters and Diaries of Major the Honourable Edward Charles Cocks, 1786-1812*, ed. J. Page (Tunbridge Wells, 1986) p. 191; Leach, *Rough Sketches*, p. 282; Kincaid, *Adventures*, pp. 86-7; Wheeler, *Letters*, pp. 90-1; Dyneley, *Letters*, pp. 37-8; Grattan, *Adventures*, vol. II, pp. 82-5, 89-91; Green, *Vicissitudes*, pp. 105-7; Gomm, *Letters and Journals*, pp. 282-3; Aitchison, *Letters*, p. 188.
70. G. Hennell, *A Gentleman Volunteer: The Letters of George Hennell from the Peninsular War, 1812-13*, ed. M. Glover (London, 1979) pp. 38, 44-8; Leach, *Rough Sketches*, pp. 284-5; Simmons, *Journals and Correspondence*, p. 249; Donaldson, *Recollections*, pp. 156-60; Grattan, *Adventures*, vol. II, pp. 113-23; Boutflower, *Journal*, pp. 159-61.
71. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 11 September 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
72. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 30 August 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3; cf. also DC, vol. XV, pp. 239-40.
73. H. Hough, *The Journal of Second Lieutenant Henry Hough, Royal Artillery, 1812-13*, ed. J. Leslie (London, 1916) p. 22.
74. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 27 May 1812, US. WP. 12/1/5.
75. Carvajal to Castaños, 31 May 1812, Servicio Histórico Militar, Archivo de la Guerra de la Independencia (hereafter SHM. AGI.) 32/49/23.
76. E.g. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 2 March 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3.
77. E.g. Penne Villemur to Wellington, 3 May 1812, US. WP. 1/345.
78. Palacio to Wellington, 1 August 1812, US. WP. 1/348; Abisbal to Wellington, 6 August 1812, US. WP. 1/348; Bassecourt to Wellington, 15 August 1812, US. WP. 1/348; O'Donnell to Wellington, 17 August 1812, US. WP. 1/348; Monsalud to Wellington, 18 August

- 1812, US. WP. 1/349; Baras to Wellington, 19 August 1812, US. WP. 1/348; Durán to Wellington, 22 August 1812, US. WP. 1/349.
79. Sydenham to H. Wellesley, 28 September 1812, US. WP. 1/361.
 80. Long, *Correspondence*, pp. 198–9, 204–5; Aitchison, *Letters*, p. 162.
 81. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 30 March 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3.
 82. Wellington to Castlereagh, 27 April 1812, PRO. FO. 72/133, pp. 163–4.
 83. Toreno, *Historia*, pp. 428–9; Infantado to Vega, 20 September 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, p. 109.
 84. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 16 September 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3.
 85. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 1 October 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 105–7.
 86. Real Orden, 22 September 1812, cit. *La Abeja Española*, 8 November 1812, pp. 70–2, HMM. AH6–5 (1250).
 87. *El impugnador impugnado: respuesta al papel titulado 'Vallesteros'* (Cádiz, 1812), p. 4.
 88. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 2 March and 13 April 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3.
 89. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 10 and 30 March 1812, US. WP. 12/1/5.
 90. Wellington to Liverpool, 12 March 1812, US. WP. 1/346.
 91. *La Abeja Española*, 11 November 1812, pp. 89–99, HMM. AH6–5 (1250).
 92. E.g. *El Redactor General*, 24 September 1812, p. 1847, HMM. 6/3.
 93. Sydenham to H. Wellesley, 10 October 1812, US. WP. 1/361.
 94. E.g. *El Redactor General*, 11 August 1811, p. 220, HMM. 6/3.
 95. *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español*, 23 March 1813, HMM. AH1–4(121).
 96. M. Alonso Baquer, *El ejército en la sociedad española* (Madrid, 1971) p. 64.
 97. Toreno, *Historia*, pp. 425–6.
 98. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 28 October 1811, PRO. FO. 72/114, pp. 90–2.
 99. Princess of Brazil to Wellington, 6 September 1812, US. WP. 1/376.
 100. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 10 September 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 7–10.
 101. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 29 August 1812, PRO. FO. 72/131, pp. 297–303.
 102. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 17 September 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 46–50.
 103. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 26 September and 1 October 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 83–4, 105–7.
 104. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 17 September 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 46–50; H. Wellesley to Wellington, 25 September 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3.
 105. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 29 September 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 106. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 3 May 1812, US. WP. 1/347; cf. also Wellington to Liverpool, 1 October 1811, PRO. WO. 1/251, pp. 2–4.
 107. Wellington to Liverpool, 6 May 1812, US. WP. 1/347.
 108. Wellington to Bathurst, 5 October 1812, US. WP. 1/351.

3 PROTEST AND RETREAT, SEPTEMBER – NOVEMBER 1812

1. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 22 November 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
2. H. Wellesley to Pezuela, 26 September 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 89–92.
3. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 20 October 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 148–9; H. Wellesley to Labrador, 21 October 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 215–9.
4. Labrador to H. Wellesley, 1 November 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 221–5.
5. H. Wellesley to Labrador, 3 November 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, 227–30; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 6 November 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 211–13.
6. Labrador to H. Wellesley, 9 November 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 271–3.
7. Circular, 11 October 1812, cit. *La Abeja Española*, 10 November 1812, p. 83, HMM. AH6–5(1250).
8. *El Patriota*, no. 1, pp. 4–5, HMM. AH. 1–5(158).
9. P. Girón, *Recuerdos de la vida de Don Pedro Agustín Girón*, ed. F. Suárez and A. Berazluce (Pamplona, 1978) vol. I, p. 71.
10. Wellington to Ballesteros, 16 February 1811, US. WP. 12/1/3.
11. Ballesteros to Wellington, 25 February 1811, US. WP. 12/1/3.
12. Schepeler, *Histoire*, vol. III, pp. 282–3.
13. *Ibid*, p. 288.
14. *Ibid*, p. 162.
15. A. Alcalá Galiano, *Memorias* (Madrid, 1886) vol. I, pp. 321–2; *Diario de la Tarde*, 29 August 1811, SHM. CDF. vol. CLVI; *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios que por la sagrada causa de nuestra independencia nacional lleva hecho hasta ahora la ilustre ciudad de Cádiz* (Cádiz, 1811) p. 8, SHM. CDF. vol. DCCLX.
16. E.g. Wellington to Liverpool, 6 May 1812, US. WP. 1/347.
17. E.g. Ballesteros to Corregidor of Algeciras, 5 November 1811, cit. *Gazeta de la Junta Superior de la Mancha*, 30 November 1811, p. 375, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXV; Ballesteros to Wimpffen, 18 February 1812, cit. *Diario Extraordinario de la Tarde*, 15 March 1812, SHM. CDF. vol. CLIX.
18. Cf. Skerret to Cooke, 5 November 1811, PRO. FO. 1/252, p. 540; Wellington to H. Wellesley, 29 February 1812, US. WP. 12/1/5.
19. *Diario de la Tarde*, 23 December 1811, SHM. CDF. vol. CLVII.
20. *Ibid*, 23 February 1812, pp. 246–7, SHM. CDF. vol. CLVIII; *ibid*, 12 April 1812, p. 444, SHM. CDF. vol. CLIX; cf. also *El Conciso*, 26 May 1812, pp. 1–6, HMM. AH2–5(348); *El Redactor General*, 20 June 1812, p. 1459, HMM. 6/3.
21. Swabey, *Diary*, p. 63.
22. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 2 July 1812, US. WP. 1/356.
23. E.g. *Canción en elogio del Excelentísimo Señor Don Francisco Ballesteros* (Jérez, 1812) SHM. CDF. vol. CCLVI, pp. 101–2; 'Décimas al Excelentísimo Señor Don Francisco Xavier de Ballesteros, restaurador

- de los cuatro reinos de Andalucía', *Diario de la Tarde*, 27 September 1812, pp. 123-4, SHM. CDF. vol. CLXI.
24. *Manifiesto de la regencia de la España sobre cesación en el mando del Cuarto Ejército y Capitanía General de las Andalucías del Excelentísimo Señor Don Francisco Ballesteros* (Cádiz, 1812) pp. 14-20 (hereafter *Manifiesto de la Regencia*); *El Redactor General*, 21 October 1812, p. 1968, HMM. 6/3; *ibid.*, 12 November 1812, p. 2062; Alcalá Galiano, *Memorias*, vol. I, p. 322.
 25. Ballesteros to Carvajal, 24 October 1812, SHM. CDF. vol. DCCCXCI, p. 162.
 26. *La Abeja Española*, 10 November 1812, pp. 85-6, HMM. AH6-5(1250); *El Fanal*, 26 November 1812, pp. 4-7, SHM. CDF. vol. CXLVI; Toreno, *Historia*, pp. 429-30.
 27. Ballesteros to Carvajal, 30 October 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3; representations of General Ballesteros, 10, 19, and 25 November, and 10 December 1812, SHM. CDF. vols. CXXXII, CXLII.
 28. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 2 and 12 November 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3.
 29. *Manifiesto que hace un andaluz exponiendo reflexiones acerca del oficio que dirigió el General Ballesteros a S.A.S. la Regencia del Reino con fecha del 24 de octubre desde Granada, y por mano del Exmo. Sr. Ministro de la Guerra, oponiéndose al nombramiento de Generalísimo de las tropas españolas hecho por S.M. las Cortes a favor del Lord Wellington* (Cádiz, 1812).
 30. *Un militar español, tan amante como el primero del bien de su patria y celoso del honor de su profesión, al considerar la conducta del Teniente General Don Francisco Ballesteros en esta última época no ha podido prescindir de manifestar al público los hechos de que está cerciorado, y las siguientes reflexiones a que da margen el reciente que ha motivado su separación del mando del Cuarto Ejército* (Cádiz, 1812).
 31. *La Abeja Española*, 8-13 November 1812, pp. 65-83, 89-94, 97-101, 105-7, 113-17, HMM. AH6-5(1250).
 32. *El Redactor General* 1 November 1812, p. 2014, HMM. 6/3; *Diario Redactor de Sevilla*, 6 and 8 November 1812, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXII; *Gazeta del la Junta Superior de la Mancha*, 14 November 1812, pp. 355-6, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXVII; *El Censor General*, 17 November 1812, p. 10, SHM. CDF. vol. DCCLX; *El Patriota*, 28 November 1812, pp. 105-6, HMM. AH1-5(158); *El Español*, 30 November 1812, HMM. AH4-2(714).
 33. *Copia original de la representación hecha a la Regencia del Reino por un vecino de la ciudad de Granada, pidiendo le vuelvan a su antiguo y debido estado al Excelentísimo Señor Don Francisco Vallesteros, General en Jefe del Cuarto Ejército y Capitán General de los cuatro reinos de Andalucía* (Cádiz, 1812).
 34. *Vallesteros* (Cádiz, 1812).
 35. *Respuesta al papel intitulado 'Vallesteros'* (Cádiz, 1812).
 36. *Aviso al sencillo pero honradísimo pueblo español* (Cádiz, 1812).
 37. *El impugnador impugnado; Manifiesto de la Regencia*.
 38. *Defensa de la defensa del valiente General Vallesteros* (Cádiz, 1812).
 39. *Representación que ocho oficiales de la tercera división del Tercer Ejército*

- hacen al agosto Congreso Nacional* (Córdoba, 1813); *Redactor General*, 17 December 1812, p. 2208, HMM. 6/3; *Diario Redactor de Sevilla*, 22 December 1812, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXVII.
40. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 1 January 1813, PRO. FO. 72/143, pp. 17-18.
 41. Borrás to Wellington, 8 November 1812, US. WP. 1/353; Mendizábal to Wellington, 1 December 1812, US. WP. 1/389; El Empecinado to Wellington, 29 December 1812, US. WP. 1/354.
 42. Wellington to Castaños, 24 February 1812, US. WP. 1/346; Wellington to H. Wellesley, 29 January and 25 February 1812, US. WP. 12/1/5.
 43. Wellington to Roche, 5 August 1812, US. WP. 1/347.
 44. Wellington to Liverpool, 18 June 1812, US. WP. 12/1/5.
 45. Wellington to Bathurst, 18 August 1812, US. WP. 1/347.
 46. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 16 August 1812, US. WP. 1/347.
 47. Douglas to Wellington, 18 August 1812, US. WP. 1/349; Castaños to Wellington, 19 August 1812, US. WP. 1/349.
 48. Wellington to Bathurst, 25 August 1812, US. WP. 1/347.
 49. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 18 August 1812, US. WP. 1/347.
 50. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 23 August 1812, US. WP. 1/347.
 51. Hennell, *Letters*, p. 51.
 52. Sydenham to H. Wellesley, 12 September 1812, US. WP. 1/361.
 53. Ballesteros to Wellington, 11 August 1812, US. WP. 1/348.
 54. Cf. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 9 September 1812, US. WP. 1/351; Wellington to Mackenzie, 13 October 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 55. E.g. Wellington to Bathurst, 4 October 1812, US. WP. 1/351; Wellington to Hill, 2 October 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 56. Wellington to Liverpool, 7 September 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 57. Wellington to Bathurst, 21 September 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 58. Cf. O'Donnell to Wellington, 27 August 1812, US. WP. 1/349; Wellington to H. Wellesley, 29 September 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 59. Wellington to Dumouriez, 13 September 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 60. Swabey, *Diary*, p. 157; cf. also Leach, *Rough Sketches*, pp. 287-8.
 61. Wellington to Cooke, 25 November 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 62. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 1 November 1812, US. WP. 1/351; Wellington to Liverpool, 23 November 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 63. Wellington to Cooke, 25 November 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 64. Popham to Wellington, 11 and 12 November 1812, US. WP. 1/353.
 65. Wellington to Murray, 11 September 1812, US. WP. 1/351; Wellington to Bathurst, 12 September 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 66. Sydenham to H. Wellesley, 12 September 1812, US. WP. 1/361.
 67. Wellington to Stuart, 31 October 1812, US. WP. 1/351; Wellington to H. Wellesley, 1 November 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 68. Wellington to Castaños, 27 November 1812, US. WP. 1/381.
 69. Wellington to Bathurst, 17 November 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 70. Wellington to Beresford, 10 December 1812, US. WP. 1/355.
 71. Wellington to Liverpool, 23 November 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 72. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 20 November 1812, US. WP. 12/2/3; H.

- Wellesley to Castlereagh, 19 November 1812, PRO. FO. 72/132, pp. 278–83.
73. E.g. *El Fanal*, 26 November 1812, pp. 4–7, SHM. CDF. vol. CXLVI.
 74. Guillén to Wellington, 21 December 1812, US. WP. 1/356; Sydenham to H. Wellesley, 5 August 1812, US. WP. 1/356.
 75. Bragge, *Letters*, p. 82.
 76. Wheeler, *Letters*, pp. 105–6.
 77. Dyneley, *Letters*, p. 61.
 78. Wellington to Bathurst, 19 November 1812, US. WP. 1/351.
 79. Browne, *Journal*, pp. 195–6.
 80. Napier to Alten, 1 December 1812, US. WP. 1/354; Carroll to Wellington, 9 December 1812, US. WP. 1/354.
 81. Wellington to Beresford, 10 December 1812, US. WP. 1/355.

4 AN INTERLUDE AT CÁDIZ

1. Wellington to Liverpool, 23 November 1812, US. WP.1/351.
2. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 1 December 1812, US. WP.1/382.
3. Wellington to Castlereagh, 25 August 1809, US. WP.1/275; cf. also Wellington to Arbuthnot, 6 October 1809, US. WP.1/284.
4. Wellington to Bathurst, 18 August 1812, US. WP.1/347.
5. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 12 September 1812, US. WP.12/1/6.
6. Wellington to Bentinck, 20 July 1813, US. WP.1/373.
7. Wellington to Bathurst, 27 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
8. Wellington to Carvajal, 4 December 1812, US. WP.1/355.
9. Mejía to Wellington, 7 December 1812, US. WP.1/354; Wellington to Carvajal, 11 December 1812, US. WP.1/363.
10. Memorandum, 26 January 1814, US. WP.1/444.
11. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 14 May 1812, US. WP.12/1/5.
12. Real Orden, 16 December 1810, cit. *Gazeta de la Regencia de España e Indias*, 26 January 1811, HMM. AH16–2(2777). The military districts and their respective armies were as follows: Catalonia – First Army; Aragón-Valencia – Second Army; Murcia – Third Army; Cádiz-Isla de León – Fourth Army; Extremadura – Fifth Army; Galicia-Asturias – Sixth Army.
13. Villariego to Regency, 25 January 1813, US. WP.1/364; Wellington to Villariego, 10 February 1813, US. WP.1/365.
14. *La Abeja Española*, 13 and 15 December 1812, pp. 101–4, 117–20, HMM. AH6–5(1250); *Diario Redactor de Sevilla*, 16 December 1812, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXII.
15. Memorandum on the organisation of the Spanish army, October 1812, US. WP.1/382; Real Orden, 4 December 1812, cit. *El Redactor General*, 9 December 1812, p. 2178, HMM. 6/3.
16. Carvajal to Wellington, 24 December 1812, US. WP.1/363.
17. Wellington to Carvajal, 25 December 1812, US. WP.1/355.
18. Wellington to Carvajal, 27 December 1812, US. WP.1/355.
19. Wellington to Bathurst, 27 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
20. Carvajal to Wellington, 1 January 1813, US. WP.1/363.

21. Wellington to Carvajal, 2 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
22. *Diario de Gobierno de Sevilla*, 5 January 1813, pp. 465–6, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXIX; *Diario Redactor de Sevilla*, 6 January 1813, SHM. CDF. vol. CXLII; *La Abeja Española*, 1 January 1813; pp. 6–11, HMM. AH6–5(1251).
23. *La Abeja Española*, 27 December 1812, pp. 216–7, HMM. AH6–5(1250).
24. *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español*, 25 December 1812, p. 226, HMM. AH1–4(120).
25. Torenó, *Historia*, p. 433; Alcalá Galiano, *Memorias*, vol. I, p. 328; P. de Azárate, *Wellington y España* (Madrid, 1961) pp. 123–4.
26. Wellington to Bathurst, 27 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
27. Wellington to Stuart, 2 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
28. J. Frere to Wellesley, 26 December 1809, BM. Add. Mss. 37288, pp. 424–9; Earl of Stanhope, *Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington* (London, 1889) p. 10.
29. Wellington to R. Wellesley, 15 September 1809, US. WP.1/277.
30. Wellington to Liverpool, 26 January 1811, PRO. WO.1/248, pp. 103–4.
31. Wellington to Mendizábal, 24 January 1811, US. WP.12/1/3.
32. *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español*, 18 December 1812, pp. 189–98, HMM. AH1–4(120).
33. B. Díaz, *El ejército español destruido por las leyes, o manifestación de los efectos que debe producir el decreto que separa de los gobiernos militares la intervención en lo político y de las capitánías generales la presidencia de las audiencias, dejando al ejército aislado a sus empleos interiores* (Alicante, 1813).
34. *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español*, 29 December 1812, pp. 237–49, HMM. AH1–4(120).
35. *Suplemento al Tribuno del Pueblo Español*, 1 January 1813, HMM. AH1–4(120).
36. Real Orden, 6 January 1813, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 62–5.
37. Carvajal to Wellington, 8 January 1813, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 71–2.
38. Wellington to Bathurst, 27 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
39. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 20 January 1813, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 26–30.
40. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 4 February 1813, US. WP.1/366.
41. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 10 February 1813, US. WP.1/365.
42. *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español*, 29 December 1812, pp. 250–5, HMM. AH1–4(120).
43. *Ibid.*, 15 and 19 January 1813, pp. 325–37, 345–60.
44. *Ibid.*, 19 January 1813, p. 354.
45. *Ibid.*, 22 January 1813, pp. 361–74.
46. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 4 February 1813, US. WP.1/366.
47. *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español*, 12 January 1813, pp. 319–22, HMM. AH1–4(120).
48. *Diario Mercantil de Cádiz*, cit. *Diario Redactor de Sevilla*, 29 January 1813, SHM. CDF. vol. CXLII.
49. *Ibid.*

50. Tweeddale to Erskine, 30 January 1813, US. WP.1/364.
51. Wellington to Graham, 31 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.

5 FROM CÁDIZ TO VITORIA, JANUARY-JUNE 1813

1. Proclamation of 1 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
2. Wellington to Walker, 23 October 1801, US. WP.1/98.
3. Wellington to Bathurst, 27 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
4. Returns of Merino, 10 September 1812, US. WP.1/350.
5. *Estados de la organización y fuerza de los ejércitos españoles beligerantes en la península durante la guerra de España contra Napoleón Bonaparte* (Barcelona, 1822) pp. 162–74 (hereafter *Estados*); Zehnpenning to Wellington, 10 December 1812, US. WP.1/354; return of Fourth Army, January 1813, US. WP.1/382.
6. Whittingham to H. Wellesley, 11 January 1813, US. WP.1/364.
7. Bragge, *Letters*, p. 75.
8. Undated return of stores dispatched to the Peninsula for the use of the Spanish army, US. WP.1/359.
9. Aitchison, *Letters*, p. 200; Wellington to Bathurst, 18 October 1812, US. WP.1/351.
10. S. Whittingham, *A Memoir of the Services of Lieutenant General Sir Samuel Ford Whittingham*, ed. F. Whittingham (London, 1868) p. 242.
11. 'Informe del Inspector General de Caballería sobre el estado actual de los cuerpos de esta arma y su mas conveniente arreglo dado a la Regencia del Reino en virtud de su orden y remitido a S.A. por el conduction del Ministro de la Guerra como Primer Jefe del Estado Mayor General en doce de enero de 1813' (MS), US. WP.1/364; 'Exposición que hace el Mariscal de Campo D. Manuel Freyre al Exmo. Sr. Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo sobre puntos concernientes a la caballería española' (MS), 26 January 1813, US. WP.1/364.
12. Wellington to Castaños, 12 February 1813, US. WP.1/365.
13. Wellington to Carvajal, 1 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
14. *Diario de Gobierno de Sevilla*, 3 May 1813, SHM. CDF. vol. CXLI, pp. 931–2.
15. Cf. Wellington to Castaños, 2 March 1813, US. WP.1/363; Castaños to Wellington, 11 March 1813, US. WP.1/367.
16. Wellington to Abisbal, 27 February 1813, US. WP.1/365; Wellington to Elió, 1 March 1813, US. WP.1/365; Wellington to Whittingham, 1 March 1813, US. WP.1/365; Wellington to Stuart, 16 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
17. Jefe de Estado Mayor, Ejército de Reserva de Andalucía, to Wimpffen, 10 March 1813, US. WP.1/367.
18. Penne Villemur to Wellington, 28 February 1813, US. WP.1/366; Castaños to Wellington, 4 March 1813, US. WP.1/367.
19. Whittingham, *Memoir*, pp. 225–6, 241.
20. Real Orden, 8 May 1812, cit. *El Redactor General*, 18 May 1812, HMM. 6/3.

21. Wellington to Abisbal, 27 February 1813, US. WP.1/365.
22. Castaños to Wellington, 12 March 1813, US. WP.1/382.
23. Wellington to Castaños, 19 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
24. Wellington to Carvajal, 19 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
25. Wellington to Bentinck, 9 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
26. Wellington to Abisbal, 28 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
27. Laborda to Gongora, 9 March 1813, US. WP.1/367; cf. also Abisbal to Wellington, 23 March 1813, US. WP.1/367.
28. Report of anonymous Spanish 'correspondent', 7 August 1812, US. WP.1/359.
29. Monsalud to Wellington, 2 August 1812, US. WP.1/361.
30. Letter of anonymous Spanish 'correspondent', 12 January 1813, US. WP.1/382; cf. also Guillén to Wellington, 29 January, 14 February 1813, US. WP.1/382; Bourke to Wellington, 8 April 1813, US. WP.1/368.
31. Guillén to Wellington, 15 May 1813, US. WP.1/382; Martón to Espoz y Mina, 1 July 1813, US. WP.1/371; Espinosa to Espoz y Mina, 2 July 1813, US. WP.1/372; cf. also note of R. Allen, 17 June 1813, PRO. FO.72/147, p. 230.
32. Sydenham to H. Wellesley, 28 September 1812, US. WP.1/361.
33. Guillén to Wellington, 9 March 1813, US. WP.1/382.
34. Wellington to O'Donoghue, 30 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
35. E.g. Castaños to Wellington, 29 March 1813, US. WP.1/367; Abisbal to Wellington, 30 January, 23 March 1813, US. WP.1/364, 367.
36. Whittingham to Murray, 24 April 1813, US. WP.1/369.
37. Wellington to Bentinck, 9 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
38. 'Observations on General Whittingham's memorandum of the 24th May 1813 in regard to the draft of supplies to the country' (MS), US. WP.1/370.
39. E.g. Sherer, *Recollections*, p. 255.
40. E.g. Abisbal to Wellington, 30 January 1813, US. WP.1/364; Wellington to Lacy, 27 November 1813, US. WP.1/381; *Atalaya de la Mancha en Madrid*, 25 July 1813, pp. 27–8, SHM. CDF. vol. CCLXII; Hennell, *Letters*, p. 51; Patterson, *Adventures*, p. 216.
41. E.g. Whittingham, *Memoir*, pp. 226–7; Hennell, *Letters*, pp. 117–18; Boutflower, *Journal*, p. 166; Long, *Correspondence*, pp. 204–5; Aitchison, *Letters*, p. 162.
42. E.g. Zehnpenning to Wellington, 30 November 1812, US. WP.1/353; Copóns to Bentinck, 8 August 1813, US. WP.1/374.
43. C. Esdaile, *The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War* (Manchester, 1988) p. 141; C. Esdaile, 'Heroes or villains? The Spanish guerrillas in the Peninsular War', *History Today*, vol. XXXVIII, April 1988, pp. 29–35.
44. E.g. Schepeler, *Histoire*, vol. III, pp. 517–18.
45. Cf. Cocks, *Letters and Diaries*, p. 125; Sydenham to Wellington, 10 October 1812, US. WP.1/361; R. Southey, *History of the Peninsular War* (London, 1823–32) vol. II, p. 336.
46. E.g. Sydenham to H. Wellesley, 5 August 1812, US. WP.1/356; Bragge, *Letters*, p. 57.

47. E.g. *Memorial Militar y Político del Ejército de la Izquierda*, 12 June 1810, pp. 169–73, HMM. AH3–3(536).
48. *El Conciso*, 15 January 1813, pp. 1–2, HMM. AH2–5(350).
49. E.g. Beresford to Wellington, 16 August 1810, US. WP.1/313; *El Redactor General*, 9 April 1812, p. 1176, HMM. 6/3.
50. E.g. 'Manifiesto de los leales castellanos', 9 November 1812, US. WP.1/364; Guillén to Wellington, 27 February 1813, US. WP.1/382; Espoz y Mina to Castaños, 12 March 1813, US. WP.1/368; Escobeda to Wellington, 12 March 1813, US. WP.1/364; *El Redactor General*, 2 April 1813, p. 2645, HMM. 6/3; *El Conciso*, 1 April 1813, pp. 3–5, HMM. AH2–5(351); *Diario de Gobierno de Sevilla*, 22 March 1813, pp. 769–70, SHM. CDF. vol. CXL; *Diario Crítico y Erudito de Granada*, 10 April 1813, pp. 37–8, HMM. AH5–5(1046).
51. Schaumann, *Diary*, p. 325; Mejía to Wellington, 7 December 1812, US. WP.1/354; Escobeda to Wellington, 8 March 1813, US. WP.1/367.
52. Wellington to Hill, 1 December 1812, US. WP.1/355; Beresford to Wellington, 4 February 1813, US. WP.1/366.
53. *Diario de Gobierno de Sevilla*, 11 February 1813, p. 614, SHM. CDF. vol. CXXXIX; W. Henry, *Surgeon Henry's Trifles: Events of a Military Life*, ed. P. Hayward (London, 1970) p. 59; *The Military Exploits of Don Juan Martín Díez, the Empecinado* (London, 1823) pp. 135–6; Leith Hay to Hill, 24 January 1813, US. WP.1/364; Castaños to Wellington, 30 August 1812, US. WP.1/349; Junta Superior de Burgos to Wellington, 9 June 1813, US. WP.1/371.
54. Abisbal to Wellington, 30 January, 11 and 23 March 1813, US. WP.1/367; Wellington to Abisbal, 28 March 1813, US. WP.1/365; Wellington to Carvajal, 24 April 1813, US. WP.1/370.
55. Castaños to Wellington, 10 and 15 February 1813, US. WP.1/366; Palacio to Castaños, 10 February 1813, US. WP.1/366; Castaños to Palacio, 11 February 1813, US. WP.1/366; Castaños to Regency, 10 February 1813, US. WP.1/366.
56. Report of O'Donoju to Regency, 15 September 1813, SHM. CDF. vol. CCCXLVIII, pp. 158–68; Canga Argüelles, *Hacienda Pública*, p. 26.
57. T. González Carvajal, *Del oficio y cargos del Intendente del Ejército en campaña* (Valencia, 1810) pp. 161–2.
58. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 16 February 1813, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 210–19; Wellington to H. Wellesley, 4 May 1813, US. WP.1/370.
59. Toreno, *Historia*, pp. 451–2; García de León y Pizarro, *Memorias*, vol. I, pp. 147–8.
60. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 16 February 1813, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 210–19.
61. Labrador to H. Wellesley, 27 November 1812, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 11–15.
62. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 1 January 1813, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 1–3.
63. Labrador to H. Wellesley, 29 May 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 223–30.
64. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 7 June 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp.

- 219–22; Woodford to Bathurst, 7 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/155, pp. 30–34; Goulburn to Hamilton, 30 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/153, pp. 175–9.
65. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 28 January 1813, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 169–71; *El Conciso*, 27 January 1813, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 177–8.
66. H. Wellesley to Labrador, 24 March 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 38–40.
67. H. Wellesley to Labrador, 25 April 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 108–11; Labrador to H. Wellesley, 4 May 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 136–8.
68. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 10 August 1810, US. WP.12/1/1.
69. Wellington to Bathurst, 21 April 1813, US. WP.1/370.
70. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 25 May 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 196–200.
71. Castlereagh to H. Wellesley, 3 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/142, pp. 86–90.
72. Bathurst to Wellington, 31 March, 5 May 1813, US. WP.1/367, 369; Castlereagh to H. Wellesley, 7 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/142, pp. 104–6.
73. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 31 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
74. Wellington to Bathurst, 21 April 1813, US. WP.1/370.
75. *Diario de la Tarde*, 26 December 1812, pp. 111–16, SHM. CDF. vol. CLXIII.
76. *Los Ingleses en España*, no. 1, pp. 1–8, HMM. AH4–4(759).
77. *Diario de Gobierno de Sevilla*, 16 and 19 June 1813, pp. 1107–8, 1121–4, SHM. CDF. vol. CXLII.
78. E.g. Galluzo to Wellington, 3 February 1813, US. WP.1/366; Junta Superior de Aragón to Wellington, 4 April 1813, US. WP.1/368; Junta Superior de Burgos to Wellington, 18 April 1813, US. WP.1/368.
79. E.g. *Sevilla o romulea al Exmo. Sr. Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo* (Seville, 1813) SHM. CDF. vol. CCLVI, pp. 68–72; Wellington, *caudillo de tres naciones* (Oviedo, 1813) SHM. CDF. vol. CCLVI, pp. 78–88; *Los Ingleses en España*, no. 2, pp. 9–16, HMM. AH.4–4(759).
80. Vega to Wellington, 28 April 1813, US. WP.1/368; Gómez to Liverpool, 23 January and 5 May 1813, PRO. FO.72/152, pp. 45–7; Guillén to Wellington, 28 March 1813, US. WP.1/382.
81. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8 August 1812, PRO. FO.72/131, pp. 194–9.
82. E.g. Guillén to Wellington, 30 March, 3 May 1813, US. WP.1/382; proclamation of General Maransin, May 1813, US. WP.1/369.
83. *Diario de la Tarde*, 3 December 1812, pp. 17–22, SHM. CDF. vol. CLXIII.
84. Allen to Hamilton, 17 February 1813, PRO. FO.72/147, pp. 169–70.
85. E.g. Sánchez and Hernández to Wellington, 21 January 1813, US. WP.1/382; Hill to Wellington, 7 February 1813, US. WP.1/366; Carvajal to Wellington, 1 March 1813, US. WP.1/367.
86. *El Conciso*, 23 March 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 69–72.
87. Castlereagh to H. Wellesley, 3 March 1813, PRO. FO.72/142, pp.

- 28-9; Bathurst to Wellington, 6 March 1813, US. WP.1/367; Mackenzie to Hamilton, 2 April 1813, PRO. FO.72/151, pp. 141-2.
88. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 5 March 1813, US. WP.1/367; Wellington to Bathurst, 10 March 1813, US. WP.1/365; *El Redactor General*, 25 February 1813, p. 2500, HMM. 6/3.
89. Labrador to H. Wellesley, 17 March 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 3-4; Wellington to H. Wellesley, 2 April 1813, US. WP.1/370.
90. E.g. *El Tío Tremenda, o los Críticos del Malecón*, nos 18 and 31, pp. 73-6, 129-32, SHM. CDF. vol. CCCXL; Nuño y Gónzalo, *patriotas españoles, conferencian sobre la suerte del General Ballesteros, resultado de la batalla de los Arapiles, y hacen observaciones propias de los hombres libres* (Cádiz, 1813); P. Muñoz, *Vallesteros: cartas de Anselmo Torrejón a su amigo Fabricio Nuñez* (Málaga, 1813); *Ballesteros: monólogo* (Seville, 1813).
91. *Los Amigos de Ballesteros* (Isla de León, 1813), Biblioteca del Senado (hereafter BS.) 431437.
92. J. Romero y Alpuente, *Wellington y España y Ballesteros en Ceuta: discurso dirigido desde Alicante a S.M. las Cortes generales y extraordinarias de España por su electo diputado suplente por la provincia de Aragón, D. Juan Romero y Alpuente* (Cádiz, 1813).
93. Cf. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8 May 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 158-60.
94. *El Español Libre*, 4 May 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 162-84.
95. E.g. Abisbal to Wellington, 30 January 1813, US. WP.1/364; Castaños to Wellington, 10 February 1813, US. WP.1/366.
96. Carvajal to Wellington, 5 March 1813, US. WP.1/367.
97. Wellington to Carvajal, 24 February and 5 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
98. Carvajal to Wellington, 15 February 1813, US. WP.1/366; *El Conciso*, 22 February 1813, p. 6, HMM. AH2-5(349); *ibid.*, 28 February 1813, pp. 3-4.
99. Toreno, *Historia*, pp. 450-1; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 7 March 1813, PRO. FO.72/143, pp. 237-8; H. Wellesley to Wellington, 8 March 1813, US. WP.12/2/3.
100. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 15 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
101. Wellington to Infantado, 28 March, 28 April 1813, US. WP.1/365, 370.
102. E.g. *El Conciso*, 21 March 1813, p. 5, HMM. AH2-5(350).
103. Carvajal to Valdés, 16 April 1813, AHN. Estado 2959/1.
104. Wellington to Cooke, 6 April 1813, US. WP.1/370; Wellington to H. Wellesley, 6 April 1813, US. WP.1/370.
105. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 16 April 1813, US. WP.1/370.
106. Abisbal to Wellington, 23 March 1813, US. WP.1/370; Doyle to H. Wellesley, 22 April 1813, US. WP.1/368.
107. Wellington to Carvajal, 7, 19 and 24 February, 5, 7, 17 and 24 March, 11 and 24 April 1813, US. WP.1/365, 370.
108. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 19 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
109. Wellington to Vega, 3 April 1813, US. WP.1/370.
110. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 21 October 1810, US. WP.12/1/2.

111. Wellington to Bathurst, 27 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
112. *Ibid.*
113. Wellington to Vega, 29 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
114. *Ibid.*
115. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 5 March 1813, US. WP.1/367; Wellington to Castaños, 22 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
116. Wellington to Bathurst, 21 April 1813, US. WP.1/370.
117. E.g. Wellington to Abisbal, 1 May 1813, US. WP.1/370; Wellington to Bertrán, 15 May 1813, US. WP.1/370.
118. E.g. Espoz y Mina to Labrador, 28 May 1813, AHN. Estado 2959/1.
119. Wellington to Bathurst, 27 January 1813, US. WP.1/365.
120. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 28 March 1813, US. WP.1/365.
121. C. Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* (Oxford, 1902-30) vol. VI, p. 300.
122. Wellington to O'Donoghue, 4 June 1813, US. WP.1/370.
123. Graham to Wellington, 4 June 1813, US. WP.1/371; Girón to Wellington, US. WP.1/371; Wellington to Girón, 14 June 1813, US. WP.1/370.
124. E.g. Roche to Wellington, 6 June 1813, US. WP.1/371; Bentinck to Wellington, 30 June 1813, US. WP.1/371.
125. 'Instruction of April 14th for the operations on the east coast', 14 April 1813, US. WP.1/383.
126. Oman, *Peninsular War*, vol. VI, p. 753.
127. Bragge, *Letters*, p. 109; cf. also Aitchison, *Letters*, pp. 255-6.
128. Oman, *Peninsular War*, vol. VI, pp. 400-1, 405-6, 415-16, 419, 427, 446; J. Sarramon, *La bataille de Vitoria: la fin de l'aventure napoléonienne en Espagne* (Paris, 1985) pp. 454-6, 475, 508-10.

6 CRISIS IN THE PYRENEES, JULY-DECEMBER 1813

1. Wellington to Castaños, 2 March 1813, US. WP.1/363.
2. *Estados*, pp. 191-2.
3. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 16 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
4. Wellington to Bentinck, 9 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
5. O'Donoghue to Wellington, 30 August 1813, US. WP.1/374.
6. Wellington to O'Donoghue, 14 September 1813, US. WP.1/377.
7. Blakeney, *Services, Adventures and Experiences*, pp. 297-8; Lawrence, *Autobiography*, p. 147; Larpent, *Private Journal*, pp. 34-5.
8. Swabey, *Diary*, p. 209; Graham to Wellington, 7 and 8 August 1813, US. WP.1/374.
9. Graham to Wellington, 6 July 1813, US. WP.1/372.
10. Lawrence, *Autobiography*, p. 147; Hennel, *Letters*, p. 136.
11. Schepeler, *Histoire*, vol. III, p. 338; Wellington to Popham, 2 October 1812, US. WP.1/351; Popham to Wellington, 12 November 1812, US. WP.1/353.
12. Freyre to Wellington, 2 September 1813, US. WP.1/376; Stanhope, *Conversations with the Duke of Wellington*, pp. 22, 106-7; Wellington to Bathurst, 2 September 1813, US. WP.1/377; Wellington to H.

- Wellesley, 2 September 1813, US. WP.1/377; Hennell, *Letters*, p. 127; R. Batty, *The Campaign in the Pyrenees and Southern France, 1813-14* (London, 1823) pp. 11-12; Wheeler, *Letters*, p. 129; Browne, *Journal*, p. 236; Steevens, *Reminiscences*, p. 110; Blakeney, *Services, Adventures and Experiences*, 305-6; Vivian, *Memoir*, p. 142.
13. Batty, *Campaign in the Pyrenees*, pp. 25-8; Blakeney, *Services, Adventures and Experiences*, pp. 311-14; for a more hostile view see G. Gleig, *The Subaltern* (London, 1825) p. 100.
 14. Carey to Bentinck, 15 September 1813, US. WP.1/376; Muller to Carey, 15 September 1813, US. WP.1/376.
 15. Stanhope, *Conversations with the Duke of Wellington*, p. 107.
 16. E.g. Zehnpenning to Wellington, 6 April 1813, US. WP.1/368; Roche to Wellington, 7 January 1814, US. WP.1/392.
 17. Zehnpenning to Wellington, 24 February 1813, US. WP.1/399.
 18. *El Duende de los Cafés*, 16 November 1813, pp. 473-4, HMM. A428; Tupper to H. Wellesley, 24 August 1813, US. WP.1/374.
 19. Bentinck to Wellington, 27 August 1813, US. WP.1/374; Clinton to Wellington, 3 October 1813, 20 January and 31 January 1814, US. WP.1/378, 393, 394.
 20. *Diario de la Tarde*, 5 October 1813, pp. 2-3, SHM. CDF. vol. CLXI; *Diario Mercantil de Cádiz*, 10 November 1813, pp. 171-2, HMM. AH4-1(686); Alvear to H. Wellesley, 1 December 1813, US. WP.1/380.
 21. Cit. Whittingham, *Memoir*, p. 226.
 22. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 3 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/145, pp. 1-3.
 23. O'Donoju to Wellington, 1 July, 1813, AHN. Estado 2959-1; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 4 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/145, pp. 5-6.
 24. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 14 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/145, pp. 37-41.
 25. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 25 April 1813, US. WP.1/368; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 23 June 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 261-6.
 26. E.g. *El Conciso*, 9 March 1813, p. 8, HMM. AH2-5(350).
 27. Toreno, *Historia*, p. 453.
 28. *Ibid.*, pp. 453-4; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 25 May 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 216-17.
 29. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 31 May 1813, US. WP.1/369; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 14 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/145, pp. 11-13.
 30. Wellington to Bathurst, 12 July 1813, US. WP.1/373.
 31. O'Donoju to Wellington, 15 June 1813 (x4), US. WP.1/363; H. Wellesley to Wellington, 17 June 1813, US. WP.12/2/3; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 23 June 1813, PRO. FO.72/144, pp. 261-6.
 32. Wellington to Castaños, 28 June 1813, US. WP.1/370.
 33. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 28 June 1813, US. WP.1/370.
 34. Wellington to Castaños, 30 June 1813, US. WP.1/370.
 35. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 2 July 1813, US. WP.1/373.
 36. *Ibid.*
 37. Wellington to O'Donoju, 2 July 1813, US. WP.1/373.
 38. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 14 and 24 July 1813, US. WP.12/2/3; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 14 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/145, pp. 51-3.

39. O'Donoju to Wellington, 19 July 1813, US. WP.1/372.
40. O'Donoju to Wellington, 25 July 1813, US. WP.1/372.
41. H. Wellesley to O'Donoju, 28 July 1813, US. WP.1/382.
42. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 31 July 1813, US. WP.12/2/3.
43. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 24 July, 4 August 1813, US. WP.1/373, 375.
44. Castlereagh to H. Wellesley, 22 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/142, pp. 110-11; Bathurst to Wellington, 22 July 1813, US. WP.1/382.
45. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 6 August 1813, US. WP.1/375; cf. also Wellington to Bathurst, 8 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
46. E.g. *El Tribuno del Pueblo Español*, 6 August 1813, pp. 150-2, HMM. AH.1-4(123); H. Wellesley to Wellington, 16 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
47. H. Wellesley to Cano Manuel, 10 August 1813, PRO. FO.72/145, p. 121; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 19 August 1813, PRO. FO.72/145, pp. 98-102.
48. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 9 August 1813, US. WP.1/383.
49. Wellington to O'Donoju, 7 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
50. Cano Manuel to H. Wellesley, 27 August 1813, PRO. FO.72/145, pp. 196-7.
51. O'Donoju to Wellington, 20 August 1813, US. WP.1/382.
52. Wellington to O'Donoju, 30 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
53. O'Donoju to Wellington, 22 September 1813, US. WP.1/363; Wellington to O'Donoju, 5 October 1813, US. WP.1/383.
54. Cf. Palacio to Wellington, 25 August 1812, US. WP.1/349; Landazuri to Wellington, 18 February 1813, US. WP.1/366.
55. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 21 November 1810, 25 June 1813, US. WP.12/1/2, 370; H. Wellesley to Wellington, 12 June 1813, US. WP.12/2/3.
56. Wellington to Bathurst, 29 June 1813, US. WP.1/370.
57. Wellington to Bathurst, 12 July 1813, US. WP.1/373; Wellington to Liverpool, 24 July 1813, US. WP.1/373; Wellington to H. Wellesley, 24 July 1813, US. WP.1/373.
58. Wellington to Girón, 19 July 1813, US. WP.1/373; Wellington to Castaños, 5 August 1813, US. WP.1/375.
59. Wellington to Bathurst, 12 July 1813, US. WP.1/373.
60. Bathurst to Wellington, 14 July 1813, US. WP.1/372.
61. Bathurst to Wellington, 22 July 1813, US. WP.1/372; Castlereagh to H. Wellesley, 22 July 1813, PRO. FO.72/142, pp. 114-15.
62. Wellington to Bathurst, 8 August 1813, US. WP.1/375-1.
63. Wellington to Archbishop of Santiago, 6 August 1813, US. WP.1/375; Wellington to Infantado, 12 September 1813, US. WP.1/375; Wellington to Ostolaza, 12 September 1813, US. WP.1/377.
64. Bathurst to Wellington, 25 August 1813, US. WP.1/374.
65. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 19 August 1813, PRO. FO.72/145, pp. 136-9.
66. Wellington to Bathurst, 5 September 1813, US. WP.1/377.
67. Bathurst to Wellington, 25 September 1813, US. WP.1/376.

68. E.g. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 28 June 1813, US. WP.1/370.
69. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 26 October 1813, US. WP.1/377.
70. E. G. Schaumann, *Diary*, pp. 396–7, 389; Vivian, *Memoir*, p. 141; Gleig, *The Subaltern*, pp. 56–8, 61–2; J. Harley, *The Veteran, or Forty Years in the British Service, comprising Adventures in Egypt, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland and Prussia* (London, 1838), pp. 83–4, 87–93; Gomm, *Letters and Journals*, pp. 319–20; Hennell, *Letters*, p. 130.
71. Villajustes to Regency, 5 September 1813, PRO. FO.72/146, pp. 139–41.
72. *El Duende de los Cafés*, 27 September 1813, PRO. FO.72/146, pp. 121–2; *ibid*, 4 October 1813, PRO. FO.72/146, pp. 123–4; *El Ciudadano por la Constitución*, 29 September 1813, pp. 724–6, US. WP.1/382.
73. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 11 October 1813, US. WP.1/377.
74. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 5 November 1813, PRO. FO.72/146, pp. 111–20; Toreno, *Historia*, p. 479.
75. *El Redactor General*, 18 September 1813, p. 3377, HMM 6/3.
76. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 16 October 1813, US. WP.1/377.
77. *Diario Mercantil de Cádiz*, no. 389, US. WP.1/389; *Los Ingleses en España*, no. 14, pp. 105–8, HMM. AH4–4(759); *ibid*, no. 15, pp. 109–12.
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80. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 11 November 1813, US. WP.1/379; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 14 November 1813, PRO. FO.72/146, p. 199.
81. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 22 November 1813, US. WP.1/379.
82. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 10 December 1813, US. WP.1/382.
83. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 17 December 1813, PRO. FO.72/146, pp. 225–6.
84. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 30 November 1813, PRO. FO.72/146, pp. 208–11; H. Wellesley to Wellington, 1 December 1813, US. WP.1/380; *Público desengaño sobre el llamado convenio del Lord Wellington, o mas bien sobre las facultades que se le concedieron cuando se le confirió el mando de los ejércitos españoles* (Madrid, 1814).
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86. Gavieta to Wellington, 28 June 1813, US. WP.1/371; Tomkinson, *Diary*, p. 152.
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88. Schaumann, *Diary*, p. 385; Costello, *Adventures*, pp. 220–1.

89. E.g. Hennell, *Letters*, pp. 117–18, 133–9; Bell, *Rough Notes*, pp. 115–16; Batty, *Campaign in the Pyrenees*, p. 35.
90. E.g. Ayuntamiento de Santander to Wellington, 6 August 1813, US. WP.1/382; Iriarte to Freyre, 16 November 1813, US. WP.1/382; Miere to Wellington, 6 January 1814, US. WP.1/391.
91. Wellington to Alava, 19 August, 5 and 14 October 1813, US. WP.1/375, 377, 383; Ayuntamiento de Bilbao to Wellington, 16 October 1813, US. WP.1/378; Wellington to Kennedy, 26 October 1813, US. WP.1/377; Lacy to Bourke, 14 December 1813, US. WP.1/380.
92. E.g. Bell, *Rough Notes*, pp. 62–3.
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94. España to Wellington, 4 August 1813, US. WP.1/375; Freyre to Wellington, 23 August, 30 October 1813, US. WP.1/382; Morillo to Wellington, 12 October 1813, US. WP.1/378; Longa to Wellington, 20 October 1813, US. WP.1/378; Girón to Wellington, 10 and 30 November 1813, US. WP.1/382; Abisbal to Wellington, 7 December 1813, US. WP.1/389.
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96. Wellington to Hope, 31 October 1813, US. WP.1/377; Simmons, *Journals and Correspondence*, pp. 319–20, 325; Leach, *Rough Sketches*, pp. 344–5.
97. Walker to Hill, 7 November 1813, US. WP.1/379; O'Donoju to Freyre, 18 November 1813, US. WP.1/379.
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99. Cf. Wellington to Freyre, 3 November 1813, US. WP.1/381.
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101. Cf. Beresford to Wellington, 25 September 1813, US. WP.1/376; Allen to Collier, 13 October 1813, PRO. FO.72/147, p. 299; Wellington to Bathurst, 1 November, 8 December 1813, US. WP.1/381; Wellington to Collier, 28 December 1813, US. WP.1/381.
102. Wellington to O'Donoju, 5 September, 8 November, 7 December 1813, US. WP.1/377, 381.
103. O'Donoju to Wellington, 23 November 1813, US. WP.1/379.
104. E.g. Swabey, *Diary*, p. 209; Hennell, *Letters*, pp. 138–9.
105. Proclamation of Abisbal, 8 March 1813, cit. *El Conciso*, 27 March 1813, pp. 6–7, HMM.AH2–5(351); proclamation of Abisbal, 16 June 1813, cit. *Diario Redactor de Sevilla*, 29 June 1813, SHM CDF. vol. CXLIV.
106. Wellington to Bathurst, 21 November 1813, BM. Add. Mss. 38255, pp. 55–8.
107. Wellington to Beresford, 28 January 1814, US. WP.1/396.

108. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 24 November 1813, US. WP.1/381.
109. Hope to Wellington, 8 October 1813, US. WP.1/378.
110. Wellington to Wimpffen, 12 November 1813, US. WP.1/381; Henry, *Trifles*, pp. 84–5.
111. Wellington to Girón, 12 November 1812, US. WP.1/381; Wellington to Bathurst, 22 November 1813, US. WP.1/381.
112. Freyre to Wellington, 28 October 1813, US. WP.1/378.
113. Freyre to Wellington, 13 November 1813, US. WP.1/382; Longa to Wellington, 15 November 1813, US. WP.1/382.
114. Wellington to Hope, 8 October 1813, US. WP.1/377.
115. Wellington to Freyre, 14 November 1813, US. WP.1/381.
116. Browne, *Journal*, p. 256.
117. E.g. petition of the inhabitants of Macaye and Louhossoa, US. WP.1/444.
118. Morillo to Wimpffen, 12 December 1813, US. WP.1/380.
119. Churchill to Morillo, 15 December 1813, US. WP.1/380; Wimpffen to Morillo, 16 December 1813, US. WP.1/380; Morillo to Hill, 16 December 1813, US. WP.1/380.
120. Wimpffen to Morillo, 18 December 1813, US. WP.1/380.
121. Morillo to Wellington, 19 and 20 December 1813, US. WP.1/380.
122. Proclamation of Morillo, 1 July 1813, cit. *Atalaya de la Mancha en Madrid*, 31 July 1813, pp. 46–7, SHM. CDF. vol. CCLXII.
123. Morillo to Hill, 18 December 1813, US. WP.1/380.
124. Larpent, *Private Journal*, vol. II, p. 69.
125. Morillo to Freyre, 21 December 1813, US. WP.1/381; Wellington to Hill, 22 December 1813, US. WP.1/381.
126. Wellington to Morillo, 23 December 1813, US. WP.1/381; Wellington to Hill, 22 December 1813, US. WP.1/381.
127. Wellington to Freyre, 24 December 1813, US. WP.1/381.
128. Morillo to Freyre, 30 December 1813, US. WP.1/391.
129. O'Donoju to Wellington, 5 October, 13 December 1813, US. WP.1/376, 379.

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1. Wellington to Bathurst, 27 November, 1813, US. WP.1/381.
2. C. Bartlett, *Castlereagh* (London, 1966), pp. 118–24; J. Derry, *Castlereagh* (London, 1976), pp. 149–54.
3. Bathurst to Wellington, 15 December 1813, US. WP.1/380.
4. Bathurst to Wellington, 10 January 1814, US. WP.1/380.
5. Cf. Beresford to Wellington, 17 January 1814, US. WP.1/393; Wellington to Alava, 9 February 1814, US. WP.1/401.
6. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 19 January 1814, US. WP.1/396.
7. Bragge, *Letters*, p. 120.
8. E.g. Wellington to Freyre, 7 April 1814, US. WP.1/413; report of Lieutenant Blackley, 2 June 1814, US. WP.1/418; Larpent, *Private Journal*, vol. III, pp. 63–4.

9. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 4 December 1813, cit. *CD*, vol. IX, pp. 88–9.
10. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 21 January, 26 February 1814, PRO. FO.72/159, pp. 76–8, 127–30; Larpent, *Private Journal*, vol. II, p. 265.
11. Real Orden, 13 February 1814, US. WP.1/400; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 26 February 1814, PRO. FO.72/159, pp. 127–30.
12. Wellington to Bathurst, 10 January 1814, US. WP.1/395; H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 6 and 11 January 1814, PRO. FO.72/159, pp. 3–9, 17–20.
13. Real Decreto, 2 February 1814, PRO. FO.72/159, pp. 113–14; *Manifiesto de las Cortes generales ordinarias a la nación española*, 19 February 1814, AHN. Estado 3566.
14. Wellington to Clinton, 27 February 1814, US. WP.1/396.
15. L. Suchet, *Memoirs of the War in Spain from 1808 to 1814* (London 1829) vol. II, pp. 373–4.
16. Cf. Wellington to Moreno, 17 and 31 March 1814, US. WP.1/407; Wellington to H. Wellesley, 31 March 1814, US. WP.1/407.
17. Lujando to Wellington, 21 March 1814, PRO. FO.72/159, pp. 211–15.
18. Toreno, *Historia*, p. 515.
19. Abisbal to Wellington, 31 January, 15 April 1814, US. WP.1/394, 409.
20. Wellington to Abisbal, 2 April 1814, US. WP.1/412.
21. E.g. Wellington to España, 9 February 1814, US. WP.1/401; Hope to Wellington, 4 March 1814, US. WP.1/402; Larpent, *Private Journal*, vol. III, pp. 14, 94, 133–4.
22. Freyre to Wellington, 6 March 1814, US. WP.1/402.
23. Wellington to Freyre, 14 April 1814, US. WP.1/413.
24. Wellington to Freyre, 5 March 1814, US. WP.1/406.
25. Abisbal to Wellington, 15 April 1814, US. WP.1/409.
26. Gleig, *The Subaltern*, p. 369.
27. Bell, *Rough Notes*, p. 134; Lawrence, *Autobiography*, pp. 180–1; Costello, *Adventures*, p. 268; Larpent, *Private Journal*, vol. III, pp. 141–2; Kincaid, *Adventures*, pp. 145–6; Lewin, *Life of a Soldier*, vol. II, p. 116; Toreno, *Historia*, pp. 515–16; Oman, *Peninsular War*, vol. VII, pp. 465–95, 560.
28. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 11 and 12 January 1814, PRO. FO.72/159, pp. 11–16, 76–8; H. Wellesley to Wellington, 27 January 1814, US. WP.1/394.
29. Toreno, *Historia*, p. 504.
30. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 25 February 1813, US. WP.1/439; cf. also Gennotte to Metternich, 27 February 1814, BM. Add. Mss. 38256, pp. 253–4.
31. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 14 March 1814, US. WP.1/403.
32. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 26 January 1814, US. WP.1/396.
33. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 31 January 1814, US. WP.1/394.
34. Wellington to Gómez, 3 February 1814, US. WP.1/401; Wellington to Abisbal, 3 February 1814, US. WP.1/401.
35. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 5 February 1814, US. WP.1/401.
36. Wellington to Abisbal, 3 February 1814, US. WP.1/401.

37. Ibid.
38. Wellington to H. Wellesley, 5 February 1814, US. WP.1/401.
39. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 25 March 1814, PRO. FO.72/160, pp. 12–13.
40. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 31 March 1814, PRO. FO.72/160, pp. 18–19.
41. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 19 April 1814, PRO. FO.72/160, pp. 26–30.
42. H. Wellesley to Castlereagh, 24 April 1814, PRO. FO.72/160, pp. 36–41; cf. also H. Wellesley to Wellington, 25 April 1814, US. WP.1/411.
43. H. Wellesley to Wellington, 15 May 1814, US. WP.1/415.
44. Toreno, *Historia*, p. 524.
45. Girón, *Recuerdos*, vol. II, pp. 12–13.
46. Esdaile, *Spanish Army*, pp. 168–75, 178–82.
47. Wellington to Eguía, 21 May 1814, US. WP.1/417.
48. Wellington to Liverpool, 9 May 1814, US. WP.1/417; cf. also Wellington to H. Wellesley, 14 May 1814, US. WP.1/417; Wellington to Castlereagh, 15 May 1814, US. WP.1/417.
49. Wellington to San Carlos, 21 May 1814, US. WP.1/417.
50. Wellington to Stuart, 25 May 1814, US. WP.1/417.
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